The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-Rate Doctrine for Third-Party Consultants by Beardslee, Michele DeStefano
SMU Law Review
Volume 62 | Issue 2 Article 12
2009
The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Third-
Rate Doctrine for Third-Party Consultants
Michele DeStefano Beardslee
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation








Due to the increasingly complex legal landscape, lawyers often rely on
information and guidance from non-lawyer consultants such as account-
ants, investment bankers, and public relations specialists to provide fully
informed legal advice to their corporate clients. Currently, however, there
is little agreement among federal courts on the appropriate standard to ana-
lyze the attorney-client privilege when lawyers' communications involve
third-party consultants. Moreover, at the margins, third-party attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine is both overly broad and overly narrow. The
narrow interpretation shields third-party communications in the rarest of
situations, for example, when the consultant is acting solely as an inter-
preter. The broadest interpretation protects communications whenever
they help the lawyer provide legal advice at the expense of the public's ac-
cess to information. Thus, the doctrine protects communications that even
those in favor of a robust corporate attorney-client privilege would not
approve and denies protection in the very contexts for which the doctrine
was created.
This Article examines when communications with third-party consulta-
tions should be protected. It is informed, in part, by some empirical re-
search the author conducted on attorneys' communications with external
public-relations consultants. It argues that exchanges between attorneys
and third-party consultants should be protected in certain circumstances.
As a means to achieve that protection, this Article recommends that the
attorney-client privilege protect these exchanges when there is a strong
nexus between the consultant's service and the legal advice provided to the
client. It proposes that the proponent show that communication with the
third party was necessary to provide legal advice or services. To guard
against the use of attorneys as shields for non-privileged communications
and to help the court determine that the primary purpose of the exchange
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was for legal (as opposed to business) advice, it proposes that courts also
take into account: (1) whether the lawyers were not skilled in the area in
which they sought expert assistance; (2) the way the communication was
conducted or distributed; (3) contemporaneous documentary support; and
(4) the substance of the law involved. Unlike the narrowest standard, this
multifactored nexus test embraces the role third-party consultation plays in
the provision of legal advice to large corporations. Unlike the broadest
standard, this test prevents the ease with which corporations can funnel
communications with third-party consultants that are unrelated to legal ser-
vices through their attorneys for protection. Further, these recommenda-
tions simplify the current doctrine and make it slightly more predictable.
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INTRODUCTION
A large publicly traded company releases an FDA approved drug
into the marketplace. One year later, it becomes apparent that the
drug is causing negative side effects in users. The Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) wants a recommendation from the General Counsel about
how best to limit legal liability and damage to the company's reputation.
The General Counsel meets with the company's outside litigator, the inter-
nal Director of Public Relations, and an external public-relations consult-
ant (the drug-recall crisis team) to strategize about if, when, and how the
drug should be pulled from the market or modified and what type of state-
ments the company can, should, or must make. They discuss the possible
impact various legal responses might have on the public and government
officials, the company's negotiation power, and the potential jury pool.
Having overseen the clinical trials conducted by external scientists, the
General Counsel shares the studies (which had previously been dissemi-
nated in the exact form to other members of the company) with the entire
drug-recall crisis team. The external public relations (PR) consultant takes
notes during the meeting.
As requested by the General Counsel, the external and internal PR con-
sultants prepare two documents. One analyzes the potential reaction by the
public and the government to various scenarios including pulling the drug,
modifying the drug, and admitting or denying knowledge. Another pro-
vides a recommendation on the best media response from a reputational
standpoint. These documents together suggest that quick action along with
contrition and admission is the best route. The General Counsel ultimately
recommends to the CEO that the company pull the drug from the market,
admit to knowing some of the adverse side effects, but explain that most
had been disclosed in the drug's FDA-approved labeling. The PR execu-
tives draft a proposed press release about the recall. The General Counsel
2009]
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and the outside attorneys look it over and make some suggested changes in
writing on the draft. The draft press release is revised and then issued.
After the company recalls the drug, its earnings are substantially below
original forecasts for that fiscal period. Consumers and stockholders file
separate class actions against the corporation.'
In general terms, this is a common scenario for large corporations to-
day. They rely on a multidisciplinary web of services to conduct business
in this increasingly complex, international marketplace.2 They routinely
utilize outside professional advisors such as accountants, investment
bankers, PR specialists, and other types of professional consultants. 3
Moreover, in order to provide fully informed, competent legal advice and
services to their corporate clients, inside and outside lawyers have to un-
derstand the business consequences. As a result, they often consult with
third-party professional consultants. 4 For example, a lawyer's advice to a
corporate client about compliance with SEC disclosure rules or the viabil-
ity of a possible restructuring may depend on information from a profes-
sional accountant about the company's financial situation or potential tax
implications. Similarly, a company may need the expertise of bankruptcy
liquidation consultants to manage the administration of a sale of a subsid-
iary. Or, as in the drug-recall scenario, a lawyer may need the expertise
of a PR consultant about the potential spin of a legal issue in order to
advise the client to settle or pursue a certain defense strategy.5 Thus, in
today's litigious, regulated, complicated world, lawyers sometimes have
to look outside the box to form legal opinions.
However, it is unclear which communications between lawyers, clients,
and third-party professional, strategic consultants, 6 if any, will be pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege or some other privilege doctrine.
For example, in the drug-recall hypothetical described at the beginning of
this Article, it is not clear if the attorney-client privilege will be consid-
ered waived because confidential client information was shared with the
external PR consultant. It is also unclear if the drug trials, the draft press
release, the notes taken by the external PR consultants, or the documents
1. This drug-recall hypothetical is loosely based on In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 1657-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2007).
2. John E. Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 464 (1982). See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part I.
4. Id.; see also In re Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc., 283 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 2002).
5. See infra note 36.
6. This Article focuses on professional, strategic business consultants, not other types
of professionals that refer to themselves as consultants such as IT consultants or other
types of third parties potentially covered by the attorney-client privilege doctrine (for ex-
ample, secretaries or family members). In this Article, public relations consultants are
used as one example of the many types of third-party consultants that lawyers rely on in
providing legal advice. In a separate article, attorneys' interactions with public relations
consultants are more thoroughly explored. See generally Michele DeStefano Beardslee,
Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion Part 1: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attor-
neys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol
3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1374595# [hereinafter Beardslee, Advocacy Part I].
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prepared for the General Counsel by the internal and external PR con-
sultant will be protected. This is because there is little agreement among
federal (and state) courts on the appropriate standard used to analyze the
attorney-client privilege when inside or outside attorneys communicate
with external third-party consultants generally. 7
Although the attorney-client privilege does not apply or is waived
when communications are exposed to third-party consultants, there are
two general exceptions. The attorney-client privilege can protect com-
munications between attorneys and third-party consultants when the
third party is: (1) the agent of the attorney or client; or (2) the "functional
equivalent" of the client's employees. With respect to the agency excep-
tion, two extreme approaches have emerged. Under the narrow ap-
proach, courts protect communications with third-party consultants when
the consultants merely translate client information. Under the broad ap-
proach, courts protect communications when the communications help
the lawyer provide legal advice. Courts have also taken a very broad
view of the functional equivalence exception, deeming external consul-
tants hired for a finite crisis (like the external PR consultant in the drug-
recall scenario) functional equivalents of the client's employees and pro-
tecting communications with them when they facilitate the provision of
legal advice.8 Further confusing matters is the interchangeability of the
standards. For example, a court majority might apply a narrow interpre-
tation of the agency exception while the dissent applies the functional
equivalents test.9
In addition to being unpredictable, the doctrine that provides excep-
tions for certain communications with third-party consultants is substan-
tively off base. The narrow approach to the agency exception is at odds
with the spirit of the doctrine and the reality of modern practice and, as a
practical matter, unsustainable. The broad approach denies the public
access to too much information and enables corporate misconduct. This
is also often true of the functional equivalents test. Given the way corpo-
rations operate and courts apply the test, the functional equivalence ex-
ception collapses into the broad approach. Thus, courts protect
communications that even those in favor of a robust corporate attor-
ney-client privilege would not approve and deny protection in the very
contexts for which the third-party doctrine was originally created.
7. See Part III.D; see also infra note 291. There are many questions regarding
whether the privilege applies to communications between lawyers and internal consultants
that rise and fall on the law-business distinction. See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., No. 1:98CV726, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4561, at *15-21 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3,
2001) (denying privilege protection to communications between attorneys and internal PR
consultants). Although controversial, these issues are outside the scope of this Article.
Therefore, when this Article refers to third-party or external consultants, it means special-
ists that are not technically client employees. Also, when this Article refers to lawyers, it
means inside and outside lawyers unless specifically identified. When it refers to general
counsels, it means general counsels of corporations, not law firms.
8. For further explanation, see infra Part II.
9. See infra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
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Despite its practical importance, little has been written about when the
attorney-client privilege protects, or should protect, third-party consulta-
tion in general. The scholarly literature that exists typically focuses on
lawyers' communications with non-testifying experts in the context of liti-
gation'0 and work-product protection, 1" or with a specific kind of expert
such as accountants or PR consultants.' 2 None of these camps grapple
with the entire scope of the doctrine. As a result, the doctrine's complex-
ity is often simplified.13 The focus of this Article, however, is broader. It
considers the issue as it relates to all third-party consultants, paying spe-
cial attention to those situations where work-product protection might
not apply.
When should communications between corporate lawyers and third-
party consultants be protected? Given the corporative propensity to out-
source and hire external consultants, should the attorney-client privilege
follow suit? The answer to these questions must assuage the obvious ten-
sion between the need for effective legal service and the harm caused by
misconduct that can occur within the zone of secrecy created by the privi-
10. See, e.g., Stanley D. Davis & Thomas D. Beisecker, Discovering Trial Consultant
Work Product: A New Way to Borrow an Adversary's Wits?, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 581
(1994) (analyzing when trial consultants are protected by attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine); Steven B. Hantler et al., Extending the Privilege to Litigation
Communications Specialists in the Age of Trial by Media, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 7
(2004) (analyzing attorney-client privilege and work-product protection for litigation com-
munication specialists hired for high profile corporate litigation); Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Non-Testifying Experts: Reestablishing
the Boundaries Between the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Protection, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (1990) (analyzing attorney-client privilege and work product protection
in the context of litigation and non-testifying experts).
11. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 48-49; see also infra notes 152-69 and accompany-
ing text.
12. See, e.g., Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client-Should The
Attorney-Client Privilege Extend to Communications With Public Relations Consultants?,
55 SYRACUSE L. REv. 545 (2005) (focusing on public relations consultants); Douglas R.
Richmond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the
Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 381, 396-406 (2005) (focusing in part on auditors
and PR specialists); Teena-Ann V. Sankoorikal et al., Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine: Potential Pitfalls of Disclosure to Public Relations Firms, 786 PLI/LIT
271 (2008) (focusing on PR relations firms but also providing a brief overview of the doc-
trine as it relates to third-party consultants generally); Deniza Gertsberg, Comment,
Should Public Relations Experts Ever Be Privileged Persons?, 31 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 1443
(2004) (focusing on public-relations consultants in the criminal law context); Kim J.
Gruetzmacher, Comment, Privileged Communications with Accountants: The Demise of
United States v. Kovel, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 977 (2003) (focusing on accountants). Scholar-
ship on how the doctrine applies to specific situations or consultants is valuable. Indeed, in
a forthcoming article I focus on how lawyers manage public relations for corporate clients
and work with PR consultants. See Beardslee, Advocacy Part I, supra note 6, at 22-34.
Further, I utilize some of the findings from an empirical study related to this topic to ex-
plore issues in this article. See infra notes 25-26, 34 and accompanying text. My point,
however, is that when making recommendations concerning the scope of the corporate
attorney-client privilege with respect to specific kinds of external consultants, scholars
often do not analyze the impact such recommendations will have on communications with
other types of third-party consultants.
13. Jonathan M. Linas, Make Me Well-Linked: In re Grand Jury and the Extension of
the Attorney-Client Privilege to Public Relations Consultants in High Profile Criminal
Cases, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 397, 407 (2005).
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lege.14 When applied too broadly, the corporate attorney-client privilege
enables corporations to run projects "through" lawyers to cover up dam-
aging information that might otherwise be discoverable. In the recent
tobacco litigation, courts discovered that attorneys purposefully oversaw
studies conducted by external scientists on the addictiveness of tobacco to
cloak the results with the attorney-client privilege. 15 This cloak allowed
the companies to withhold information about the harms caused by smok-
ing that otherwise would have informed public policy on tobacco market-
ing and sales. Thus, on the one hand, protecting the free flow of
information between attorneys and external consultants can be at odds
with our system's cooperative discovery rules. 16 This is precisely why the
attorney-client privilege, perhaps the most robust of privileges, is gener-
14. See, e.g., First Chi. Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(explaining that a standard that "strike[s] a balance between encouraging corporations to
seek legal advice and preventing corporate attorneys from being used as shields to thwart
discovery" will likely do more good than harm). The answers to these questions also, to a
degree, require bracketing the dispute over whether the attorney-client privilege should be
applied to corporations. The risks and benefits of applying the attorney-client privilege to
corporations can be (and have been) debated. See, e.g., Vincent C. Alexander, The Corpo-
rate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 191, 222-
28 (1989) (outlining the debate); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHI-
CAL STUDY 206-34 (1988) (providing reasons why the privilege should not be applied to
corporations); Sexton, supra note 2, at 464-68 (identifying risks and benefits of a corporate
attorney-client privilege). However, this Article assumes that the attorney-client privilege
should be applied to corporations as the Supreme Court has consistently held. Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981) (citing United States v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. 236 U.S. 318 (1915)); see also Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U.
L. REV. 59, 81 (2002) ("[T]he privilege-including the corporate privilege-is here to stay
in one form or another .. "). This assumption, however, does not totally dispense with the
dispute because the justifications for and against having a corporate attorney-client privi-
lege are relevant to deciding how and when third-party communications should be cov-
ered. See infra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
15. Ido Baum, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Who Represents the Corporation?,
3 REV. L. & ECON., 62, 64 (2007) ("Tobacco corporations structured research activities
through the external attorneys in order to secure the privilege, which applied also to com-
munications between lawyers and third-party professionals."); Bruce A. Green, Thoughts
About Corporate Lawyers After Reading the Cigarette Papers: Has the "Wise Counselor"
Given Way to the "Hired Gun"?, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 407, 409 (2001) (same); Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 931, 938 (2002) ("Allegations have been lodged, for instance, that tobacco lawyers
arranged to have research on the health effects of smoking conducted under their aegis, in
order to invoke the attorney-client privilege to prevent disclosure .... ); Gertsberg, supra
note 12, at 1455 (explaining that the privilege was used to cover up damaging studies con-
ducted by tobacco companies); Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and
Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1811, 1844 n.184 (1995)
(same). See, e.g., United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 28 (D.D.C.
2006) (disparaging in-house and outside lawyers for "[taking] shelter behind baseless asser-
tions of the attorney client privilege" as it relates to use of both inside and outside special-
ists); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 200 F.R.D. 661, 678 (D. Kan. 2001) (denying
protection to documents created by external tobacco committee); Liggett Group Inc. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 209-11 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (denying
protection to communications with external marketing consultant).
16. Then again, many rules are at odds with the traditional adversarial system, such as
those dictating judicial management of cases, pretrial settlement conferences, or a limited
number of preemptory challenges.
2009]
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ally strictly construed. 17 On the other hand, when applied too narrowly,
attorneys may not seek the help they need to provide competent legal
advice and assist their clients in complying with the law.18 As Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 emphasizes, when determining the best
legal course of action, attorneys may need to "refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors,
that may be relevant to the client's situation."'19 In the drug-recall scena-
rio, for example, absent any possibility of privilege protection, the lawyer
might not have sought advice from the external PR executive, and the
company may have not recalled the drug as quickly or admitted knowl-
edge of certain side effects. 20 The failure to take these actions could
have negatively affected the legal strategies, judicial or juror opinions, or
the corporation's bargaining power.
This Article contends, therefore, that exchanges between attorneys and
third-party consultants should be protected under certain circumstances.
It recommends revising the attorney-client privilege doctrine so that
there is one standard based on the agency approach. Specifically, this
Article argues that there should be a strong nexus between the consult-
ant's service and the legal advice or services ultimately provided to the
client. As a few federal courts have mandated, 21 the proponent must
demonstrate not that the consultation simply helped the attorney but
rather that it was necessary to the legal service actually provided. Some
courts have attempted to apply a nexus test along these lines,22 but they
have not been very effective because this standard alone is too abstract to
be predictable. To help determine whether the communication was for
business as opposed to legal advice and whether the services provided by
the attorney were essential and legal in nature (and not an attempt to
shelter otherwise non-privileged information) courts should also consider
four factors: (1) whether the lawyers were not skilled in the area in which
they sought expert assistance; (2) the way the communication was con-
ducted or distributed; (3) the existence of contemporaneous documentary
or formal support for interpreting the facts surrounding the contested
documents in the proponent's favor; and (4) the substance of the law
involved.23
Although still subject to interpretation which might produce varying
results, this standard will generate better reasoned decision-making be-
17. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
18. See infra Part ll.D. (explaining why the work-product doctrine does not necessa-
rily provide protection to communications between attorneys and third-party consultants).
19. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 2.1 (2002); see also infra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 92.
22. Id.; see also infra note 298.
23. Obviously, the other parameters of the attorney-client privilege still apply.
Namely, protection would only be afforded to those communications that are legal advice
or based on or directly or indirectly reveal client confidences. See infra notes 68-69 and
accompanying text.
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cause it requires litigants and courts to spell out the connection between
the consultation and the legal service with a rigor currently absent from
the analysis. Moreover, as opposed to the current doctrine, it will protect
lawyers' communications with third-party consultants when necessary,
without creating an enormous asylum for malfeasant corporations. It also
will enable informed decision-making and compliance. Further, elucidat-
ing one uniform test improves consistency and predictability to some ex-
tent. Finally, the analysis and the recommendations may also enhance
the application of the attorney-client privilege in other contexts. 24
Granted, some may disagree with the exact recommendations in this
Article, and there may be alternate solutions to the problems it identifies.
At a minimum, however, the Article highlights the importance of a dis-
cussion around the appropriate scope of the attorney-client privilege in
the third-party consultant context. Moreover, this Article attempts to de-
fine a set of first principles that should be considered when developing
any solution.
The analysis is informed, in part, by a recent study I conducted on the
intersection of PR and corporate legal controversies [hereinafter PR
Study]. The study consisted of: (1) fifty-seven interviews of general coun-
sels of S&P 500 companies, outside lawyers, and PR executives; and, (2) a
survey sent to all general counsels of the S&P 500 that elicited a twenty-
eight percent response rate. 25 Findings from this study are relevant to a
degree because the study explores attorneys' use of one type of third-
party consultant, specifically external PR consultants. 26 Part I of this Ar-
ticle explains why third-party consultation is integral to the provision of
legal advice in the corporate context. Then Part II provides an overview
of the corporate attorney-client privilege and examines how courts apply
it to communications between attorneys and third-party consultants. It
24. Although this Article focuses on federal case law, the analysis and recommenda-
tions are also applicable to states. See infra notes 289, 291. Further, this Article focuses on
cases involving corporations, but occasionally non-corporate cases will be addressed.
Lastly, the recommendations apply equally to individuals. Indeed, there have been cases
addressing the attorney-client privilege and use of third-party consultants by attorneys
representing individuals. See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972)
(holding that privilege extended to communications with accountant by attorney represent-
ing two individual clients); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to
(A) Grand Jury Witness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (protecting communications with external PR consultant by attorney rep-
resenting Martha Stewart).
25. For more information, see infra note 34.
26. That being said, the inferences that can be made from this study are limited be-
cause the study: (1) only concerns one type of third-party consultant; (2) was not, nor was
it intended to be, random or statistically representative of all large, publicly-traded compa-
nies that have high demand for legal services; and (3) suffers from bias since most partici-
pants are members of the corporate bar or corporate executives with a vested interest in
the privilege. Although more research should be done (especially with other non-lawyer
corporate executives), the goal of the study was primarily to explore the perspectives of
general counsels servicing large, publicly-traded corporations regarding the way the court
of public opinion impacts corporate legal controversies and is managed today. Thus, I use




also addresses the complexity involved in making the law-business dis-
tinction in this context and the role of the work-product doctrine. Part
III delineates a set of criteria by which third-party attorney-client privi-
lege doctrine should be judged. Based on these criteria, it concludes that
the current application of the doctrine is too narrow, too broad, or not
effective. Part IV proposes one possible solution.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIRD-PARTY CONSULTATION TO
THE PROVISION OF LEGAL ADVICE
Although it is relevant to individuals, the doctrine that applies protec-
tion to communications between lawyers and third-party consultants is
especially salient for lawyers servicing large corporate clients who face a
wide range of legal challenges across multiple jurisdictions. 27 Given to-
day's highly regulated, litigious, publicized, and complex marketplace,
corporations often rely on consultants from various disciplines to help
make business and legal decisions.28 According to Professor Robert Eli
Rosen, "[t]his is the age of consultants. ' '29 As corporations have down-
sized and organized around self-managing project teams, they have hired
external consultants to be part of those teams. 30 These teams (consisting
27. Sexton, supra note 2, at 464. Attorneys representing individuals, such as Roger
Clemens, also sometimes need to consult with third-party professionals. See infra note 197;
see supra note 24 (listing cases that address the use of third-party consultants by attorneys
representing individuals). However, the issues addressed in this Article may arise more
frequently for corporate clients. The landscape becomes even more complex for corpora-
tions operating in a global context given that in-house counsel communications are not
privileged in some countries outside the United States. Nina Goswami, Revealed: Akzo
Nobel Threat to Global Firms, LAWYER, Feb. 18. 2008, available at http://www.thelawyer.
com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=131249&h=pnhpr&f=pnfpr.
28. Theodore Eisenberg, Introduction to RISK BEHAVIOR AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN
BUSINESS LIFE 257 (Bo Green ed., 2000) (explaining there is a "need for a multidisciplinary
approach to risk research in business life"); 1 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATrORNEY CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 269 (5th ed. 2007) ("[C]orporations
increasingly conduct their business not merely through regular employees but also through
a variety of independent contractors retained for specific purposes."); Robert Eli Rosen,
"We're All Consultants Now": How Change in Client Organizational Strategies Influences
Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637, 659 (2002);
BusinessTown.com, Hot Growth Areas for Consultants, http://www.businesstown.com/con-
sulting/article3.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2009) (projecting use of independent consultants is
rising "to compensate for the knowledge gap" because large corporations are downsizing
and reengineering). The movement in early 2000 to allow law firms to form multidiscipli-
nary partnerships was based on corporate clients' need for a mix of independent consulting
services. See RHONDA ABRAMS, THE SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS PLAN: SECRETS AND STRATE-
GIES 196 (4th ed. 2003) (recommending corporations hire independent management con-
sultants, accountants, marketing consultants, and designers to help fill gaps).
29. Rosen, supra note 28, at 648 (analyzing organizational development in corpora-
tions and how law firms are reorganizing to serve company teams).
30. Id. at 642-648; id. at 647 ("[T]he organizational strategies of downsizing and out-
sourcing link corporate demand and the supply offered by consulting firms."); id. at 648
(explaining that outside consultants do not replace inside consultants but instead comple-
ment each other); see also Michele D. Beardslee, If Multidisciplinary Partnerships Are In-
troduced into the United States, What Could or Should Be the Role of General Counsel?, 9
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 36 (2003) ("When we have a particular matter we always
form [a multidisciplinary partnership] team and work together to solve a problem.") (quot-
ing a general counsel interviewee from a different study than the PR Study) [hereinafter
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of internal employee professionals and external consultants) work col-
laboratively on projects.31
In turn, third-party consultants often have information essential to the
attorney's provision of legal advice. 32 For example, given the impact the
court of public opinion has on what charges are brought, whether a case
will be filed or even goes to trial, the parties' negotiation power, and the
legal strategies, corporate lawyers sometimes need help from external PR
experts. 33 As part of the PR Study, I conducted fifty-seven qualitative
interviews with general counsels of the S&P 500, law firm partners, and
PR executives. I also sent a survey to all general counsels in the S&P 500.
34 Of the twenty-eight percent that responded to the survey, ninety-eight
percent claimed they dealt with a high-profile legal issue one or more
times in the past three years, and fifty-three percent hired an external PR
Beardslee, Multidisciplinary Partnerships]. Cf Mary C. Daly, What the MDP Debate Can
Teach Us About Law Practice in the New Millennium and the Need for Curricular Reform,
50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 521, 533 (2000) ("A common feature of in-house lawyering is "team-
ing": lawyers join with nonlawyer employees who have expertise in other disciplines to
arrive at an integrated solution to a problem that has nonlegal as well as legal aspects to
it.... Some business problems are simply too big and too complex to be solved by in-house
teams of lawyer and nonlawyer employees. Outside advice is needed."); Robert Nelson &
Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside
Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & Soc'y REV. 457, 488 (2000) (explaining that
"corporate management turned from relying on fixed institutional arrangements for con-
ducting business to frequently reorganized, project based teams").
31. Rosen, supra note 28, at 647 (explaining that corporations have porous borders
and that outsourcing includes not only hiring workers "on a contingent basis, with fewer
benefits" but also hiring external specialists like engineers, accountants, and even outside
counsel); Interview with General Counsel #31, at 16 (Sept 24, 2007) (on file with author)
("[YJou get together with your CEO, CFO, your general counsel, your outside counsel and
your PR guy and you go through everything and get everyone's input on the documents
and strategy and you get your outside PR firm too."). Research on collaboration and deci-
sions by teams indicate that this approach is effective. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder & John
Morgan, Are Two Heads Better Than One?: An Experimental Analysis of Group vs. Indi-
vidual Decisionmaking, 47 (NBER Working Paper No. 7909, 2000), available at http://www.
nber.org/papers/w7909.pdf (finding that group decisions are not slower and are superior to
individual decisions).
32. Cf In re Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc., 283 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. M.D. Ga.
2002). Rosen, supra note 28, at 654 ("Legal work ... requires obtaining 'input from the
[whole] team."' (quoting JOHN E. TRIANTIS, CREATING SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION AND
JOINT VENTURE PROJECTS: A PROCESS AND TEAM APPROACH 142 (1999))).
33. See Gertsberg, supra note 12, at 1462-65; cf. Hantler et al., supra note 10, at 8-10
(explaining that media affects settlement options, motions and juries; and "public relations
can be a necessary element in litigating a case"); but see Linas, supra note 13, at 424 (argu-
ing that media influence on prosecutorial discretion "is unsubstantiated, speculative, and
hardly a valid reason to extend the privilege to public relations experts"). One interviewee
explained that he may want to vet a letter written to the other side with a PR consultant
before sending it to find out how the letter will be viewed by the public if the other side
publishes it. Interview with Law Firm Partner #55, at 5 (Apr. 17, 2008) (on file with
author).
34. This study was conducted as part of a larger research project funded by Harvard
Law School's Program on the Legal Profession. I was the Associate Research Director of
the Center and the lead researcher on the project. For a full description of the research




agency in the last three years to deal with a high-profile legal issue.35 The
preliminary findings from the interviews were consistent with the study.
Moreover, they suggest that, as in the drug-recall scenario, in order to
advise clients, general counsels meet with external PR consultants to dis-
cuss press releases, disclosure obligations, and the effect potential legal
strategies might have in the media and on governmental agency regula-
tors, stockholders, judges, potential juries, etc. 36 Many of the interview-
ees in the PR Study described the impact of PR on legal controversies as
follows:
[J]udges pay attention to the public relations effects of what they do
. ... I mean judges read newspapers, even the best judges aren't
completely immune from the PR effects of the case. Certainly juries
are not.., even if they have been cautioned not to read the newspa-
pers. So it's very important, and, take a proxy fight . . . how the
shareholders perceive the combatants is the whole battle ... [and if it
is a] regulatory issue,... the SEC is now part of your audience. 37
In order to provide a meaningful overview of the PR implications to the
attorney (so the attorney can provide informed legal advice to the client),
the PR consultants often have to know the confidential details surround-
ing the legal issues.38 As one general counsel participant explained,
35. Sixty percent of survey respondents reported dealing with a high profile legal mat-
ter many times in the past three years. Twenty-seven percent claimed a few times. Eleven
percent said once or twice. Two percent said never. For more information on the use of
PR consultants see generally Beardslee, Advocacy Part I, supra note 6.
36. Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (ex-
plaining that PR consultants need to understand legal strategies to provide PR advice and
PR advice influences attorneys' strategic and tactical legal decisions). This is not to imply
that lawyers build legal strategies around the media strategy, but simply that media impact
is a consideration when providing legal advice. For example, a lawyer might want to meet
with an external PR consultant if representing a private bank facing significant regulatory
sanctions for money laundering. The company has to appear appropriately chastened
before the regulators but also reassure the customers. A PR consultant can help the attor-
neys understand how certain statements might be construed and how to reach the right
balance to prevent additional charges or cases against the company while still protecting
defenses. See, e.g., Interview with General Counsel #3, at 6 (Feb. 25, 2008) (on file with
author). As one general counsel interviewee explained: A dialogue with the PR executive
might lead to a lawyer recommending that "it's not worth it to confront a regulator pub-
licly even when [he] think[s] [the regulator] is wrong" and he "was right on the narrow
issue" because "it might be detrimental to [the] company's long-term dealings with them."
Interview with General Counsel #22, at 5 (Feb. 11, 2008) (on file with author).
37. Cf. Interview with Law Firm Partner #55, supra note 33, at 14; see also Interview
with Law Firm Partner #49, at 7-8 (Apr. 7, 2008) (on file with author) (explaining that
juries are not as important as judges, shareholders, arbitragers, and market professionals
because they often do not read the financial part of the paper).
38. Some scholars assert that "[a] client need not divulge incriminating information in
order to receive effective media advice." Murphy, supra note 12, at 587. However, the
qualitative interviews in the PR Study suggest the opposite. See infra note 194. Other
scholars have made similar contentions. Gertsberg, supra note 12, at 1476 ("There is sim-
ply no practical way for meaningful discussions to occur if the lawyer is unable to inform
the public relations expert of nonpublic facts, as well as the lawyer's defense strategies and
tactics."); Hantler et al., supra note 10, at 23. That being said, many of the lawyer-inter-
viewees are careful about sharing information that could destroy their case such as their
opinion on the client's chance of winning. But when it comes to less major confidential
information, many take their chances because they believe they have a good argument
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"there nonetheless are situations where you, in order to be fair to [PR
consultants] and for them to give you good advice about what they think
the media's perspective on things might be, you are going to have to
share some confidential information with them."' 39 Moreover, the PR
consultants need guidance from attorneys on how to position legal con-
troversies and other types of disclosures to the public in a way that com-
ports with the law, does not instigate potential lawsuits,40 and is
synergistic with the legal strategy. As one law firm partner interviewee
commented, "more detailed briefing can help [the PR executives] under-
stand the approach of the lawyer and the client so everyone is more likely
to be on the same page." 41 To be sure, a message in the court of public
opinion that is different than the message in the court of law can create
inconsistencies that are fatal,42 instill mistrust, or even anger the public at
large.43
A need for expert consultation is not limited to the PR context.44 Law-
against waiver. See, e.g., Interview with Law Firm Partner #55, supra note 33, at 18; see
also supra notes 280-282 and accompanying text.
39. Interview with General Counsel #11, at 6 (Mar. 26, 2008) (on file with author)
(explaining that the amount of information that has to be shared with the communications
people may be a bit limited because media stories do not get written at the level of intense
detail).
40. Peter J. Gardner, Media at the Gates: Panic! Stress! Ethics?, VT. B.J., Sept. 27,
2001, at 39; Hantler et al., supra note 10, at 22-23; Beth A. Wilkinson & Steven H. Schul-
man, When Talk Is Not Cheap: Communications with the Media, the Government and Other
Parties in High Profile White Collar Criminal Cases, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 203, 204 (2002).
41. Interview with Law Firm Partner #53, at 2 (Apr. 10, 2008) (on file with author).
42. For example, if a client is being sued for violation of antitrust laws, the lawyer will
likely try to demonstrate that the client is not a monopolist. The PR strategy for the corpo-
ration, however, might be to emphasize that the client is the dominant market participant.
Christopher P. Bogart & Robert D. Joffe, High-Profile Litigation, Objectives Concerns and
Preliminary Considerations, in 4 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND
OUTSIDE COUNSEL § 67:2 (Robert L. Haid ed., 2009) (discussing the "strong need to coor-
dinate the client's litigation strategy and the client's on-going business strategies, share-
holder/investor relations, and public relations").
43. Michael Dore & Rosemary Ramsay, Dealing with Public Relations Concerns in
Products Liability and Toxic Tort Litigation, N.J. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 56 ("Finally, all public
disclosures must be coordinated. When clients, counsel, experts, and other persons in the
disclosure process convey different information (or even the same information at very dif-
ferent times) media mistrust and public uncertainty and/or anger inevitably increases.");
Interview with Law Firm Partner #59, at 5 (Apr. 29, 2008) (on file with author) ("If a
reporter decides that they do not believe your defense or that you are not being candid...
you are hiding something ... it creates even more of a story in and of itself. So you've got
to be especially careful of this.").
44. For example, many scholars contend that attorneys need to consult with account-
ants to provide competent legal advice about complex financial transactions. See, e.g.,
Gruetzmacher, supra note 12, at 977; Carl Pacini, Pamella Seay & Raymond Placid, Ac-
countants, Attorney-Client Privilege, and the Kovel Rule: Waiver Through Inadvertent Dis-
closure Via Electronic Communication, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L., 893, 893 (2003). Although
twenty-five state courts recognize an accountant-client privilege, federal courts do not. Id.
at 894 n.3. That said, the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,
enacted in 2000, grants tax payers (in federal forums) something similar to the common
law attorney-client privilege. See generally Alicia K. Corcoran, Note, The Accountant-
Client Privilege: A Prescription for Confidentiality or Just a Placebo?, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV.
697, 698 (2000). However, because it has severe limitations and its scope is very uncertain,




yers may need advice from various external consultants in many different
types of situations to provide complete legal advice.45 For example, when
an investment banking company approaches a large corporation about an
investment to produce capital losses to offset gains from a recent transac-
tion, the corporation's general counsel may need to talk with the invest-
ment banking consultant about the proposal and its potential tax
consequences based on the corporation's goals, history, and confidential
financial situation. 46 In addition, presuming the general counsel is not a
tax expert, he or she may need to discuss the structure and purpose of the
transaction and the potential tax consequences with a tax consultant. It is
not until after these conversations take place that the general counsel can
provide a recommendation on the risks and legality of the investment
proposal. A similar need to resort to third-party consultation exists when
a corporation considers a restructuring that may lead to a significant tax
refund. 47
As Professor Rosen points out, "[llegal risks not only must be assessed,
but also processed because legal risks often are not detached risks." 48
For example, attorneys need to understand the business risks in order to
understand a company's insolvency risks and, therefore, must work with
accounting and finance experts. 49 As a general counsel interviewee of a
large pharmaceutical company explained:
[I]n the world there is now a convergence of discipline, not just legal
and public affairs. People who are actually able to manage compli-
cated situations have to be able to look at it from multiple perspec-
tives. There are no more pure finance questions. There are no more
pure marketing questions. There are no more pure policy questions
or legal questions or HR questions. They are all multidisciplinary. 50
45. Gregory Sisk & Pamela J. Abbate, The Dynamic Attorney-Client Privilege, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 7, on file with author) (explain-
ing that a real estate transaction may involve questions related to engineering, environ-
mental science, tax, zoning, finance, insurance, and liability), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1261015.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1999). Or a lawyer
might hire an environmental consultant to help with an environmental audit and assess
whether the corporation has complied with environmental laws. Sisk & Abbate, supra
note 45, at 13-14 (describing this example).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Adlman (Aldman 1), 68 F.3d 1495, 1497 (2d Cir. 1995).
48. Daly, supra note 30, at 521-522 (" '[Legal' advice is rarely just that. The complex-
ity of modern society increasingly creates a superabundance of problems in which it is
virtually impossible to separate the legal component from components more traditionally
associated with other disciplines ...."); Rosen, supra note 28, at 659; Sisk & Abbate, supra
note 45, at 11 ("[T]he lawyer must ... know the client's business and offer business-rele-
vant advice if legal counsel is to have any practical value.").
49. Rosen, supra note 28, at 659; cf id. at 670 ("Teams are multidisciplinary, so the
lawyers meet as equals with, for example, engineers and accountants."); Mary C. Daly,
Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from
Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 281 (2000)
("The needs of clients are increasingly difficult to pigeonhole as 'legal,' 'accounting,' 'finan-
cial planning,' 'environmental planning,' etc. And the boundaries between the law and
other disciplines are blurring."); see also infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
50. Interview with General Counsel #42, at 23 (Oct. 1, 2007) (on file with author).
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Accordingly, consultation with various third-party specialists is some-
times essential to the provision of legal advice.
In U.S. v. Kovel, the attorney-client privilege was extended to commu-
nications with a third-party consultant for just this reason 5 1-because
"the complexities of modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively
handling clients' affairs without the help of others. '52 Since this case was
decided in 1961, there has been dramatic growth in the number of cases
filed each year, dollars spent on litigation,53 amount of regulation, 54 num-
ber of government agencies, 55 complexity of corporate laws,56 and num-
ber of media outlets. 57
As far back as 1950, courts believed it was the lawyer's "duty" to con-
sider "relevant social, economic, political and philosophical considera-
tions" when providing legal advice. 58 Consistent with that, today's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct urge lawyers to consider non-legal factors,
consult with non-legal professionals, and guide the client when outside
experts' recommendations conflict. 59 Attorneys are, therefore, in an
51. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961); see supra notes 74-76 and
accompanying text; Emily Jones, Note and Comment, Keeping Client Confidences: Attor-
ney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Light of United States v. Adlman, 18
PACE L. REV. 419, 423 (1998).
52. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also, Jones,
supra note 51, at 423.
53. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2005); Neal Ellis, Saving the Jury Trial, BRIEF, Summer 2005, at
15. But see Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explo-
sion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day In Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 994-95 (2003) (arguing that there has not been a
litigation explosion).
54. For example, in 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission introduced the Fair
Disclosure Regulation of 2001 (Regulation FD) that "prohibits executives from feeding
market-moving information to select individuals." Stephen Barr, The FD Effect-Fair Dis-
closure Regulation on Corporations, CFO, April 1, 2001, available at http://www.cfo.com/
article.cfm/299289?f=search. See infra notes 203-207 and accompanying text. Also, the
Sarbanes Oxley Act was enacted in 2002. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745); Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1721, 1756 (2004) ("[T]he pace of regulatory development is increasing.").
55. Even non-government organizations like Public Citizen focus attention on corpo-
rations and consumer protection.
56. Dennis R. Lassila & L. Murphy Smith, Tax Complexity and Compliance Costs of
U.S. Multinational Corporations, in 10 ADVANCES IN INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 207,
207 (T.S. Doupnik ed., 1997), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=247726 (explaining that
U.S. tax laws have become increasingly complex).
57. Kathleen F. Brickey, From Boardroom to Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media
and the Corporate Governance Scandals, 33 J. CORP. L. 625, 636 (2008) (describing media
outlets that are "instrumental in orchestrating the public relations wars"); cf. Robert
Schmuhl, Government Accountability and External Watchdogs, ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY,
Aug. 2000, at 21, 24 http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdfl(e)/ijde0800.pdf (last visited on Feb. 13,
2008) (describing "the new information environment" as it relates to the government and
press).
58. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950);
cf. Murphy, supra note 12, at 589 ("One could even argue that it is an attorney's ethical
obligation to attempt to influence public opinion.").
59. Rule 2.1 states that attorneys "may refer not only to law but to other considera-
tions such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the
client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002). However, the com-
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awkward position. On the one hand, adequate legal representation can-
not be provided without sometimes candidly consulting with third-party
consultants, but on the other, this divulgence may not be protected. One
interviewee aptly summed up the conflict with respect to PR consultants:
"In hindsight, maybe the PR people should have been more in the loop,
but then you have privilege issues right? And, so it's you are damned if
you do it and damned if you don't. '60
II. THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AND THIRD-PARTY CONSULTANTS
A. THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In Upjohn Co. v. United States, 61 the Supreme Court resolved the con-
flict among federal circuits about which employees personify the corpo-
rate entity so that their communications with corporate counsel can be
considered attorney-client communications. 62 The Court adopted a case-
by-case approach that in practice has resulted in an expansive rule em-
phasizing the importance of the flow of information between corporate
employees and attorneys for sound legal advice. 63 It justified broad pro-
ments explain that "[p]urely technical advice ... can sometimes be inadequate.... Where
consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer
would recommend, the lawyer should make such recommendation. At the same time, a
lawyer's advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of
conflicting recommendations of experts." Id. at R. 2.1 cmts. (2), (4). Further, some legal
scholars have argued that Model Rule 2.1 obligates attorneys to advise clients on non-legal,
related issues. See, e.g., Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, More Than Lawyers: The Legal and
Ethical Implications of Counseling Clients on Nonlegal Considerations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 365, 366-67 (2005).
60. Interview with Law Firm Partner #40, at 8 (Aug. 22, 2007) (on file with author)
(referring to consultation with third-party PR expert).
61. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
62. Id. at 386. Before this landmark decision, courts applied one of two standards to
corporations. The narrow "control group" test (applied by a majority of federal courts)
limited attorney-client privilege to communications with employees that could control cor-
porate decisions based on the attorney's advice. Sexton, supra note 2, at 451. See also City
of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485-86 (E.D. Pa. 1962)
(describing control test). The broader "subject matter" test (applied by a minority of fed-
eral courts) protected communications by employees when the subject matter concerned
the employees' employment duties. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d
487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) (rejecting the control group test); Sexton, supra note 2, at 453.
For a clear history of these tests, see Sexton, supra note 2, at 449-56.
63. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-93; cf. Sexton, supra note 2, at 502. Upjohn rejected the
control group test and neither accepted nor rejected the subject matter test. Upjohn, 449
U.S. at 392-93. Some claim the Court, in rejecting the control group test, embraced the
subject matter test. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 15, at 62, 64; Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Recon-
sidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response to the Compelled-Voluntary
Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 897, 932 (2006) ("Although the Court declined to set
forth a bright-line test, its recognition of the privilege here suggests receptivity to the [sub-
ject matter] approach."). However, the subject matter test was never addressed and the
Court expressly refused to adopt any specific test. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386; id. at 402
(Burger, J., concurring) (asserting that the Court should articulate a standard); see also,
Sexton, supra note 2, at 458-59, 462; Bufkin Alyse King, Commentary, Preserving the At-
torney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Environment, 53 ALA. L. REV. 621, 631 (2002)
("[Upjohn] did not adopt the subject matter test."). State courts still apply both the subject
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tection on the grounds that lawyers need to be able to communicate
freely with corporate employees in order to carry out their professional
obligations and guide corporate clients to legal compliance. 64 Thus, the
Court considered only whether: (1) the information helped the attorney
provide legal advice; (2) the communications related to the employees'
corporate duties; (3) the "employees were sufficiently aware that they
were being questioned; '65 and, (4) the communications were considered
and kept "highly confidential." 66 Therefore, Upjohn provides protection
to a very broad group of corporate employees. 67 If the company is con-
ducting an internal investigation, all the communications with the em-
ployees will be covered if the lawyer eventually provides legal advice to
the client because these communications, arguably, helped the attorney
do so. Although this rule is broad, other limits on the attorney-client
privilege still apply. Communications from attorney to client are only
covered when they constitute legal advice or are based on or might dis-
close confidential client information. 68 Further, while neither client nor
attorney can be compelled to disclose communications, the client may be
matter and control test and "everything in between." Brown, supra at 934 (commenting on
the problems this lack of uniformity poses for national corporations).
64. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-92. Many agree that Upjohn provides very broad protec-
tion. See e.g., Chambliss, supra note 54, at 1726 ("[T]he Supreme Court [in Upjohn] has
endorsed broad protection of the corporate privilege .... ); King, supra note 63, at 632;
Brian E. Hamilton, Note, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate At-
torney-Client Privilege, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 632-33 (1997).
65. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95 (emphasizing that the conversations with the employ-
ees helped the lawyers "to be in a position to give legal advice to the company with respect
to the payments") (internal quotations omitted).
66. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395. Some courts interpret this to be a "need to know" stan-
dard. See, e.g., FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Wrench
LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 212 F.R.D. 514, 517-18 (W.D. Mich. 2002); Sexton, supra note 2, at
503.
67. Hamilton, supra note 64, at 629-30 (characterizing the Upjohn decision as provid-
ing protection to "a much wider range of employees than would have been protected under
the alternative 'control group' standard"); see also supra note 64.
68. The attorney-client privilege "shields communications from the lawyer to the cli-
ent only to the extent that these are based on, or may disclose, confidential information
provided by the client or contain advice or opinions of the attorney." United States v.
Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1048 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626, 635 (7th
Cir. 1990) (privileging communication from attorney to client as long as it is legal advice or
indirectly or directly reveals confidential information); In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[A]dvice prompted by the client's disclosures may be further and in-
separably informed by other knowledge and encounters .... [T]he privilege cloaks a com-
munication from attorney to client based, in part at least, upon a confidential
communication to the lawyer from the client." (internal annotations omitted)); United
States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1268 n.12 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Chevron Tex-
aco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("[I]t is widely accepted that the
privilege encompasses not only (qualifying) communications from the client to her attorney
but also communications from the attorney to her client in the course of providing legal
advice."); Rattner v. Netburn, No. 88-Civ-2080, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *9-10
(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989) (noting that courts generally concur that protection extends to
legal advice from attorney if it might reveal confidential client communication). Some
courts have a narrower view and only apply protection if confidential information is actu-
ally disclosed. United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106, 122 (2d Cir. 1970) ("A communi-
cation from an attorney is ... privileged ... if it has the effect of revealing a confidential
communication from the client to the attorney."). For an overview of federal cases apply-
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obligated to reveal underlying facts. 69
B. THIRD-PARTY ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE DOCTRINE
Generally, the privilege does not apply or is considered waived when
the client voluntarily discloses an otherwise confidential, privileged com-
munication to a third party.70 The rationale is that if clients are willing to
divulge information to third parties, they would likely divulge it to their
attorneys, even if no privilege applies. 71 Thus, a primary justification for
the privilege-to promote the free flow of information between client
and attorney-disappears. 72
There are, however, two general exceptions. 73 Communications be-
tween attorneys, clients, and third parties can be protected when: (1) the
third party is the agent of the attorney or client (agency theory); or (2)
the third party is the functional equivalent of the client's employees (the
functional equivalents test).
1. Third Party as Agent
The agency theory stems from United States v. Kovel, decided in 1961.74
There, the Second Circuit applied the attorney-client privilege to com-
munications between the lawyer, client, and an accountant employed by a
law firm.75 It analogized the accountant to an interpreter translating a
foreign language. It reasoned that attorneys sometimes have to seek help
from others given modern complexities and concluded that communica-
tions with third-party agents should be protected when they are needed
ing the privilege to communications from lawyer to client, see Thurmond v. Compaq Com-
puter Corp, 198 F.R.D. 475, 480-82 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
69. H.W. Carter & Sons v. William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ-1274, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6578, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995); Davis & Beisecker, supra note 10, at 592.
70. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (explaining that there is no expecta-
tion of confidentiality); Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 246 (1st Cir. 2002); 8
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2317 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
71. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines (Westinghouse 11), 951
F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991).
72. Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. (Westinghouse 1), 132
F.R.D. 384, 388 (D.N.J. 1990).
73. The exceptions apply to situations in which (a) the lawyer, client, and third-party
consultant meet at the same time; and (b) after formation of the privilege, the client or
lawyer later disclose privileged communications to the third-party consultant. In the for-
mer, one might argue that the attorney-client privilege never formed and in the latter that
the attorney-client privilege was waived. This Article will refer to both exceptions as the
"third-party attorney-client privilege doctrine" or the "third-party doctrine."
74. 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that the attorney-client privilege may
apply to employee/agent of lawyer under some circumstances). This exception is some-
times referred to as the Kovel doctrine or the derivative attorney-client privilege. See
Comm'r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1196-97 (Mass. 2009); Epstein,
supra note 28 at 217. This Article will refer to it as the Kovel or agency theory or
exception.
75. Id. at 920. The accountant had been employed by the law firm for over fifteen
years and was formerly an Internal Revenue agent. Id. at 919.
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to accomplish the attorney's work.76
Since Kovel, many federal courts, including the Second Circuit, have
applied the privilege to various types of third parties. 77 It is generally
safe to assume that the presence of non-professional agents, "immediate
subordinates, ' 78 or "ministerial agents" 79 under the supervision of the at-
torney and necessary for an attorney to conduct business such as law
clerks, paralegals, and secretaries, 80 will not abrogate the privilege. 81
However, as will be discussed below, no assumptions are safe when the
third party is a professional consultant.
Generally, a narrow and a broad view have emerged with respect to
Kovel's agency theory.82
a. The Narrow Approach
Courts that view Kovel narrowly generally follow the Second Circuit's
interpretation in United States v. Ackert,83 decided thirty-eight years after
76. Id. at 922 ("[T]he presence of an accountant, whether hired by the lawyer or by the
client, while the client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not destroy
the privilege .... "); id. at 923 ("What is vital ... is that the communication be made in
confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.").
77. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1989) (accountants); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 786 F.2d 3, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (paralegals); United States v.
Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1975) (psychiatrists); Young v. Taylor, 466 F.2d
1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1972) (secretaries and law clerks); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d
142, 144-45 (8th Cir. 1972) (accountants); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 906-07 (4th Cir.
1965) (private investigators); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp.
156, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (non-testifying experts and patent agents); Golden Trade v. Lee
Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (patent agents).
78. Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40 (D. Md. 1974); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954).
79. FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
80. Young, 466 F.2d at 1332; Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 26.
81. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) ("[T]he privilege covers
communications to non-lawyer employees with a menial or ministerial responsibility that
involves relating communications to an attorney." (internal quotations omitted)); Dabney
v. Inv. Corp. of Am., 82 F.R.D. 464, 465-66 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("[P]rotected subordinates
would include any law student, paralegal, [or] investigator."); Imwinkelried, supra note 10,
at 25 ("All courts and commentators agree that clerks and secretaries fall within the defini-
tion [of attorney's agent].").
82. Deniza Gertsberg peripherally describes Kovel as providing protection for two cat-
egories of third parties: (1) those that fit what this Article calls the narrow theory; and (2)
those "whose work is sufficiently important that it deserves protection, such as law clerks,
assistants, and 'aides of other sorts."' Gertsberg, supra note 12, at 1457. According to
Gertsberg, the second category exists because of the "complexities of modern existence."
Id. at 1457-58. This Article contends, however, that courts have interpreted Kovel even
more broadly to cover communications with third-party consultants when such communi-
cations facilitate the provision of legal advice.
83. 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 564-66
(explaining that Ackert greatly limits Kovel). According to some sources, this narrow ap-
proach is taken by a majority of courts. See, e.g., Comm'r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp.,
901 N.E.2d 1185, 1198 & n.20 (Mass. 2009) (explaining it "agree[d] with the majority of
courts" that the Kovel doctrine only applies when the consultant acts as a translator but
that "[a] few courts have applied the Kovel doctrine with less rigidity"); Black & Decker
Corp. v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87, 90 (D. Md. 2003) ("Cases decided after Kovel have
narrowly interpreted this concept of derivative privilege."); Gruetzmacher, supra note 12,
at 978 ("Over the past four decades, courts have repeatedly narrowed the holding in Kovel.
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Kovel. There, the Second Circuit interpreted Kovel's exception only to
apply to third parties who interpret information the client already has to
improve comprehension between attorney and client.84 In Ackert, an in-
vestment banker pitched a proposal to the corporate client to reduce tax
liability from a recent sale of the client's subsidiary. 85 The client's inter-
nal tax counsel researched the proposal and met with the investment
banker on several occasions to gauge the tax implications and better ad-
vise his client about the legal and financial ramifications of the propo-
sal.86 The court found that the consultation was important to the
attorney's ability to give effective legal advice. 87 But it did not apply the
privilege 88 because the investment banker did not translate client com-
munications89 nor enable counsel to understand aspects of the client's
own communications that could not otherwise be appreciated in the ren-
dering of legal advice. 90 Accordingly, the common thread for applying a
narrow interpretation of Kovel is the ability to analogize the third-party
consultant's role to that of a translator-solely interpreting the confiden-
tial client information without adding new information. 91 It is only when
the third party's services are necessary for the client and attorney to ef-
fectively communicate that the privilege attaches under the narrow
agency approach. Consequently, courts adopting the narrow approach
would not protect any of the communications in the drug-recall scenario.
As a result, there is very little protection left for communications with accountants, and the
little protection remaining is often confusing and unpredictable.").
84. Ackert, 169 F.3d at 139. This case involved an IRS tax summons enforcement pro-
ceeding. Id. at 138. During an audit, the IRS wanted to question Ackert about conversa-
tions with counsel. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 139.
88. Id. ("[T]he privilege protects communications between a client and an attorney,
not communications that prove important to an attorney's legal advice to a client.").
89. Id. at 140.
90. Id. at 139.
91. See, e.g., FTC v. TRW, Inc. 628 F.2d 207, 209-12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (explaining it
would have extended Kovel to a research institute consultant hired to study "[a] company's
complex computerized credit reporting system" had the party shown the institute was hired
to put company's computerized credit reporting system into a more understandable form
for lawyers); In re G-I Holdings Inc., 218 F.R.D. 428, 434 (D.N.J. 2003) ("The Kovel court
thus carefully limited the attorney-client privilege between an accountant and a client to
when the accountant functions as a 'translator' between the client and the attorney);
United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
("Kovel 'did not intend to extend the privilege beyond the situation in which [a profes-
sional] was interpreting the client's otherwise privileged communications or data to enable
the attorney to understand those communications or that client data."); Sankoorikal et al.,
supra note 12, at 281-82 (explaining both the functional equivalents and agency exceptions
but claiming that the Kovel exception "has been viewed as a narrow 'translator' or 'inter-
preter' exception"); see also infra note 173. Some courts claim to apply the translator ap-
proach, yet instead apply broader protection. See, e.g., Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v.
Wachner, 124 F. Supp. 2d. 207, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (protecting documents shared with an
external investment banker to help the attorney draft disclosure documents because the
investment banker interpreted for the client and the law firm what a reasonable business
person would consider "material" for disclosure purposes).
[Vol. 62
The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
b. The Broad Approach
Perhaps because this standard is so limiting, courts, even after Ackert,
have applied broader interpretations of Kovel. Often, courts adopting a
generous view of Kovel claim the privilege applies to third parties who
provide services that merely facilitate the attorney's ability to render legal
advice. 92 These courts privilege lawyers' consultations with many exter-
nal professional consultants. For example, one court privileged commu-
nications between an outside PR consultant, the client, and lawyers
because the PR specialist "participated to assist the lawyers in rendering
legal advice, which included how defendant should respond to plaintiff's
lawsuit."' 93 Courts subscribing to a very broad view of Kovel would likely
protect all communications in the hypothetical at the beginning of this
Article.
92. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1046 (3d Cir. 1975); U.S. Postal
Serv., v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Golden Trade v.
Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Willemijn v. Apollo Computer,
Inc., 707 F. Supp 1429, 1446 (D. Del. 1989); Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D 198, 202
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98-Civ-8520, 1999 WL
1006312, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999); In re Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc., 283
B.R. 358, 362-63 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002) (applying a broad interpretation of Kovel to pro-
tect communications with financial bankruptcy advisor but ultimately determining that the
attorney-client privilege was waived in part by offering a third party as a testifying expert
witness); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v. Cantor, Fitzgerald Sec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 414, 418
(D.C. Ga. 1981) ("If the accountant is consulted in connection with the client's obtaining
legal advice, the privilege extends to cover confidential documents in the accountant's pos-
session. If the documents were turned over to the accountant for reasons totally unrelated
to seeking legal advice, the accountant is viewed as an unrelated third party and the attor-
ney-client privilege as to these formerly confidential documents is waived." (internal cita-
tion omitted) (citing In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2nd Cir. 1973); United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2nd Cir. 1961))); see also supra note 236. As will be discussed
infra, some courts take a less extreme approach like that recommended in this Article. See,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand Jury Wit-
ness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (requiring
that consultants "have a close nexus to the attorney's role in advocating the client's cause
before a court or other decision-making body" and protecting communication with exter-
nal PR consultants because attorneys "were not skilled at public relations" and "needed
outside help" to provide legal advice); see also United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th
Cir. 1972) (privileging audit papers created by an accountant at the attorney's request be-
cause the accountant was "a necessary aid to the rendering of effective legal services to the
[non-corporate] client"). See also Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt, No. 02-Civ-7955, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003).
93. H.W. Carter & Sons v. William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ-1274, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6578, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995). Courts have applied a broad interpretation
of Kovel to protect communications with patent agents. See, e.g., Golden Trade, 143 F.R.D.
at 518, 519 n.3. A broad approach has also been applied to protect communications withjury consultants. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326 (explaining thatjury and personal communication consultants come within attorney-client privilege as they
have a close nexus to attorney's role in advocating the client's cause before a decision-
making body); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 2003) (Garth, J.,
concurring); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotext Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 476-77 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (applying protection to jury consultant expert). Of course, communications with jury
consultants are often protected by the work-product doctrine.
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2. Third Party as Functional Equivalent
Although Upjohn94 dealt with employees of a corporation, its reason-
ing has been applied by federal courts to third-party consultants who are
the "functional equivalents" of the corporate client's employees. 95 The
rationale is that "[tihere is no reason to differentiate between[, for exam-
ple,] an accountant-employee and a regularly retained outside accountant
when both occupy the same extremely sensitive and continuing position
as financial adviser, reviewer, and agent: both possess information of
equal importance to the lawyer." 96 For example, in In re Bieter, 97 the
Eighth Circuit, relying on Upjohn, found that the commercial and retail
development consultant hired by the company was "in all relevant re-
spects the functional equivalent of an employee" for the purposes of ap-
plying the privilege.98 The consultant was regularly retained, often the
sole company representative at meetings, and possibly the only person to
possess information regarding the transaction at issue in the litigation.99
The role the quasi-employee plays within the company and how he or
she is treated is more important than the length or regularity of service,
formal titles, or contracts between the parties. For example, in NXIVM
Corp. v. O'Hara, the court found that a non-paid volunteer was a func-
tional equivalent of the client's employees because this individual was
"not some mere or informal advisor," but a "quintessential insider of
[the] business on every aspect confronting it."100 As the Third Circuit
explained, the functional equivalents test protects communications to
third-party consultants who "possess[ ] a commonality of interest with the
client."1 01
3. Functional Equivalent Versus Agent
At first blush, the functional equivalents test seems practically and the-
oretically distinct from the agency theory. It concerns third parties who,
94. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 383 (1981).
95. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1409-M-21-95, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18636, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2003) (noting that a "limited number of
cases" support this interpretation). Because this exception is distinct in theory, courts do
not generally reconcile holdings with Kovel. That being said, as will be discussed, some-
times courts consider both exceptions in one opinion. Moreover, in practice, when the
functional equivalents exception is applied broadly, the functional equivalency test col-
lapses into the broad approach to Kovel.
96. Sexton, supra note 2, at 498; see also In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 937 (8th Cir.
1994).
97. 16 F.3d at 929.
98. Id. at 938-39. The court also relied on the reasoning in McCaugherty v. Sif-
fermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 239-40 (N.D. Cal. 1990), and Sexton, supra note 2, at 498.
99. In re Bieter, 16 F. 3d at 938.
100. 241 F.R.D. 109, 139 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
101. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 386 n.20 (3d Cir. 1990); Smithkline
Beecham Corp. v. Apotext Corp., 232 F.R.D. 467, 476-77 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (same); Sexton,
supra note 2, at 487, 498 (explaining that functional equivalents should have "a significant
relationship to the corporation" and attempting to define a rule to determine when attor-
ney-client privilege extends to employees and/or functional equivalents); see also In re
Bieter, 16 F. 3d at 937.
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because of their "continuing positions" and the way that they are treated
by employers, are deemed synonymous with client employees. The
agency theory, on the other hand, concerns outsiders usually (but not al-
ways) hired by the attorney for a specific matter to facilitate the provision
of legal advice. However, when the functional equivalents test is consid-
ered in the context of third-party professional consultants (the subject of
this Article), this difference begins to disappear for a few reasons.
a. Commonality of Interest
For some courts applying the functional equivalents test, a "commonal-
ity of interest" means simply that the third party had information or ad-
vice important to the lawyer's provision of legal advice or services.10 2
Thus, the main inquiry mimics that found in the broad agency approach
of Kovel. 103 For example, in Baxter Travenol Laboratories v. Lemay,104
the client hired a former employee of the opposing party as a "litigation
consultant" to provide information based on his former employment with
the opposing party; in essence the client hired a witness. 105 The court
reasoned that neither the status of the communicator nor the content of
the communication should dictate application of the privilege.106 As long
as the communication is made by the functional equivalent "at the client's
behest, in order to secure legal advice, and such communication is in-
tended by the client and participants to be confidential," the communica-
tion should be protected. 107 Although this case is an extreme one,108 it
epitomizes the importance some courts place on the flow of information
between attorney and "client" so the attorney can render better legal ad-
vice. Moreover, it demonstrates the potential breadth of the functional
equivalents test.
A more tempered example is McCaugherty v. Siffermann.10 9 There,
the court found that consultants hired by a company to assist it in arrang-
ing the sale of another company should be treated as functional
equivalents of the hiring company. 110 In making this determination, the
court found important that: (a) the consultants were hired to advance the
102. In re Bieter, 16 F.3d at 938-39; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enter.,
No. 01-Civ-3016, 2002 WL 31556383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002).
103. But see Sankoorikal et al., supra note 12, at 281 (claiming that "courts have applied
the [functional equivalents] exception carefully, often ruling that the facts do not support a
finding that the third party operated as a 'functional [equivalent]' . . . because [this excep-
tion can] encompass many communications with third-party contractors").
104. 89 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
105. Id. at 412-13.
106. Id. at 414.
107. Id.
108. Alexander, supra note 14, at 320 n.433 (critiquing the Baxter court's "bootstrap
approach").
109. 132 F.R.D. 234 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
110. Id. at 238-39. This case involved a complicated fact pattern. In its simplest form,
one company (FSB) hired another company (FADA) for management services and assis-




interests of the hiring company in an "environment dense in regulations";
(b) there were legal implications concerning the sale; 1 ' and, (c) the con-
sultants and lawyers needed to share information so that the lawyers
could provide fully informed legal advice to the consultants and the
company. 112
b. The Context
Second, although providing regular, ongoing services is indicative of
functional equivalency, courts consider the context in which the third
party was hired and do not always require a certain length of service.11 3
Consequently, a third-party professional consultant can be hired for a dis-
crete project, like the external PR consultant in the drug-recall scenario,
and be deemed a functional equivalent. For example, in Federal Trade
Commission v. GlaxoSmithKline, the FTC claimed that GlaxoSmithKline
waived the attorney-client privilege by sharing documents with external
government relations and PR consultants.114 The court, however, dis-
agreed because GlaxoSmithKline's in-house attorneys:
worked with these consultants in the same manner as they d[id] with
full-time employees; indeed, the consultants acted as a part of a team
with full-time employees regarding their particular assignments and,
as a result, the consultants became integral members of the team as-
signed to deal with issues [that] ... were completely intertwined with
[its] litigation and legal strategies.1 15
Therefore, it found "no reason to distinguish between a person on the
corporation's payroll and a consultant hired by the corporation if each
acts for the corporation and possesses the information needed by attor-
111. Id. at 239.
112. Id. at 239-240 (concluding that privilege attached, but finding that the company did
not take steps to maintain Upjohn's requirement of confidentiality with respect to other
employees). Similarly, in another case, the court protected all communications between
the lawyer and an independent engineer hired to help develop an auto park because the
engineer provided the attorneys with information necessary to obtain permits. MLC Auto.
v. Town of S. Pines, No. 1-05-CV-1078, 2007 WL 128945, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 11, 2007)
(implying that communications from attorney to engineer were covered because they
helped consultant handle client-related tasks). Some courts do not take such a broad ap-
proach. See, e.g., Export-Import Bank of the U.S. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., 232 F.R.D.
103, 113-14 (S.D. N.Y. 2005) (denying functional equivalent status to consultant hired to
help with debt restructuring because, among other things, the consultant provided services
similar to that provided by any other financial consultant, did not use the office provided,
spent more time in his own office in a separate city, and was able to "build a successful
consulting business" at the same time that he worked for the company).
113. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enter., No. 01-Civ-3016, 2002 WL
31556383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002) (finding that independent contractors providing
production-related services for a company on temporary basis were functional equivalents
because employment in movie industry is sporadic in nature and the use of independent
contractors in this fashion was standard practice).
114. 294 F.3d 141, 143-144 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (seeking all "documents related to the man-
ufacturing and marketing of Paxil").
115. Id. at 148 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting In re Copper Mar-
ket Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 2B, S.D.N.Y. (2001)).
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neys in rendering legal advice. '116
c. Who Hires the Consultant
Although some courts pay attention to who hires the third-party con-
sultant (client or attorney), 117 even that distinction is not determina-
tive." 8 For example, the Kovel court stated that the agency exception
applied when either the attorney or the client hires the third party.11 9
And courts have analyzed communications with third-party consultants
under an agency theory when the consultants were hired by the client. 120
Similarly, to apply a functional equivalents analysis, courts have not re-
quired that the third party be hired by the client.' 21
C. THE LAW-BUSINESS DISTINcrION IN THE THIRD-PARTY CONTEXT
Courts protect communications that mix business and law as long as
they are "predominantly legal"'1 2 or "made primarily for the purpose of
generating legal advice."'1 23 This is because (a) business and law are often
"intertwined" and difficult to distinguish;124 and (b) even "the average
lawyer-whether [in-] house or outside counsel-often mixes his legal
advice with business, economic and political counsel.' 25 Consequently,
116. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
117. Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 247-48 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that
who hires the third party, and when, may be "probative" of an agency relationship but that
it "need not determine whether, in all instances, the attorney or client ... must hire the
accountant in order to sustain a privilege under Kovel").
118. Many of the interviewees in the PR Study believed this to be a key factor and,
therefore, have purposefully arranged for law firms to sign the hiring contracts. See infra
note 332.
119. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961); see, e.g., United States v.
Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972) (explaining that it is immaterial who hired the
consultant or if the consultant had previously provided services).
120. See generally Dorf & Stanton Commc'ns, Inc. v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919
(Fed. Cir. 1996). See infra notes 265-271 and accompanying text.
121. In NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, the consultant who was deemed a functional
equivalent was a volunteer and not hired by either party. 241 F.R.D. 109, 139 (N.D.N.Y.
2007); see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
122. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954)
("When he acts as an advisor, the attorney must give predominantly legal advice to retain
his client's privilege of non-disclosure, not solely, or even largely, business advice.").
123. McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 240 (N.D. Cal. 1990); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950) ("[Tjhe privilege of nondis-
closure is not lost merely because relevant nonlegal considerations are expressly stated in a
communication which also includes legal advice."); United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
66 F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
124. See, e.g., Sedco Int'l v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982); Diversified In-
dus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 610 (8th Cir. 1977); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434
F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 70 § 2296; see also Murphy, supra
note 12, at 581.
125. NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126; Rattner v. Netburn, No. 88-Civ-2080, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989) (alteration in original); United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 360; John M. Burman, Advising Clients About Non-Legal Fac-
tors, Wyo. LAWYER, Feb. 27, 2004, at 40, 40 (2004) ("[C]lients are in search of help with
problems which they perceive ... to involve legal issues. But they generally want more. No
legal problem arises in a vacuum .... A client usually wants, therefore, advice about how to
resolve the problem, in general, and not just the legal aspects of it. Resolving a problem
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corporate lawyers pride themselves on their ability to provide integrated
legal advice. 126
However, determining whether the purpose of a communication was
primarily for garnering legal versus business advice is particularly difficult
in the corporate context, especially for in-house counsel because they
usually play a multidisciplinary role.12 7 As one general counsel inter-
viewee in the PR Study explained, "It is not enough in an in-house posi-
tion simply to say, well, here is the legal analysis and you make the
business decisions. The business leaders and managers ... want and they
need recommendations from their lawyers that take into account the con-
text of the business. ' 128 Additionally, courts fear that corporations use
in-house attorney participation to create a zone of secrecy. 129 This is
unsurprising given the tobacco companies' recent use of the privilege to
shield studies conducted by external scientists about the addictiveness of
tobacco. 130 Consequently, if the in-house attorney has non-legal duties,
many courts require a higher showing that the attorney gave the advice in
a legal capacity.131 Some courts consider whether the communication ex-
pressly requests legal advice. 132 Others ask whether the communication
would have occurred even if the client did not need legal advice 133 or if
thus invariably involves non-legal issues."); Sisk & Abbate, supra note 45, at 36 (arguing
that when "non-legal components of a communication are intertwined with genuine and
material requests for or legal advice provided by corporate counsel, whether in-house or
outside, the privilege should attach.").
126. As one law firm partner interviewee opined, "If you ask me to name five things
you are most proud of as a lawyer, I would say one is that I tend to understand the business
considerations and can give [legal] advice with that very much in mind." Interview with
Law Firm Partner #49, at 10 (Apr. 7, 2009) (on file with author) (explaining that he "gives
legal advice that has business impact").
127. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y.
1994); NXIVM Corp., 241 F.R.D. at 126; Beardslee, Multidisciplinary Partnerships, supra
note 30, at 15 ("[The] job is multi-disciplinary and cross-functional by nature."); id. at 20
("Most General Counsel have a broad range of responsibilities and perform a mixture of
legal and non-legal work." ); see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 581 ("The problem is
especially pronounced . . if the attorney is in-house counsel .... ); United States v. Chev-
ron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2002) ("Because ... attorneys...
performed the dual role of legal and business advisor, assessing whether a particular com-
munication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice (as opposed to business
advice) becomes a difficult task."); King, supra note 63, at 623; see supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text.
128. Interview with General Counsel #36, at 15 (Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
129. First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Hercu-
les, 434 F. Supp. at 143.
130. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
131. In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Borase v. M/A COM, Inc., 171
F.R.D. 10, 13-14 (D. Mass. 1997); McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 241 (N.D.
Cal. 1990); Chambliss, supra note 54, at 1727; see Murphy, supra note 12, at 581 ("[S]ome
courts ... have imposed a heavy burden on corporations seeking to protect communica-
tions with persons holding dual legal/nonlegal rules.") (internal citations and quotations
omitted); Pacini, Seay & Placid, supra note 44, at 901; King, supra note 63, at 623.
132. Allied Irish Banks v. Bank of Am., 240 F.R.D. 96, 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
133. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423-
24 (3d Cir. 1991); HPD Labs., Inc., v. Clorox Co., 202 F.R.D. 410, 415 (D.N.J. 2001); U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp, 852 F. Supp. 156, 163-164 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); First
Chicago Int'l, 125 F.R.D. at 57-58; Sexton, supra note 2 at 459.
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there was no hope of privilege protection.134 Some also consider whether
a non-lawyer could have readily accomplished the task and whether the
task was one normally tackled by attorneys. 135 Thus, when corporate
attorneys consult with internal non-legal professionals, the business-law
distinction becomes blurry.
The involvement of an external third-party consultant adds another
layer of complexity. Consider the drug-recall hypothetical. It is hard to
determine whether the lawyer is meeting with the external PR consultant
to help manage media spin to protect the corporation's image and bottom
line or to provide legal advice to protect its ability to negotiate with
shareholders, attain a fair trial, or both. Although some courts resolve
ambiguity in favor of protection, 136 others do the opposite. 137 The pres-
ence of a third-party consultant can overshadow whatever legal purpose
exists for the communication. For example, in Allied Irish Banks v. Bank
of America, the court refused to protect all documents created in prepara-
tion of a report on the internal investigation that was led by an indepen-
dent financial services consultant and an outside law firm.1 38 The court
acknowledged that the investigation was a joint undertaking conducted in
part so that the law firm could provide Allied Irish Banks (AIB) with
legal advice about the potential criminal, regulatory, and civil liabilities
that could ensue. 139 However, the court reasoned that all the documents
134. Phelps Dodge Ref Co., 852 F. Supp. at 160.
135. Oil Chem. & Atomic Workers v. Am. Home Prods., 790 F. Supp. 39, 41 (D.P.R.
1992); see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 581. But see Chore-Time Equip. v. Big Dutchman,
255 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D. Mich. 1966) ("The mere fact that non-lawyers could also
have performed the services in question does not in any way destroy the privilege.").
136. See Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 146, 148 (D. Del. 1977)
(resolving doubts in favor of plaintiff).
137. FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying protection to a
document that was prepared by a third-party consultant to enable the law firm to advise
the client regarding application of the Fair Credit Reporting Act to its current procedures
because the law-business distinction was ambiguous).
138. 240 F.R.D. 96, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying protection to "memos of Wachtell's
investigation interviews [and] reports of attorney communications with the banks' Board
of Directors" among other documents). The court's ultimate conclusion may indeed be
accurate, especially since it appears that AIB failed to present supporting evidence that the
documents aided the lawyer in providing legal advice. Id. at 104. However, as will be
discussed infra, its reasoning is faulty.
139. Id. at 101. In today's post-Enron world, whether a corporation has conducted an
internal investigation, cooperated, and/or voluntarily disclosed wrongdoing is considered
by prosecutors when deciding whether to charge the corporation and can greatly impact
the amount the corporation is fined if convicted of an offense. See generally Oren M.
Henry, Privilege? What Privilege? Culture of Waiver in the Corporate World, 20 GEO J.
LEGAL ETHics 679, 684-86 (2007). See also Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Att'y
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Component Heads and United States Att'ys (June 16,
1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html (com-
monly known as the Thompson Memo); Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy
Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to Heads of Department Components and United States
Attorneys (January 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftfcorporate.guide
lines.htm; Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a
Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo In Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
1095, 1106 (2006). The interviews with lawyers supported this. Interview with Law Firm
Partner #40, at 7 (Aug. 22, 2007) (on file with author) ("[I]n the past five years, it's very
clear that the companies that cooperate do better than those who don't."). Id. at 12-14
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and notes in preparation of the report could not possibly be for the pur-
pose of providing legal advice because the published report itself did not
include legal advice and was not for the purpose of attaining legal ad-
vice.140 Ironically, had the investigation been led solely by the law firm,
the decision may have been different.141 In short, inclusion of a third-
party business consultant makes the law-business distinction more com-
plex and may lead some courts to assume that the purpose of the commu-
nication is not to attain legal advice. 142
Furthermore, in making the law-business distinction, some courts and
scholars ask what type of advice the third-party consultant provided.
They consider whether the consultant is providing typical as opposed to
special services. 143 Similarly, some scholars contend that the attor-
("It's also very clear that the message that you are sending is: 'We are guilty if we say we
are not going to waive the privilege."'). However, recent revisions to the 2004 amend-
ments to the Organizational Sentencing guidelines and the McNulty memo (which requires
approval at a higher level before a request for waiver can be made) may change things. See
Henry, supra note 139, at 684, 687 (explaining that the comment in § 8C2.5 that implied
corporations had to waive privilege protection to lower culpability score in certain circum-
stances was deleted and discussing the McNulty memo). Moreover, if the recent proposals
by the DOJ to revise its policy regarding how the Department will measure or demand
cooperation are implemented, it may dissipate the culture of waiver. See Posting of the Joe
Palazzolo to Blog of Legal Times, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2008/07/page/9/ (July
10, 2008, 13:52 CST) (explaining that these proposals are in response to the Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act of 2008, S. 3217, 110th Cong. (2008), legislation introduced
on June 26, 2008 by Senator Arlen Specter).
140. Allied Irish Banks v. Bank of Am., 240 F.R.D. 96, 101, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(denying protection in part because the investigator's actual report was not legal advice or
for the purpose of legal advice but also asserting that privilege protection must also be
denied because financial consultant was not translating client's communications); id. at 107
(observing that "critical public accountability concerns.., motivated the commissioning of
the Report," and concluding that they necessarily also motivated "the creation of the un-
derlying investigatory documents").
141. See supra notes 117-119; see infra notes 330-333 and accompanying text. Cf. In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657-L, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164 (E.D. La. Mar. 5,
2007) (providing work-product protection to the preparatory documents and communica-
tions for investigation led solely by lawyers).
142. Court decisions like this, similar to those that do not uphold selective waiver
agreements with the government, could discourage companies "from affirmatively investi-
gating and reporting on irregularities, mistakes and outright wrongdoing" and, therefore,
compliance. George J. Terwilliger, III et al., Privilege in Peril: Corporate Cooperation in
the New Era of Government Investigations, 1592 PLI/CoRP 163, 172 (2007). Indeed, one of
the factors the SEC considers in leniency is "whether the company conducted or had an
outside entity conduct an internal review." Id. at 168. If using an outside entity destroys
privilege protection for documents underlying the report, companies may not use outside
entities as frequently. Arguably, an attorney may be better able to investigate whether the
corporation is complying with the law and recommend how to avoid legal action in the
future with the help of a third-party consultant/investigator. The inclusion of an indepen-
dent third party provides benefits perhaps not otherwise attainable, such as enhanced co-
operation with employees, accuracy, and perspective. Cf. infra note 263 and accompanying
text.
143. In one case, the court indicated that if the PR consultant only provides standard
public relations services then the communication would not be covered. Haugh v. Schro-
der Inv. Mgmt, No. 02-Civ-7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
2003). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed to (A) Grand
Jury Witness Firm and (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(distinguishing a case that did not protect communications with the PR consultant because,
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ney-client privilege should only extend to certain types of third-party spe-
cialists as opposed to regular consultants. 144 On those same lines, others
contend that communication should not be protected because the advice
provided by the third party was not legal advice. 145
D. THE ROLE OF THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 1 4 6
Although a full analysis of the work-product doctrine is outside the
scope of this Article, this next section turns to it briefly to demonstrate
that it is not an adequate substitute for the attorney-client privilege in the
third-party context.
Like the third-party attorney-client privilege doctrine, the
work-product doctrine was developed to account for the realities of mod-
ern practice and the importance of third-party consultation. 147 Gener-
ally, it protects tangible and intangible work product if it was prepared by
an attorney or a representative or agent of the attorney 148 for litigation
among other things, the PR firm provided ordinary PR advice); Murphy, supra note 12, at
585 (describing how courts consider the type of PR advice).
144. See, e.g., Hantler et al., supra note 10, at 21-22 (claiming that the privilege should
only cover litigation communication specialists and highlighting the skills and tasks that
make these specialists "experts" compared to regular PR consultants).
145. See, e.g., Haugh, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *8 (analyzing whether advice the
PR firm provided was traditional PR advice as opposed to legal advice). See also Murphy,
supra note 12, at 587, 590 (arguing that communications with PR consultants should not be
protected in part because they do not provide legal advice); id. at 591 ("Public relations
consultants do not provide legal advice."). See infra note 304.
146. Courts consider the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine
"inseparable twin issues" because "[w]henever the attorney-client privilege is raised in on-
going litigation, concomitantly the work product doctrine is virtually omnipresent."
NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). Resultantly, courts are
often imprecise when applying the two doctrines, relying on one to support the other. See,
e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-97 (1981) (relying on work-product
cases to determine the scope of attorney-client privilege); NXIVM Corp. 241 F.R.D. at
138-39 (merging the analysis for both doctrines). Some use work-product to side-step
attorney-client privilege issues. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657-L,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164, at *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 5, 2007) (deciding to not address the
attorney-client privilege arguments because it found the communications were protected
as work-product). This is problematic. Although work-product and attorney-client
privilege doctrines are strongly allied, they are theoretically distinct. Hercules Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 150-51 (D. Del. 1977). The former is designed to protect
the adversarial process, the latter to protect confidentiality so that communication can flow
freely. Id. If courts do not consider the attorney-client privilege ex post, eventually it
could affect the flow of information ex ante. Because there is the potential that the court
will consider only the work-product doctrine (which is not absolute), communication
between attorney and client might be chilled, thereby defeating the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (defining the
central purpose of the privilege as "encourag[ing] full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients" (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1981))).
147. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 500-01 (1947). Work-product is governed, in part, by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)(2). In re Grand Jury Subpoenas,
265 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
148. FED. R. EVID. 502(g)(2) ("['W]ork-product protection' means the protection that
applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation or for trial."). Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) states that
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or "in anticipation of litigation."'1 49 According to courts, when attorneys
work with third-party consultants "whose expertise and knowledge of
certain facts can help the attorney in the assessment of any aspect of the
litigation," work-product protection is not waived. 150
However, the work-product doctrine does not moot the issues ad-
dressed in this Article for three reasons. First, work-product protection
does not equate to attorney-client privilege protection. Unlike attorney-
client privilege protection, work-product protection can be pierced with
certain showings of need. 151 Second, the attorney-client privilege pro-
tects different circumstances than those protected by the work-product
doctrine. 152 Today, many legal battles are fought and won before a case
is even filed, 153 yet courts generally interpret the "anticipation of litiga-
tion" requirement narrowly and do not consider the remote possibility of
litigation to be in anticipation of litigation.1 54 Therefore, in the drug-re-
call scenario, the communications between the general counsel and the
it protects "the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of [the] attor-
ney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." FED. R. CIv. P.
26(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added); In re Cendant Corp., 343 F.3d 658, 661-62 (3d Cir. 2003); 8
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2009); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3)(A) (defining "another party or its representative" as "including the other party's
attorney, consultant, . .. or agent").
149. Linde Thomspon Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke, P.C. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5
F.3d 1508, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Importantly, "the existence of litigation is not a prerequi-
site; materials qualify for work-product protection if the primary purpose for their creation
was related to potential litigation." In re Vioxx, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23164, at *10 (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
150. NXIVM, 241 F.R.D. at 128 (emphasis added). However, work-product protection
does not apply to third-party consultants that are identified as experts to present opinions
at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (explaining that such testifying experts can be deposed).
151. NXIVM, 241 F.R.D. at 126-27; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4); Nobles, 422 U.S.
at 238 n.11; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512. Some state courts allow the attorney-client privi-
lege to be pierced upon showings of need and relevance. See, e.g., Payton v. N.J. Tpk.
Auth., 678 A.2d 279, 288 (D.N.J. Super. 1996); Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94,
100 (D.N.J. 1990) (applying state law).
152. Although Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried asserts that the attorney-client privi-
lege is "hardly necessary," and that courts have "severely restricted discovery of work
product material from experts not called as trial witnesses," he delineates some of the same
problems with the third-party attorney-client privilege doctrine highlighted here. Im-
winkelried, supra note 10, at 49.
153. See Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of the Civil Trial of the American College of
Trial Lawyers, The "Vanishing Trial:" the College, the Profession, the Civil Justice System,
226 F.R.D. 414, 433 (2005) (explaining how alternative dispute resolution, especially arbi-
tration, is "replacing the civil trial in court."); Ellis, supra note 53, at 15-16 (noting the
prominence of alternative dispute resolution and the often prohibitive cost of litigation);
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Fed-
eral and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 519 (2004) (explaining that a
significant number of case are now being resolved by alternative dispute resolution and
mediation instead of trial).
154. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977) (explain-
ing that the "remote prospect of future litigation" is not "in anticipation of litigation" and
is not work-product); Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(holding that the remote possibility of litigation does not meet this requirement); Patricia
L. Andel, Inapplicability of the Self-Critical Analysis Privilege to the Drug and Medical
Device Industry, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93, 102 (1997) ("[T]he requirement that the infor-
mation be compiled 'in anticipation of litigation' has been interpreted narrowly.").
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drug-recall crisis team might not be considered to have occurred in antici-
pation of litigation. 155 Similarly, when an attorney meets with an ac-
countant to discuss the structure and purpose of a transaction and
potential tax consequences, the communication might not be considered
to have been made in anticipation of litigation if subsequent litigation
arises' 56-even though litigation often occurs after a high profile deal
concludes. 157 Importantly, unlike the attorney-client privilege, the
work-product doctrine does not generally protect advice given before the
alleged misconduct-advice that may actually guide a client to compli-
ance. 158 Also, many legal services are provided without the prospect of
155. Cf. Moses, supra note 15, at 1839 ("[M]ost public relations work starts well in
advance of indictment, let alone a possible trial .. ").
156. This is problematic. If the communications are not protected from discovery by
the work-product doctrine or attorney-client privilege, they "point out to the IRS the
problems with the tax return and increase exposure to liability." Jones, supra note 51, at
455; Cf United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 812-16 (1984) (rejecting an
accountant-client privilege protecting accountant's tax accrual work papers);
Gruetzmacher, supra note 12, at 993 (explaining that the work-product doctrine "provides
little protection for communications among a client, lawyer, and accountant in connection
with the planning and execution of a tax-advantaged transaction"); but see Comm'r of Rev-
enue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185, 1205 (Mass. 2009) (protecting a document pre-
pared by tax consultants to "discuss the pros and cons of the various planning
opportunities and attendant litigation risks" in order to help the client decide whether it
should refrain from paying corporate excise taxes that would result in "substantial capital
gains"). Further, some accountants cannot be protected by the work-product doctrine be-
cause of the potential conflict of interest between providing an independent audit and ad-
vocacy. Pacini et al., supra note 44, at 895.
157. Lawyers work under this assumption because litigation can occur "over any num-
ber of issues including alleged failure to close transactions; breaches of representations and
warranties; securities and common law fraud; and contractual purchase price adjustments."
Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, M&A/Fiduciary Duty Litigation, http://www.debevoise.com/
areasofpractice/ServiceDetail.aspx?id=3ef585a3-d831-4924-96fl-0aca8db01af0&type=show
fullDesc (last visited June 13, 2009); Interview with Law Firm Partner #49, at 4, 7, 9 (Apr. 7,
2008) (on file with author) (claiming that litigation occurs after a deal is done almost fifty
percent of the time but that "M&A is decided by dollars and cents not by litigation. Litiga-
tion can buy time. Litigation can create unpleasantness. Litigation can occasionally stop a
deal but it's rare."); Interview with General Counsel #2, at 25 (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with
author) (explaining that in a hostile takeover or M&A, work-product protection is less
likely because the deal was not in anticipation of litigation, "although certainly one could
see that litigation might arise").
158. Cf Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desireability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567, 569 (1989) (empha-
sizing the importance of ex ante advice and contending that ex post advice during litigation
"cannot guide behavior for the simple reason that such advice is given only after individu-
als have chosen how to act"). Moreover, the fact that a consultant provided such ex ante
advice may prevent work-product protection or protection under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4)(B) for work done by those consultants after litigation ensues, unless
care is taken to distinguish the two roles. See, e.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Hunts-
man Corp., C.A. No. 3841-VCL, 2008 WL 3878339, at *3 (Del.Ch. Aug. 22, 1008)) (denying
protection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), the attorney-client privi-
lege, and work-product doctrine and explaining that Huntsman should not be able to pro-
tect communications with Merrill Lynch financial consultants that occurred prior to
litigation "by the simple expediency of purporting to hire the same team of Merrill Lynch
employees as its counsel's so-called litigation consultants"). Although it may make perfect
business sense to use the same advisors or the same financial advising company to perform
both roles, courts may suspect that the corporation is "trying to use the rule to shield
testimony by a natural fact witness" and not apply work-product protection or protection
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litigation, such as preparations for an administrative proceeding,159 legal
advice on disclosure statements, 160 press tactics, or income tax returns. 61
Lastly, when documents are prepared in anticipation of litigation for
both litigation and business purposes, they may not be protected. 62 For
example, in the drug-recall hypothetical, even if a court determined that
the meeting was in anticipation of litigation, it might not provide
work-product protection to either of the documents prepared by the ex-
ternal PR consultants because the court might determine that they were
not designed primarily to assist in the pending litigation, but instead to
assess how to best manage negative publicity.' 63 In one case, the court
held that the attorney-client and work-product doctrines were waived
under Rule 26(b)(4)(B). Id. at *3 (explaining that in cases that protected post litigation
consultations with a financial consulting firm that was used prior to litigation, dual repre-
sentation was protected because different analysts were used and/or there was a clearly
defined separation between the financial and litigation advisory roles).
159. See Gruetzmacher, supra note 12, at 991-92 (explaining that work-product protec-
tion would not apply).
160. In a typical securities fraud lawsuit, the communications between the client, law-
yer, and any third-party consultant leading up to disclosure of the client's future growth
prospects would likely not be considered to be in anticipation of litigation because the
lawsuit does not occur until after there is a drop in stock value, which may not occur, if at
all, for months or years after the original projection.
161. Thus, Professor Imwinkelried's conclusion that some communications do not need
to be protected by the attorney-client privilege because they will be protected by the
work-product doctrine is inapplicable outside the anticipation of litigation context. See
Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 48-49.
162. In re Om Group Sec. Litig., 226 F.R.D. 579, 586-87 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (explaining
that dual purpose documents "would have been generated in the absence of pending or
possible future litigation"). In In re Om, the court ultimately privileged the documents but
explained that this is not a certain result since there were business and litigation purposes
that could not be separated. Id. at 587, 594.
163. In Rattner v. Netbaun, the court refused work-product protection of a public an-
nouncement crafted by the attorneys because the document-although it had potential use
in pending litigation- was also prepared to bolster the corporation's image. Rattner v.
Netburn, No. 88-Civ-2080, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989);
see also Kyle Kveton, Advice and Counsel: The Question of Whether a Lawyer Has Given
Legal or Nonlegal Advice Is Highly Fact-Specific, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2006, at 31, 36 ("[W]ork
product protection may not extend to business strategy or public relations plans .. ").
Although some courts protect documents if they "were prepared because of existing or
expected litigation," others do so only if they were prepared "primarily to assist in litiga-
tion," which is a higher standard. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195, 1198 (2d
Cir. 1998) (explaining that work-product protection applies when "a document was cre-
ated because of anticipated litigation, and would not have been prepared in substantially
similar form but for the prospect of that litigation); id. at 1198 (stating that the "primary
purpose" test "would potentially exclude documents containing analysis of expected litiga-
tion, if their primary, ultimate ... purpose is to assist in making the business decision"
whereas the "because of" test enables protection for "such documents, despite the fact that
their purpose is not to 'assist in' litigation"); see also Maine v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
298 F.3d 60, 67 n.8, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (adopting the "because of" standard and noting that
the Fourth, Eight, D.C., Seventh, and Third circuits have adopted the "because of" stan-
dard); United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(explaining that a court will deem a document to have been prepared in anticipation of
litigation "if in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particu-
lar case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the
prospect of litigation" and that Rule 26(b)(3) does not "state that a document must have
been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to constitute work product, much
less primarily or exclusively to aid in litigation. Preparing a document 'in anticipation of
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because confidential information was shared with the PR firm not to aid
the attorneys in litigation, but rather to control media spin,164 despite the
fact that the way a trial is spun can affect judges' and juries' decisions. 165
In a recent case involving a failed merger, a court held that work-product
protection did not apply to consultations with financial advisors because
the "presentations are similar to presentations one would expect from a
company's financial advisors in the context of a disputed merger agree-
ment. ' 166 Although the court admitted that "some of those presentations
address questions raised by the outbreak of litigation," it found that "the
advice relates to business issues rather than to the conduct or defense of
litigation" and that the financial advisors were acting as financial advisors
instead of in some "other capacity." 167 In sum, many of the same
problems inherent in making the law-business distinction in the attor-
ney-client privilege context exist when the work-product doctrine is in-
volved. Thus, when consultation with third parties is not covered by the
attorney-client privilege, it often does not fall within the protective
shadow of the work-product doctrine either. 168
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EXCEPTIONS
Although this Article assumes that the attorney-client privilege applies
to corporations as it has since 1915, the risks and benefits associated with
having a corporate attorney-client privilege are relevant to deciding how
and when third-party communications should be protected and analyzing
the effectiveness of the current doctrine. The risks often discussed in the
literature and in case opinions are corporate misconduct and a shield
litigation' is sufficient." (quoting Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198, 1202) (internal quotations
omitted)).
164. NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 142 (N.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Burke v.
Lakin Law Firm, PC., No. 07-CV-0076-MJR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 833, at *8 (S.D. Ill.
Jan. 7, 2008) (denying protection of emails sent between client and PR firm because they
"discuss preparation and strategy for minimizing the public relations fallout that could re-
sult from the pending litigation .... [The work-product doctrine] does not protect docu-
ments that were merely prepared for one's defense in the court of public opinion."); Calvin
Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[T]he purpose of
the [work-product doctrine] is to provide a zone of privacy for strategizing about the con-
duct of the litigation itself, not for strategizing about the effects of the litigation on the
client's customers, the media, or on the public generally."). Under the narrow interpreta-
tion of the agency exception, a court would have denied protection but under a broad
interpretation it might have protected the communication if it somehow facilitated the law-
yer's provision of legal services.
165. See generally Beardslee, Advocacy Part I, supra note 6, at 9-20. See also infra, note
185 and accompanying text.
166. Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc., 2008 WL 3878339, at *4 (rejecting Huntsman's ar-
gument that "Merrill Lynch would have had no reason to create its post [litigation] work
product in the absence of pending or anticipated litigation").
167. Id.
168. The work-product doctrine provides even less protection in state courts because
some "confine absolute work product protection to written material reflecting the attor-
ney's personal mental impressions and legal theories." Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 21
(explaining that work product does not protect communications between attorneys and
non-testifying experts in many states). In federal courts, however, the work-product doc-
trine protects tangible and intangible work product. See sources cited supra note 148.
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against discovery of information. 16 9 The benefits often discussed are in-
formed decision-making and increased compliance. 170 Also, frequently
integral to the analysis are concerns about predictability and clarity.'
71
Arguably, third-party attorney-client privilege doctrine should seek to
restrict the risks and wreak the benefits in a way that is consistent with
the spirit of the corporate attorney-client privilege. Therefore, the next
sections use these criteria to assess the existing approaches to the third-
party doctrine. When these criteria are considered, it becomes clear that,
at the margins, third-party attorney-client privilege doctrine today is at
once overly broad and overly narrow. Moreover, it is unpredictable.
A. THE NARROW APPROACH Is Too NARROW
The narrow interpretation of Kovel, although predictable, is not the ap-
propriate standard to apply to communications between attorneys and
third-party consultants.
1. Not in Keeping with the Spirit of the Doctrine
Significantly, it is not clear that the original Kovel decision was sup-
posed to be read as narrowly as the Second Circuit did in Ackert thirty-
eight years later. 172 First, in limiting Kovel to only applying protection to
169. One of the main arguments that opponents to the corporate attorney-client privi-
lege make is that it creates a zone of secrecy. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 14, at 195
("In a large corporation, cloaking all such communications with an inflexible privilege may
produce a veil of darkness so impenetrable in some cases as to preclude effective discovery
of the truth."). Opponents also often support their position by highlighting the tactical
costs associated with the zone of secrecy. Id. at 229 (explaining that "unearthing corporate
knowledge may be quite difficult" and may require "depositions of numerous directors,
officers and employees" (internal quotations omitted)).
170. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (explaining the impor-
tance of balancing these "two conflicting forces"); NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 241 F.R.D.
109, 125 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The free-flow of information and the twin tributary of advice
are the hallmarks of the privilege. For all of this to occur, there must be a zone of safety
for each to participate without apprehension that such sensitive information and advice
would be shared with others without their consent."); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) ("In a society as complicated in structure as ours and gov-
erned by laws as complex and detailed as those imposed upon us, expert legal advice is
essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and honesty of communica-
tions of pertinent facts is a prerequisite. To induce clients to make such communications,
the privilege to prevent their later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to be a
necessity."); Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of "Law Consultants", 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1397, 1426 (2008) ("[T]he importance of the attorney-client privilege is premised on its
capacity to further social values[,] . .. not only ... to assist counsel in formulating legal
advice ... [but also] to create a zone of privacy ... to convince corporate clients to abide
by the law."); see also sources cited infra note 194. Opponents claim that full and open
communications with attorneys would still occur even if the attorney-client privilege did
not apply to corporations because business professionals have to disclose information to
lawyers in order to make good business decisions. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 225-26;
Paul R. Rice, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Loss of Predictability Does Not Jus-
tify Crying Wolfinbarger, 55 Bus. LAW. 735, 739-42 (2000); see also infra note 187.
171. See infra Part III.D.
172. See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
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third-party interpreters, 173 the Second Circuit relied primarily on two
older decisions that do not support the narrow interpretation. 174 Second,
the facts in Ackert are meaningfully different from those in Kovel. In
Ackert, it was not apparent that the third-party consultant had been hired
to help with the specific project for which the attorneys were providing
legal services. 175 Lastly, given the language of Kovel, the court likely con-
sidered its holding applicable to other situations where the "assistance of
the[ ] agents [is] indispensable to [attorneys'] work." 176 Kovel was justi-
fied based on the realities of modern practice at the time. The "complexi-
ties of modem existence" today make it even more difficult than it was in
1961 to "handl[e] clients' affairs without the help of others." 177
If it is true, as this Article posits, that attorneys sometimes have to
consult with third-party specialists in order to provide integrated legal
advice, the Second Circuit's reading of Kovel-even if accurate-is too
narrow today. When applied literally, it bars protection for most commu-
nications with most third-party consultants because: (a) companies usu-
ally do not need to hire third parties to assist their own employees in
communicating with their attorneys; and, (b) consultants are hired prima-
rily for their cumulative knowledge and expertise.
Even the few third-party consultants most often protected by courts-
like doctors, 178 auditors, and accountants,179-are not merely transmit-
ting information into a more understandable language or functioning as a
set of merely ministerial agents. They are, as Professor Edward J. Im-
173. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (denying
protection because litigation consultant "was retained for the value of his own advice, not
to assist the defendant's attorneys in providing their legal advice"); U.S. Postal Serv. v.
Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Occidental
Chem. Corp. v. OHM Remediation Servs. Corp., 175 F.R.D. 431, 437 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)(rejecting application of privilege to engineering consultants in part because consultants
relied on information not obtained from client).
174. The court relied on a passage in Hickman v. Taylor that explains that information
that an attorney procures from witnesses in anticipation of litigation is not covered by the
attorney-client privilege, but rather by the work product doctrine. See Ackert, 169 F.3d at
139 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947)). It also relied on Colton v. United
States. See id. There, however, the defendant conceded that third parties were not covered
and failed to assert any theory upon which to justify the privilege. Colton v. United States,
306 F.2d 633, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1962) (commenting that the principle behind the admittance
is "obvious").
175. See Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98-Civ-8520, 1999 WL 1006312,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (distinguishing Ackert on this basis).
176. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). When Ackert was written, the three judges that wrote Kovel had been
dead for over ten years.
177. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see supra notes 51-59 and accompa-
nying text.
178. Courts reason that the doctor is the conduit and "the client is the source of...
information" that "reveals intensely personal information to enable the [doctor] to trans-
late the data," (the patient's condition), "into a form usable by the attorney." Im-
winkelried, supra note 10, at 24-29; accord People v. Lines, 531 P.2d 793, 800 (1975); City &
County of S.F. v. Superior Court, 231 P.2d 26, 31 (1951).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (protecting
communication with accountant); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963)
(same); United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 346-48 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (same).
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winkelried points out, "add[ing] an important increment of [their own]
knowledge to evaluate the client's communications and other case-spe-
cific information.' 180 For example, auditors conduct trend analyses and
make judgments about the company's calculations when they certify that
the company's financial statements are not materially misstated and are
in accordance with applicable accounting standards. 181 Ironically, even
accountants (the type of third-party consultant originally protected by
Kovel) do more than put the client's information into a more usable for-
mat. 182 As claimed by scholars and judges alike, "[o]n closer scrutiny, the
[translator] analogy breaks down."'1 83 Hence, the narrow interpretation
of Kovel, although more predictable, is under-inclusive and borders on
pretense.
Interestingly, courts that adhere to a narrow reading of Kovel recognize
that "[e]ven the most proficient and prolific attorneys have to resort to
consultation with others in order to render full and complete legal ser-
vices to their clients." 184 For example, in a case involving an external PR
firm, the court acknowledged that:
the public relations firm [might] need[ ] to know the attorney's strat-
egy in order to advise as to public relations, and the public relations
impact [might] bear[ ], in turn, on the attorney's own strategizing as
to whether or not to take a contemplated step in the litigation itself,
and if so, in what form. 185
But because these considerations are not taken into account when apply-
ing the narrow version of Kovel, the court would not privilege any of the
communications between the lawyer and the external PR agents. 186 Sim-
180. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 31, 36, 37 ("The expert creates new information
and thereby becomes an independent source of information about the case.") (internal
quotations and citations omitted)); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F.
Supp. 1038, 1047 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[T~he doctor's observations and conclusions are based
upon far more than the client's communications.") (citing Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery
and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 463-64 (1962));
see also NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 141 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that
PR consultants do not meet the test outlined in Kovel and categorizing the Kovel and
Ackert tests as "narrowly tailored"); Gruetzmacher, supra note 12, at 980 (explaining that
business advisors "do not translate information from the client to the attorney; rather, they
provide information independently to the attorney").
181. See United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 143-44 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying a broader
interpretation of Kovel to protect communications with auditor).
182. For example, when the accountant does a quality of earnings analysis about an
acquisition candidate, the accountant analyzes and evaluates the significance of the infor-
mation gleaned from the client and other sources. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States, 219 F.R.D. 87, 90-91 (D. Md. 2003) (same); United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp.,
241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that communications between a law-
yer and an accountant were not privileged because the accountant did more than
translate).
183. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 36; accord United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith,
425 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting that relying on the interpreter analogy to
extend privilege to psychiatrists is "not beyond criticism").
184. NXIVM, 241 F.R.D. at 140-41.
185. Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner (Calvin Klein 1), 198 F.R.D. 53, 55
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying the narrow agency theory).
186. Id. at 54-55.
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ilarly, a court taking a narrow approach to Kovel would not privilege any
of the communications involved in the drug-recall scenario. In all of the
documents and recommendations, the external PR consultant provides
information and advice of his or her own. Not even the notes taken by
the external PR consultant can be said to serve a translator function.
Moreover, even if all the attorneys' comments on the draft press release
were specific legal advice, they would not be protected under the narrow
approach because confidentiality was breached by sharing the draft press
release with the third-party consultant.
2. May Result in Less Informed Decision Making
Evidence suggests that lawyers, even if they truly need the advice,
might not resort to third-party consultation if they know beforehand that
by doing so they waive protection in all situations other than when the
third-party translates. 187 For example, preliminary findings from the PR
Study suggest that absent the possibility of protection, general counsels
would either refrain from revealing confidential information or forego
third-party consultation with PR consultants altogether. 188 As one
outside attorney vividly exclaimed, such a rule would "put the PR people
out of business in all litigated matters-no one would hire them." 189
This is problematic for several reasons. First, the deterrent effect is
placed at the wrong point in the decision-chain. The effect is to discour-
age lawyers from seeking needed guidance, but it is not the attorneys'
privilege to lose. Lawyers would have to inform clients that they wanted
third-party expertise but that any shared information would be discovera-
ble. 190 Knowing what this means, lawyers might have to counsel the cli-
187. See, e.g., Gruetzmacher, supra note 12, at 978 ("[N]o competent attorney would
engage in confidential communications with a... representative of a client unless he were
certain the privilege would apply."). Admittedly, this evidence is from the corporate bar
and, therefore, is subjective. However, as Professor Lonnie Brown stated in the context of
compelled waivers, "[w]hether real or imagined, that belief alone could prove to be a self-
fulfilling prophecy, which is enough to establish the existence of a very real problem."
Brown, supra note 63, at 946; accord Henry, supra note 139, at 689; Imwinkelried, supra
note 10, at 27 (explaining that denying all protection to experts used for pretrial prepara-
tion "deters thorough pretrial investigation"). A common argument against the corporate
attorney-client privilege is that businesses "are forced by circumstances and impelled by
business necessity to resort to lawyers," and "[t]he benefits [of communicating with coun-
sel] outweigh the risks." Brown, supra note 63, at 924; see supra note 170. However, this is
not necessarily true of third-party consultation. It may not be worth the risk to the lawyer
because discovery that an attorney ignored a consultant's advice, even if it was a logical
decision, could have drastic consequences in court. On the other hand, if the attorney and
the corporation have already decided to do something risky or illegal, they likely would not
engage the consultant even if the privilege would protect the communication. See infra
note 194 (discussing the value of the corporate attorney-client privilege in promoting free
flowing communication).
188. See, e.g., Interview with General Counsel #42, supra note 50, at 21.
189. Interview with Law Firm Partner #53, supra note 41, at 3.
190. See, e.g., Interview with General Counsel #42, supra note 50, at 21 (stating that
"[he] would owe it to [his] client to tell them that" and that the client would likely not want
the general counsel to talk to the external PR consultant). Arguably, given the state of the
doctrine, attorneys should be making these types of warnings today. Some scholars and
practitioners contend that malpractice suits can arise out of nonlegal advice provided by
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ent against third-party consultation even if the lawyer believed he or she
could provide better legal advice with the consultation.
Second, a narrow rule may result in less adequate legal services. For
example, if the narrow reading of Kovel is the standard, tax shelter trans-
actions will continue to occur, but lawyers may choose not to consult with
accountants (who often know more than lawyers do about tax shelters);
therefore, clients may not get the best advice.1 91 Alternatively, consulta-
tion might still occur, but less openly. For instance, in the drug-recall
scenario, the executives at the senior strategy meeting may be more hesi-
tant to share information with the external PR agency. 192 As one general
counsel interviewee commented, "if people are scared to talk in meetings
because they are afraid it's going to be discovered someday then you
don't [get] good advice . . .and you don't make good decisions if you
don't get good advice. '193 Essentially, when people are not armed with
the full story, decision making is impeded and the risk of liability is in-
creased. Many of the general counsel interviewees expounded that "if
PR people don't have a full understanding of a story," they "can't make
decisions [sic] that are made properly. 1 94 For example, PR consultants
lawyers. See, e.g., Kveton, supra note 163 at 32; John C. Watson, Litigation Public Rela-
tions: The Lawyers' Duty to Balance News Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L. & POL'Y
77, 77 (2002) (finding "a basis in contract and malpractice law for requiring attorneys to
tend to their clients' interests in the court of public opinion as zealously as they do in
courts of law").
191. See Gruetzmacher, supra note 12, at 994 (making a similar point with respect to
attorneys consulting accountants). Since the narrow interpretation denies protection to
almost all third-party consultants, in those states where courts apply a narrow interpreta-
tion of Kovel and deny work-product protection for the intangible, attorneys may be una-
ble to adequately prepare for trial. See Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 28 (citing
commentators that claim rejecting protection to all third-party experts "deals a crippling
blow to pretrial investigation and makes it virtually impossible to prepare adequately for
trial" (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Further, attorneys may then prefer to
seek advice from biased experts so that if the expert communications are disclosed they
have more potential to be in the client's favor. See id. at 28. These two points do not
resonate as much in the federal context because there the work-product doctrine applies
to both tangible and intangible materials.
192. Another potential unanticipated consequence might be for corporate executives to
exclude lawyers from engaging in the multidisciplinary teams to avoid the risks that (a) the
lawyer will disclose confidential, strategic legal information that could later be construed as
a waiver of the privilege and (b) opponents will know to seek discovery of communications
because the presence of the attorney indicates the importance of the meeting and that
potentially useful confidential information about the controversy was discussed.
193. Interview with Law Firm Partner #40, supra note 60, at 16; see supra note 34; see
also Interview with General Counsel #3, supra note 36, at 6 ("They have to know what's
going on in order to give you good advice.").
194. See, e.g., Interview with General Counsel #2, at 21 (Feb. 4, 2003) (on file with
author); Interview with General Counsel #26, at 27 (Feb. 11, 2008) (on file with author) ("I
don't think it's fair to give them only a part of the story, they can't contribute I don't think
as well if they're limited."); Interview with General Counsel #39, at 68 (Apr. 26, 2007) (on
file with author) ("If you keep people in the dark, they end up being mismanaged."); Inter-
view with Law Firm Partner #40, supra note 60, at 15 ("[Y]ou can't really have comforta-
ble candid conversation with [the PR consultant] if you know that you may be waiving the
privilege."). Proponents of the corporate attorney-client privilege often assert that "even
if... the modern corporation has no choice but to communicate with attorneys, a corpo-
rate privilege still might serve to make those communications that do occur more candid
and truthful, as well as to prevent corporate employees from simply refraining from sup-
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may sugar-coat something, like a consent decree, that should be ad-
dressed more candidly so that regulators do not bring additional
charges. 195 Or "they may inadvertently say something that they're not
supposed to,"11 9 6 which could be construed as an admission, false exculpa-
tory statement, or statement later found inconsistent.1 97 Whether it is
less information sharing or refusal to consult altogether, the effectiveness
plying information." Sexton, supra note 2, at 465 (internal quotations omitted). See also
Chambliss, supra note 54, at 1754-55 ("[M]ost lawyers and corporate officials believe that
the privilege does, in fact, promote candor in attorney-client communications, especially as
to potential litigation and other 'sensitive' matters."). As the general counsel of Johnson
and Johnson is reported as stating, "without the privilege, you discourage the necessary
level of trust and open communication between business people and lawyers that is neces-
sary for good decision making." Johnson & Johnson-True to Its Credo, THE METRO.
CORP. COUNSEL, Jan. 2007, at 55, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2007/
January/01.pdf. A general counsel interviewee of a large pharmaceutical company
explained,
I am a big believer in the privilege. You know when you read some of these
opinions on the privilege and they say the privilege prevents people from
finding out what's really going on inside the world. I think they have it com-
pletely backwards. The privilege is what allows my clients to come to me in
the worst times and tell me honestly, that they have done something that
they are worried about.
Interview with General Counsel #42, supra note 50, at 21. This sentiment is supported by
the fact that even the two interviewees who claimed there was less risk of disclosure for
M&A deals due to professional courtesy and alleged recognition by some Delaware courts
of a "deal privilege" stated they would be less forthcoming with external PR consultants if
the narrow approach was adopted. See, e.g., Interview with Law Firm Partner #49, supra
note 37, at 11; Interview with General Counsel #2, supra note 157, at 23. See also infra
notes 280-281.
195. Interview with Law Firm Partner #40, supra note 60, at 22.
196. Id.; see also Interview with General Counsel #2, supra note 157, at 11-12 (explain-
ing that even when a company is innocent of charges, something that is said in the paper
might lead to an investigation for internal control problems under Rule 404 which "could
lead to both civil or regulatory liability").
197. See Kevin C. McMunigal, The Risks, Rewards, and Ethics Client Media Campaigns
in Criminal Cases, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 687, 690 (2008). Consider the recent Roger
Clemens scandal. See generally Gordon Edes, Clemens Implicated in Steroid Scandal by
Trainer, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/sports/
baseball/articles/2007/12/14/clems-implicated in-steroid..scandal-by-trianer/. It is impos-
sible to know what information Clemens shared with his attorney or his PR representatives
or when. However, it does not appear that PR executives were consulted early on or that,
when they were consulted, they were given the whole story. Testifying before Congress
damaged Clemens's reputation and professional future and could have subjected him to
perjury charges. Whether he lied or not, it appeared that he lied. Hypothetically, had his
attorney wanted to convince Clemens not to testify, he may have been able to do so armed
with the information a PR executive could supply about the potential ramifications of de-
nying steroid use before Congress after a long period of silence. Alternatively, if the attor-
ney was unsuccessful in convincing Clemens not to testify, he may have helped Clemens
decide to make a public denial earlier, before the hearings began (if a denial was truthful).
See Marene Gustin, Does Your Business Need A Crisis Plan?, DAILY COURT REVIEW ON
THE WEB, Jan. 29, 2008, http://www.dailycourtreview.com ("By delaying his press confer-
ence in the wake of the Mitchell Report about steroid abuse in major league baseball
[Clemens] gave bloggers and the mainstream media time to come to their own conclu-
sions."). In both situations, the attorney would have provided better legal advice because
the business repercussions (gleaned, in part, from communications with the PR executives)
would have been incorporated. Then again, it could be that Clemens's attorney consulted




of the legal advice and the client's best interests may be at risk. 198
3. May Discourage Corporate Misconduct but Not Enhance Discovery
As discussed above, under the narrow rule, few, if any, communica-
tions with third-party consultants can legitimately be predicted to receive
privilege protection. Therefore, to its credit, the narrow approach does
not enable corporate misconduct or support a lawyer's inclination to take
a broad approach to the corporate attorney-client privilege. Despite this
advantage, however, it is not apparent that discovery will be enhanced,
that is, that more accurate information will flow to the public with such a
narrow rule.' 99 For example, general counsels in the PR Study explained
that the dialogue that occurs between the PR consultant and the attorney
balances the attorney's instinct to limit exposure and the PR consultant's
desire to divulge. 200 True, the issue may be spun in the media even if
lawyers are not involved. However, because the facts surrounding legal
issues are often complicated and hard to communicate to a lay audience,
an open dialogue between attorneys and PR consultants may enable
more specific and more accurate information to reach the public. 20 1 De-
nying protection, therefore, may lead to an altogether different zone of
secrecy-one in which corporations mouth generalities and hold back
specific information or worse, one in which the typical response is "no
comment." One general counsel interviewee explained the effect a very
narrow rule would have had on a prior legal controversy:
It would [have] put a larger wall between PR and Legal. There
would [have] be[en] less communication between the people ....
[W]e would have probably fallen back more often on "No Com-
ment." So then the interests of the world would have been less
served, presuming that the world has an interest in having informa-
tion. The world would have gotten less of the story, and frankly
more of a misunderstanding of what had actually happened would
have been promulgated. 20 2
The 2001 Fair Disclosure Regulation (Reg FD) has had a similar ef-
198. Another potentially damaging consequence of such a narrow rule is that counsel
may try to fill in the gaps-despite not being qualified to do so. This harms the client and
could undermine the lawyer's reputation.
199. Opponents to the corporate attorney-client privilege often support their stance by
claiming that more information will be discoverable without a corporate attorney-client
privilege. Cf Alexander, supra note 14, at 195 ("In a large corporation, cloaking all such
communications with an inflexible privilege may produce a veil of darkness so impenetra-
ble in some cases as to preclude effective discovery of the truth.").
200. See, e.g., Interview with General Counsel #42, supra note 50, at 9; Interview with
General Counsel #37, at 12 (Feb. 8, 2008) (on file with author).
201. According to many of the interviewees, the media "tends to oversimplify complex
issues" and "get the facts and details wrong" when left to their own devices. See, e.g.,
Interview with Law Firm Managing Partner #59, supra note 43, at 21. For further discus-
sion of the role corporate attorneys play in managing media spin around legal issues, see
generally Beardslee, Advocacy Part I, supra note 6, at 9-20.
202. Interview with General Counsel #2, supra note 157, at 20.
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fect.203 Reg FD was passed to prevent issuers from selectively disclosing
material information to analysts, brokers, or journalists, even for a legiti-
mate corporate purpose, because these select individuals could poten-
tially gain a trading benefit.20 4 Thus, Reg FD requires an issuer to
simultaneously or promptly disclose material information to the public
that an issuer purposefully or inadvertently discloses to anyone regarding
that issuer or its securities.20 5 Similarly, although Reg FD requires more
disclosure, those disclosures do not necessarily provide more meaningful,
accurate information to the public. 20 6 Empirical studies show that esti-
mates by analysts are actually less accurate since Reg FD was passed.20 7
Analysts that once relied on early access to non-public information to
project earning expectations now do not have that information and, as a
result, are "less certain [their] earnings estimates will match the profit"
that they report.20 8 Ironically, a more restrictive privilege rule may not
achieve its intended benefit of more disclosure. 20 9
Another consideration is the risk that attorneys will be even more hesi-
tant than they already are to put anything into writing when it involves
third-party consultants. 210 As a law firm partner interviewee explained,
lawyers currently:
worry about documents because they last forever and can be taken
out of context.211 Lawyers are more conservative perhaps than they
would be if they are giving oral advice. [Written advice] can be dis-
covered so that if you are actually making the arguments in both
directions you don't want the judge to read the downside of the
argument. 21 2
203. See supra note 54.
204. See Barr, supra note 54.
205. See Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2009).
206. See Barr, supra note 54 (explaining that Reg FD has increased the amount of in-
formation flowing to the public from corporations but that the market is not necessarily
better informed).
207. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal et al., Who is Afraid of Reg FD? The Behavior and Per-
formance of Sell-Side Analysts Following the SEC's Fair Disclosure Rules, 79 J. Bus. 2811,
2816-26 (2006).
208. Jeff D. Opdyke, The Big Chill: Street Feels Effect of the New Fair Disclosure Rule,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at C1.
209. Indeed, Reg FD may exacerbate this if the narrow rule is the adopted rule. One
general counsel interviewee stated he worries he could "inadvertently get [him]self into a
Reg FD situation" if he knew that conversations with external PR consultants could not be
privileged except under a translator analogy. Interview with General Counsel #2, supra
note 157, at 9-10.
210. Liability often turns on what is provable, not on substance. The lawyers may have
made the same recommendations and the company the same decisions, but a memo that,
for example, advises the client against sanctionable action, can ruin a case. But see Brown,
supra note 63, at 942 (arguing in the context of compelled waiver that "[a] lawyer's ethical
duty of competency combined with a fear of malpractice liability or the possibility that
some other civil or criminal action will be instituted against him or her seem to provide
ample motivation for careful documentation and record-keeping").
211. Interview with Law Firm Partner #55, supra note 33, at 6; see also id. at 7
("urg[ing] clients generally" to "take their advice orally rather than in writing").
212. Id. at 7.
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This worry would only increase if the narrow rule was the only rule. "If
you knew that every time you put something in writing, you faced a real
risk that that communication.. . is not going to be considered privileged
by the court, [it would] impact the way you wrote .... Anybody that tells
you anything to the contrary, isn't being honest. '213 A general counsel
interviewee of a large investment bank said sarcastically, "Memory al-
ways serves you better than writing. ' 214 Given that depositions, even in
good faith, do not yield accurate, complete information, discovery is im-
paired by the failure to keep an accurate record.2 15
A less restrictive rule might make lawyers more comfortable keeping a
record of conversations. As one law firm partner interviewee remarked:
[lawyers] may be more comfortable ... [and] clients will get better
legal advice. It will facilitate your communication if you know that
what you were saying or what you were writing is going to be pro-
tected so that you [don't] have to be constructing even more protec-
tions to make sure that you've done what's necessary to try and
maximize the privilege.2 16
Further, uninhibited consultation between attorneys and third-party spe-
cialists might help corporations craft disclosures in compliance with Reg
FD that are less risky but more forthcoming. Similarly, a better under-
standing of the tax implications of a transaction gained from an invest-
ment banking consultant may enable the lawyers to persuade their
corporate clients to provide more detailed disclosures to stockholders. If
there is value in the public exchange of information, as the Supreme
Court has intimated in cases addressing the First Amendment, 217 a nar-
row rule may not suffice.
4. May Not Increase Compliance
Lastly, although such a narrow standard may deter corporate miscon-
duct, lack of third-party consultation may lead to less compliance and to
less socially desirable decisions. 218 For example, when lawyers consult
213. Interview with Law Firm Partner #59, supra note, at 43. See also Interview with
General Counsel #1, at 5 (Feb. 7, 2008) (on file with author) ("It's not like you will have a
lot of written things that you are sharing if you thought you would lose privilege.").
214. Interview with General Counsel #1, supra note 213, at 5.
215. Interview with Law Firm Partner #55, supra note 33, at 6 ("[W]ith respect to
what's orally said in the meeting, I also don't worry about it frankly too much because you
have [an] endless number of meetings, and if you were called to testify as to what hap-
pened in the meetings no one will remember terribly well what happened three months
ago.").
216. Interview with Law Firm Partner #59, supra note 43, at 24.
217. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561-62 (1980) (referring to "the societal interest in the fullest possible dissemination of
information" and explaining in the context of commercial speech that "[e]ven when adver-
tising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment
presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at all").
218. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390-94 (1981) (emphasizing
that a narrow interpretation of the attorney-client privilege "threatens to limit the valua-
ble efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law"). Propo-
nents of the corporate attorney-client privilege often assert that it helps the flow of
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openly with PR executives, they better understand the reputational
ramifications. This may help the lawyer persuade the CEO against taking
a certain legally risky action. If a large clothing company is considering
contracting with a manufacturing plant that borders on being a sweat-
shop, after consultation with a PR executive, a lawyer may be able to
persuade the CEO not to contract with the company or to do so in a
manner that protects the company from risk of liability and provides a
better media platform at the same time. 219 In fact, lawyers often couch
legal advice in terms of business consequences.220 Additionally, as a few
general counsel interviewees pointed out, consultation with a PR special-
ist may help the attorney determine what a corporation should disclose
because a PR expert may better understand what the public would think
was material. 221
Similar benefits may stem from consultation with other types of third-
party consultants. For example, consultation with the investment bankers
information between attorney and client and thus compliance with the law. Alexander,
supra note 14, at 222. Opponents to the corporate attorney-client privilege often use cases
like Enron and World Bank to emphasize how the attorney-client privilege enables corpo-
rations to finagle regulations and avoid compliance.
219. One PR interviewee made this same point. He said that often lawyers will make
the argument that a particular transaction or course of action should be pursued because it
is legally appropriate, but that he will explain that the company will get highlighted pub-
licly in a way that is significantly disadvantageous and that this would convince senior man-
agement to forgo the action. Interview with Global Head of Corporate Communications
Investment Bank #47, at 5 (Apr. 3, 2008) (on file with author). For example, in the South it
is perfectly legal to engage in mountain top removal to mine coal even though it is environ-
mentally destructive. After talking with a PR executive, an attorney might successfully
argue against the company's involvement from a reputational standpoint.
220. In re County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 420 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that the "com-
plete lawyer may well promote and reinforce the legal advice given, weigh it, and lay out its
ramifications by explaining" implementation, alternative measures, and "collateral bene-
fits, risks or costs in terms of expense, politics, insurance, commerce, morals, and appear-
ances"); Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings
and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 465, 478 (2008) (explaining that
the general counsels in her study "deployed a variety of techniques, including invoking
reputational and ethical considerations to persuade their peers [or] proposing different,
less risky ways to structure transactions"); see also supra Part I.
221. Interview with Associate General Counsel #22, supra note 36, at 6; see also Inter-
view with General Counsel #35, at 17 (Jan. 11, 2008) (on file with author) ("I think you
have to divulge some confidential information to the PR folks so they can understand what
it is.... There are certain times when [our company] was a public company, [and] if we had
a potential crisis[,] aside from whether we wanted to talk about a PR disclosure, we may
have [had] other legal disclosure obligations as part of the SEC or part of the other regula-
tory environment.... So that may force us to take a public position on something, but you
can't really get to that determination without having a fully staffed team that has PR indi-
viduals on there to collectively determine that as a group."). See also supra note 36.
This is not to imply that PR executives control the legal decisions, but they do have
influence. Interview with Counsel, PR/Law Firm #46, at 15 (Sept. 26, 2007) (on file with
author). As a PR interviewee explained, "I mean I cannot say that somebody has ever
written me a letter and said, 'Okay because of what you said we are not going to do this,'
but there have been discussions about both legal and public relations difficulties that could
arise from a particular activity of the client and they decide to change or even not to do it."
Id. Also, although it was not true for most of the interviewees, some claimed that their
companies have very experienced, seasoned internal PR executives that the lawyers consult
with in lieu of external PR consultants. Beardslee, Advocacy Part 1, supra note 6, at 22-34.
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handling a company's upcoming merger could help the attorney decide
what information should be disclosed to the other corporation. Similarly,
an attorney may be better able to assess and convince the client of the
risks of a possible restructuring by talking openly with a tax consultant. 222
Or an attorney may be better able to investigate whether the corporation
is complying with the law and to recommend how to comply in the future
with the help of a third-party consultant or investigator, like the one in
AIB. 223 By consulting with these external specialists, a lawyer is better
able to (a) provide the 360-degree counseling clients need and (b) play
the gatekeeper role.224 Additionally, when external consultants are part
of the internal multidisciplinary team handling the project, they may be
an indispensable source of risk information, because part of their role is
to help manage and predict risks that internal employees and consultants
might overlook. 225
B. THE BROAD AGENCY APPROACH Is Too BROAD
Although the broad agency approach enables informed decision-mak-
ing in a way that the narrow approach does not, it too is less than ideal.
1. Not in Keeping with the Spirit of the Doctrine
a. Inconsistent with Attorney-Client Privilege Doctrine
A broad standard is not in keeping with the maxim that the attor-
ney-client privilege should be construed narrowly because it impedes dis-
222. Not all large corporations have in-house tax specialists.
223. See supra notes 136-142 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court made a simi-
lar point when justifying application of the privilege to lower level corporate employees.
Absent the protection of the privilege, "the depth and quality of any investigations, to
ensure compliance with the law would suffer, even were they undertaken." Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 n.2 (1981).
224. Arguably, an attorney is better able to provide the moral counseling or gatekeep-
ing functions often sought by clients when he or she is able to analyze the nonlegal aspects
of the problem. Gantt, supra note 59, at 383 ("Significant anecdotal evidence supports the
notion that many clients appreciate it when their attorneys offer moral counseling."); Rob-
ert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 25 (1988); Burman, supra
note 125 at 40 (arguing that clients want lawyers to provide more than just the legal as-
pects); see also Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion Part II: How Far
Should Corporate Lawyers Go, GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at
59, on file with author) (arguing that corporate clients want and need attorneys to play a
gatekeeper role but admitting that this notion is contested) [hereinafter Beardslee, Advo-
cacy Part II]; Rostain, supra note 220, at 474 (explaining that despite research findings
suggesting otherwise "[s]everal general counsels [in the study] saw themselves as having an
expansive gatekeeping role, which involved invoking reputational and other concerns in
corporate decision making."); Beardslee, Multidisciplinary Partnerships, supra note 30, at
34-35 ("General Counsel view themselves as the 'ethics conscience of the corporation."'
(quoting a general counsel interviewee from a different study than the PR Study)). For a
larger discussion of the ability of an attorney to play a gatekeeping role, see Sung Hui Kim,
Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 429 (2007); Sung Hui Kim, The
Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983,
986 (2005).
225. Rosen, supra note 28, at 655 (explaining that project teams can lose their objectiv-
ity, so "companies rely on outside experts to manage this risk"); see infra notes 262-263 and
accompanying text.
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covery.226 As such, the broad construction of Kovel risks not only the
search for truth but also the viability of the corporate attorney-client
privilege in general. Increased abuses prompt reconsideration of the ar-
guments against applying the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
context. 227 Cases where a court views the attorney's involvement in
meetings with external consultants as merely a facade to achieve secrecy
erode the defensibility of the privilege.228 Risks to corporate attor-
ney-client privilege protection may exist even if attorneys do not actually
abuse the privilege because the broad standard in and of itself represents
the threat of abuse. Faced with the appearance or the potential of impro-
priety, judges may simply deny coverage.
Additionally, courts applying the broad approach are not always care-
ful to limit protection to communications that are based on or that might
reveal client confidences. 22 9 As a result, they protect all communications
between the attorney and the consultant if in furtherance of legal advice.
For example, in In re Grand Jury Dated March 23, 2003 (the Martha
Stewart Case), the court carefully explained how the consultation with
the external PR consultants facilitated the provision of legal advice and
that non-public facts were disclosed.230 However, it shielded all commu-
nications between the lawyers and the PR consultants that were not dis-
tributed beyond a "need to know" 231 basis-as opposed to shielding only
those confidential communications that were based on or which might
226. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt., No. 02-Civ-7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003); Gertsberg, supra note 12, at 1455-56; Linas, supra note 13, at
421; Murphy, supra note 12, at 590-91.
227. Gertsberg, supra note 12, at 1456 ("While a crime/fraud exception exists to pierce
the attorney-client privilege, the fact that the privilege was used for illegal purposes rein-
forces the idea shared by an increasing number of legal professionals, including those in
the Department of Justice and the SEC, that the attorney-client privilege should be lim-
ited."); Paul R. Rice, How the Tobacco Industry Lost Its Attorney-Client Privilege, LEGAL
TIMES, May 4, 1998, http://www.acprivilege.com/articles/article4.html.
228. NXIVM Corp. v. O'Hara, 241 F.R.D. 109, 140 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (analogizing the
use of an external lawyer to that of a "mule-with the anticipated effect of concealing all
conversations and all actions under the cloak of an attorney-client privilege or work prod-
uct, without any particular professional involvement on [the attorney's] part").
229. See, e.g., H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ-1274, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6578, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995) (privileging all communications
between a PR consultant, attorney, and client in a discovery suit related to trademark
litigation and sale of branded watch); GoldenTrade v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514,
518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. But see In re E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 918 F. Supp. 1524, 1547-48 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (denying protec-
tion to scientific studies produced by external consultants because they were not based on
client confidences but factual scientific evidence gathered through observation of other
data); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(same).
230. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed To (A) Grand Jury
Witness Firm And (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see also H.W. Carter & Sons, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6578, at *7-8 (emphasizing the confi-
dentiality of conversation between the client, lawyer, and PR consultants instead of analyz-
ing whether specific communications contained confidential information).
231. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
2009]
SMU LAW REVIEW
have disclosed client confidences. 232 Thus, it is not clear that courts ap-
plying a broader standard would deny protection to the studies conducted
by the external scientists in the drug-recall scenario, even though they
were conducted for business purposes and were not based on client confi-
dences.233 Similarly, these same courts might protect both draft press re-
leases in their entirety and all the notes taken by the PR executive in the
drug-recall scenario even if parts do not disclose confidential client infor-
mation or legal advice.
b. Inconsistent with Third-Party Attorney-Client Privilege Doctrine
The broadest interpretation of Kovel is also inconsistent with the spirit
of the original Kovel decision; it sweeps in more than a careful reading of
Kovel would permit. The passage that gave birth to the first third-party
exception stressed that protection should be afforded in circumstances
where it was necessary or indispensable for effective legal services. 234 Al-
though the Second Circuit too narrowly interpreted "necessary" to
equate to situations in which the attorney cannot understand what the
client has already communicated, 235 other courts have too widely inter-
preted "necessary" to mean merely "helpful" or "facilitating. '2 36 The
broad approach is like a presumption that the communication with the
third-party consultant will be protected versus the original notion that the
attorney-client privilege is an exception to the existing broad discovery
regime237 and that communication with third parties waives the privilege
(or prevents it from attaching).2 38
2. May Promote Informed Decision-Making and Compliance but
Shield Information
Arguably, a broad approach may promote informed decision making
and increased compliance because attorneys can be fairly confident that
communications with third-party consultants will be protected. Armed
with the business consequences, an attorney may be better able to con-
vince senior management not to take a legally risky action that might
232. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331, 334. Perhaps the court was
assuming that the normal parameters of the privilege apply. However, since the language
it used included but revised the normal attorney-client privilege standard, this is unlikely.
233. This may be true even if the distribution went beyond a need to know. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text describing tobacco companies' use of third parties to shel-
ter otherwise discoverable communications.
234. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
235. See id.
236. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1191
("[Clommunications between the client and his agent made for the purpose of facilitating
the rendition of legal services would be covered by the privilege."); Black & Decker Corp.
v. United States, 219 F.R.D. 87, 90 (D. Md. 2003) ("[I]f the accountant is needed to facili-
tate communication between the client and the attorneys, then the communications with
the accountant are protected by the privilege.").
237. Rice, supra note 170, at 742.
238. As discussed below, the harm from this standard is not merely derivative; there-
fore, a rigorous application of the other factors is not the solution.
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technically comport with law. However, the words "useful," "helpful," or
"facilitating" encompass too much and create a large zone of secrecy. For
example, in one case, the court simply cited Kovel and stated that confi-
dentiality was not waived by the presence of the third-party consultants
during the client-lawyer meeting because the consultants participated in
the meeting to help the lawyer render legal advice about how the client
should react to the litigation.239 If such a court were dealing with the
drug-recall scenario, it might shield all communications with the external
PR agent and all the documents the PR agent created. However, the
document that recommends the best media response should not be pro-
tected. Although "useful," it was arguably not necessary to provide legal
advice (and was likely motivated more by reputational than legal con-
cerns). Similarly, protecting all the communications during the meeting is
over-inclusive.
3. May Enable Corporate Misconduct
It is easier to hide abuse and is harder to uncover it when the standard
is very broad. 240 Therefore, to a degree, a broad approach encourages
corporate misconduct. This is because when corporate actors believe that
there is little chance of discovery, they are more apt to misbehave.241
Moreover, a broad approach may signal to attorneys that an aggressive
approach to the privilege is acceptable and, therefore, should be pursued
to further clients' interests.242
239. H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ-1274, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6578, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995).
240. See generally Rice, supra note 170. This is likely why so many courts adhere to the
narrow standard.
241. Cf Baum, supra note 15, at 67 ("If... litigation opponents can be denied access to
damning information due to the existence of the attorney-client privilege, the corporation
might choose to pursue sanctionable actions."); id. at 69 (explaining that "sanctionable
actions are privately desirable by corporations, [when] they produce a higher expected
profit, yet they are socially harmful").
242. Think of it in terms of a budget. If your budget is unlimited, you buy different
things than if the budget is capped. Susan Koniak made a similar point in her testimony
before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the fall of Enron. She
argued that the broadness of the securities laws "invited" lawyers to "fail[ ] to 'know' what
the facts in front of the lawyer plainly suggest-that the client is committing fraud." Ac-
countability Issues: Lessons Learned From Enron's Fall: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 45-46 (2002) (testimony of Susan P. Koniak, Professor of Law,
Boston University School of Law), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testi-
mony.cfm?id=149&witid=135 (recommending, inter alia, that Congress revise the securi-
ties laws to "replace the 'knowingly' standard.., and provide that recklessness will suffice
in actions brought by the SEC and by private parties as well"). Similarly, court decisions
applying a broad approach to communications between attorneys and third-party consul-
tants may have supported the tobacco attorneys' aggressive assertion of privilege protec-
tion for external studies and communications with outside researchers. Cf Green, supra
note 15, at 416-17 (describing tobacco attorneys' aggressive reading of privilege and at-
tempts to cover up information); id. at 422-24, 429 (arguing that the ABA's position that
"'progressive advocacy' is important in 'modern business lawyering"' was "read by many
to mean that corporate lawyers may adopt aggressive legal interpretations and exploit legal
loopholes" and likely contributed to the attorneys' "aggressive reading" of the corporate
attorney-client privilege (quoting Brief for the A.B.A. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (No. 93-489)).
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Additionally, because it is hard to prove frivolous an argument that
something merely facilitated legal advice, this standard, combined with
the lack of definitive factors to make the business-law distinction, facili-
tates pre-trial gaming. Corporations often assert privilege for hundreds
of documents without adequate support, which delays the process and
influences negotiations.2 43 Consequently, the party with the deeper
pockets can win the war by papering the other party to death even if it
might ultimately lose the battle over the privilege claims. Moreover, a
broad interpretation, unlike a narrow one, makes false assertions of privi-
lege less obvious and, therefore, more effective in dissuading opponents
from challenges.2 44
C. THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENTS TEST Is ALSO Too BROAD
The functional equivalents test suffers from some of the same problems
as the broad agency approach and is, therefore, also inadequate.
1. Not in Keeping with the Spirit of the Doctrine
Because PR consultants, such as those in the drug-recall scenario, can
be deemed functional equivalents even though they are hired for a dis-
crete project and remain at (and loyal to) their outside agencies, an op-
portunity for manipulation is created. As Professor Rosen points out,
many corporations today act as though they have "porous borders" and
adopt a team model of organization, creating teams around finite projects
or crises. 245 They deploy outside consultants on these internal teams in a
way that eliminates barriers between employees and non-employees. 246
Roles are fluid and team members openly share information and ideas.
243. Corporations use privilege wars to their advantage when they can-sometimes to
purposefully enable privileged documents to be read by the judge. Interview with Law
Firm Partner #55, supra note 33, at 6-7 ("I once wrote a letter to a client giving legal advice
on a matter in the midst of litigation believing that it was privileged but actually wanting
the judge to read it .... We listed it on the privilege log and the judge had to read it in
order to determine whether or not it was privileged. He found it was privileged and [it
was] not produced, but in the meantime he read my arguments as to why I thought my
client should win."). These types of shenanigans likely occur in cases involving third-party
consultants as well. See, e.g., FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(whittling thousands of documents to hundreds via court ordered negotiation process and
finally seeking resolution for ninety-one at trial); United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp.,
241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (reviewing one hundred eighty documents for
attorney-client privilege); Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4561, at *6-7 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001).
244. Baum, supra note 15, at 72 (observing that "corporations have an incentive to
assert the privilege also when the assertion is false" because "it is costly for plaintiffs to
challenge the assertion[s]" and "since the assertion might be true, a positive payoff for the
plaintiff is not guaranteed").
245. Rosen, supra note 28, at 643-49 (analyzing organizational development in corpora-
tions and how law firms are re-organizing to serve company teams). Qualitative interviews
from the PR Study also supported this. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
246. Rosen, supra note 28, at 649 ("The distinction between inside and outside blurs
with outsiders being part of the decision-making team.").
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247 Thus, if courts continue to consider the standard practice, context,
corporate climate, and average duration of similar projects and thereby
deemphasize the "continuing position" requirement outlined in Upjohn,
almost any outside consultant hired by one of these "boundary-less" cor-
porations would qualify as a functional equivalent. For example, the
third-party consultant that was hired to help the outside law firm conduct
the internal investigation in AIB might meet a functional equivalents test.
248 Similarly, the external PR consultant brought in to deal with the drug-
recall crisis, depending on interactions with the client, might be deemed a
functional equivalent of the drug company's employees. As discussed,
this has happened. 249
It is a theoretical stretch, however, to apply the functional equivalents
theory to the external PR consultant in the drug-recall scenario (and
thereby protect most, if not all, the communications in the hypothetical),
even though he or she will likely be consulting for many months on the
matter.250  The circumstances in which third-party consultants are
deemed functional equivalents today are likely different than those
imagined by the original creators of the functional equivalents theory.
247. Id. at 650 ("[S]eeing the company [with] porous borders means recognizing that
transactions with outsiders are not, and need not be, arms-length deals.").
248. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. An ironic example is United States
v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999). There, the client's internal tax counsel met with the
investment banker to understand, communicate, and help finesse the potential legal and
financial risks of the proposal. Id. at 138. Had the investment banker ultimately been the
banker to oversee the actual transaction (as it usually happens), he would have held an
important influential position and would have likely been the only person in possession of
certain information about the transaction. See id.; Sexton, supra note 2, at 498 (describing
a functional equivalent as holding "extremely sensitive ... position[s] as financial adviser,
reviewer, and agent"). Although only hired temporarily for a finite period of time, he
would have been treated like other employees on the team, copied on memos, expected to
participate in meetings, and thereby have information important to the lawyer in providing
legal services. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text; See generally McCaugherty
v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 235-39 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (applying similar reasoning to pro-
tect communications with liquidation consultants); Rosen, supra note 28, at 646-51. Like in
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc., No. 01-Civ-3016, 2002 WL
31556383, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002), a court may consider important that this transac-
tion was a one-off. Therefore, he might have been considered a functional equivalent of
the corporation's employees.
249. FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also In re Copper
Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 219-220 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (protecting manufacturing
and marketing documents shared with external public and government relations consul-
tants because the third-party consultants were treated just like the other full time employ-
ees that were part of the litigation/legal strategy crisis team).
250. The drug-recall scenario is slightly different than that in In re Copper, where a
Japanese commodities trading company temporarily hired an outside PR agency to deal
with reputation issues related to litigation because it did not have experience dealing with
Western media and the company executives struggled with English. In re Copper, 200
F.R.D. at 215. Because "[the company's] internal resources were insufficient to cover the
task," and confidential communications between the companies "were made for the pur-
pose of facilitating the rendition of legal service," the court held that the outside PR
agency was a functional equivalent of the company. Id. at 219-20. Yet, even this case does
not exemplify functional equivalency in its truest form because the PR company was not
hired as an independent contractor for an ongoing position. Id. It was hired for a discrete
crisis, and the company lacked sufficient resources to handle it. Id.
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Outsourcing the sales force or the IT department for an indefinite period
of time in order to save on health care costs is very different than hiring a
third-party consultant to aid internal managers in running finite projects
or in dealing with a specific crisis-especially when the company has
dedicated internal staff to the matter. 251
True, the team approach to organization cuts both ways. Functional
equivalency is supposed to give protection to independent contractors
that are treated like any other employees. In a company with porous
borders, these temporary external consultants behave and are treated like
other employees on the project team.252 When the team is dissolved,
work on the project ends for both internal and external team members.
Why, then, should the functional equivalents doctrine not bend to chang-
ing times, to the new model of organization? 253 The answer is twofold:
(a) third parties may potentially serve a gatekeeping function, and (b) as
discussed below, this test shields information that would be discoverable
under an agency theory.
2. May Increase Informed Decision Making and Compliance but
Decrease Discovery
As with the broad approach, the functional equivalents exception en-
ables communications with third-party consultants to be protected in
many circumstances. Therefore, for the same reasons described above,
this exception may enhance informed decision making and compliance.
However, once the third-party consultant is deemed a functional
equivalent, the analysis falls under Upjohn, which may afford even more
expansive protection than that provided by the broadest Kovel theory.254
This is because the functional equivalent "is" the de facto client and,
therefore, all of the information and the advice that the functional
equivalent shares with the lawyer is considered confidential client infor-
mation. Moreover, when an "employee" communicates with an attorney,
many courts presume that the communication is for legal advice and do
not require a strong connection between the information provided and
the employee's duties. 255
Today, plaintiffs and the government find it very difficult to elicit infor-
mation from corporate employees who are scared to talk-especially
251. Cf. Rosen, supra note 28, at 647-48 (explaining that outsourcing includes not only
contingency based hiring of non-employee workers to do basic organizational functions,
but also professional service consultants for their investment in R&D, varied experience,
and efficient, high quality work).
252. Id. at 649.
253. This question is salient since, in advocating a standard broader than the narrow
approach, this Article is arguing (to a degree) that the third-party attorney-client privilege
doctrine bends to changing times.
254. Hamilton, supra note 64, at 650 ("Upjohn left the door open for the corporate
attorney-client privilege's possible application where there are only tenuous connections
between the subject of the communication and the employee's work-related duties."). See
also supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
255. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 938-39 (8th Cir. 1994). See supra note 254.
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when corporate counsel is present, as is usually the case. Therefore, third
parties are a valuable source of information. They know how the corpo-
ration is monitored and structured. Additionally, transparency-infor-
mation about what third-party consultants and lawyers are doing-assists
regulation.2 56 Protecting these consultants to the same extent that em-
ployees are protected lends less transparency to the public. This, in turn,
may reduce confidence in the economy, which has been prone to failure
lately. The recent subprime mortgage scandals and the collapse of key
investment banks are great examples.
Application of the functional equivalents test may enable corporations
to use attorney involvement to circumvent discovery of sanctionable ac-
tion.2 57 For example, external scientists hired to be part of an internal
drug R&D team could be deemed functional equivalents and all the stud-
ies reflecting health risks could be protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege under Upjohn if they aided the lawyer in providing legal advice to
the team (and were not distributed beyond a need-to-know). The com-
pany could then more freely ignore these results or fail to disclose them
without fear of discovery. Therefore, in the drug-recall hypothetical, the
clinical studies could be protected if a court determined their wide distri-
bution was not beyond a "need to know" basis. Arguably, this could also
occur if the scientists are internal employees, but should not the corpora-
tion shoulder the costs of staffing its needs in order to garner protec-
tion?2 58 In short, because porous borders of corporations make
temporary, external consultants functional equivalents of the corpora-
tion's employees, the functional equivalents test not only collapses with
the broadest approach to Kovel but may prove even more expansive.
3. May Not Deter Corporate Misconduct
Moreover, external consultants, although appearing to behave and be
treated just like the internal team members, may be separate in one key
respect. External consultants have different interests than employees,
and especially, upper management.2 59 Although they have some of the
256. Although they disagree on the balance to be struck between transparency and a
client's right to protect information, both Bruce A. Green and William H. Simon appear to
agree that some level of transparency can facilitate professional regulation. Bruce A.
Green, The Market for Bad Legal Scholarship: William H. Simon's Experiment in Profes-
sional Regulation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1605, 1612 (2008) ("[T]here is a tension between the
regulatory interest in transparency and client confidentiality, which promotes the private
and public interest in obtaining effective legal assistance."); William H. Simon, The Market
for Bad Legal Advice: Academic Professional Responsibility Consulting as an Example, 60
STAN. L. REv. 1555, 1561 (2008) ("Secrecy removes another mechanism of lawyer
accountability.").
257. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
258. Also, one could argue that this could result in less use of consultants, which may
have negative consequences as argued earlier, but if the consultation is necessary and the
corporation wants to better protect itself, it can hire the consultant as an employee.
259. Those in opposition to the corporate attorney-client privilege often make a similar
argument with respect to employees. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Se-
crecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
157, 173-74 (1993) (suggesting that corporate employees and clients have different interests
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same objectives, they do not necessarily have a commonality of interests.
They are part of a different organization that has its own corporate cul-
ture.2 60 These differences can potentially have both negative and positive
consequences. On one hand, the variance in interest and culture between
the external consultant and the client could influence team members to
behave in a way that does not comport with the norms and ethics of the
corporate client. 261 On the other hand, these differences could serve a
very useful function. Outside consultants may not fall prey to the same
subjectivity as the "real" internal team members. 262 Thus, as Professor
Rosen points out, they may be able to protect against the risk that the
team will lose objectivity because of its propinquity to the project. 263 A
rule that shields communications with external consultants if they are
treated like employees encourages clients to treat them like employees,
which may eventually erode the ability of the external consultant to serve
this function. Thus, functional equivalency may inculcate inapposite
norms into the corporate culture or prevent gatekeeping.
D. THE DOCTRINE IS UNPREDICTABLE AND SUBJECT TO ABUSE
For the reasons discussed, this Article argues that each of the current
individual approaches is inadequate. As it stands today, however, courts
can use any of the approaches to determine whether communications
with third-party consultants will be privileged. This creates additional
problems.
1. Covertly Unpredictable
In addition to being substantively off-balance, the third-party attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine is unpredictable and results in varying inter-
pretation and application. Courts within the same district have applied
different interpretations of the agency exception, 264 and protection can
and, therefore, that employee candor is limited because the privilege only protects the
corporation). But see Glynn, supra note 14, at 78 ("[I1n many circumstances the entity, its
decision makers, and its employees will have mutual interests."). If employees sometimes
do not have mutual interests with the corporate entity and the decision makers, arguably
this might be true for workers that are external to the corporation.
260. Tamar Frankel, Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations, 62
Bus. LAW. 161, 161-64 (2006) (arguing that corporations have a culture that is a "social
habit" and that the expected form and substance of interaction amounts to the "culture" of
the corporation).
261. Depending on the existing culture of the corporate client, this could be a positive
or a negative impact. But see Joan MacLeod Heminway, Does Sarbanes-Oxley Foster the
Existence of Ethical Executive Role Models in the Corporation?, 3 J. oF Bus. & TECH. L.
221, 223 (2008) (contending that "[c]reating or changing the ethical components of culture
in a corporation is exceedingly difficult").
262. This is their claimed virtue, although more research needs to be done to confirm it.
263. Rosen, supra note 28, at 655. See supra note 225.
264. See, e.g., Allied Irish Banks v. Bank of Am., 240 F.R.D. 96, 101, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (adhering to the narrow approach of Kovel); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated
March 24, 2003 Directed To (A) Grand Jury Witness Firm And (B) Grand Jury Witness,
265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying a more moderate approach of Kovel);
[Vol. 62
The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
hinge on which exception theory is applied by the court.265 Indeed, com-
munications with third-party consultants that would be denied protection
under a narrow agency theory can prevail under a functional equivalents
test.266 Therefore, protection of third-party communication can turn not
only on which interpretation of Kovel is used, but also on the choice be-
tween agency and functional equivalents theories. A recent case between
Labatt and Molson Breweries highlights this point. 267 Labatt's attorney
met with Labatt's PR and advertising agencies to ensure "that the content
of the advertising placed by the agencies would not undercut the theories
expounded in the [related] litigation. '268 Applying a narrow agency the-
ory, 269 the majority upheld the lower court's ruling that the handwritten
notes taken by the external PR consultant during the meeting were dis-
coverable even though they revealed litigation strategy. 270 The dissent,
however, analyzed the case under the functional equivalents theory; and
it concluded that the consultants were functional equivalents of Labatt
employees and that the attorney met with them "for the purpose of assur-
ing that the agents take legally correct actions on the client's behalf." 271
Thus, the decision can turn on which theory is applied. 272
Moreover, there is little guidance on which factors will be considered
when applying either exception. Even those courts that claim to apply
more stringent tests than the broadest application of Kovel do not isolate
key factors to guide future courts or litigants. 273 As a result, attorneys do
not know ex ante how the privilege will be applied. For example, over
fifty percent of general counsel respondents in the PR Study hired exter-
nal PR consultants to manage a legal controversy in the last three years;
yet the findings suggest that they are uncertain about what types of infor-
H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ-1274, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6578, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995) (applying a broad approach of Kovel).
265. See, e.g., Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer, Inc., 707 F.
Supp. 1429, 1445-46 (D. Del. 1989) (explaining that the difference between a patent agent
acting as a client's constructive employee as opposed to an agent of the attorney is impor-
tant and determinative although formalistic).
266. See id. at 1445.
267. Dorf & Stanton Commc'ns, Inc. v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
268. John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, No. M885, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 507, at
*3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1995), enforced sub. nom. Dorf & Stanton Commc'ns, Inc. v. Mol-
son Breweries, 100 F.3d 919 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
269. Although it is not completely clear from the opinion, it appears that the lower
court based its decision, in part, on a narrow interpretation of Kovel. See Labatt, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 507, at *4 ("The documents themselves do not indicate either the seeking of
legal advice or the confidentiality of their contents."); see also Dorf & Stanton Commc'ns,
Inc., 100 F.3d at 927-28 (Newman, J., dissenting).
270. Dorf & Stanton Commc'ns, Inc., 100 F.3d at 923-24 (majority opinion).
271. Id. at 928 (Newman, J., dissenting). Cf Murphy, supra note 12, at 572 (explaining
that the dissent "analyzed the case under a completely different theory").
272. This is not a lone case. As mentioned above, court majorities have deemed exter-
nal consultants functional equivalents of the corporate client. See supra notes 109-16 and
accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed To (A) Grand Jury Witness Firm And (B)
Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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mation sharing might endanger the attorney-client privilege.274 In keep-
ing with those findings, it did not appear that the interviewees in the PR
Study fully comprehended the real state of the doctrine or, understanda-
bly, when communications with external PR consultants would be cov-
ered by the attorney-client privilege. 275 As mentioned before, attorneys
believe that it is important to share information with the external consult-
ant to provide the best legal advice, which puts the attorneys in an un-
wieldy position. 276 Unsurprisingly, forty-seven percent of survey
respondents said they were uncomfortable sharing any confidential infor-
mation with external PR consultants. Thus, those attorneys that believe
that the narrow rule is "the" rule today are likely neither utilizing the
external consultants to their fullest potential nor providing the most in-
formed legal advice to their corporate clients. 277 Alternatively, some at-
torneys may take advantage of the lack of clarity of the doctrine and
pursue false privilege claims, understanding that the costs associated with
challenging the assertion are high and the opponent has no dependable
way to predict a ruling.278
True, doctrine is often unpredictable and unworkable. However, here
it is covertly so. Scholars and courts often present the third-party attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine as if it were clear and there were only one
standard. 279 Although the interviewees seemed to be aware that protec-
274. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
275. Some of the interviewees mentioned the agency theory and the recent Martha
Stewart case in which the court protected communications between the attorney and the
external PR consultant. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326. Some of
the attorney interviewees seemed to be aware that courts do not always side in favor of
protection. But none mentioned the functional equivalents theory as a mode for protect-
ing communications with external PR consultants. Indeed, when they talked about the
attorney-client privilege, the lawyer interviewees rarely justified arguments for privilege
protection in specific doctrinal terms. Instead, they described tactics they employed that
were based on a vague notion they had about what was required for protection and often
this notion was inaccurate. For example, one lawyer interviewee declared that the attor-
ney-client privilege would apply to communications with external PR consultants if there
was "baseline agreement of confidentiality and they become agents." Interview with Gen-
eral Counsel #31, supra note 31, at 17. Another explained, "if [the external PR executives]
are part of [the lawyer's] team as opposed to part of the client's team, you have more
potential that it's [protected] .... It's more that it's part of the legal strategy as opposed to
the business strategy." Interview with Law Firm Partner #460, supra note 60, at 13; see also
infra notes 280, 282. These findings are supported by the literature. Glynn, supra note 14,
at 82 ("[Olne of the consistent findings in the aforementioned surveys is how little corpo-
rate executives, other laypeople, and attorneys understand the scope and, more impor-
tantly, limitations of the privilege.").
276. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
277. The few interviewees that appeared to believe that communications would not be
protected were "very careful not to accidentally waive privilege by, for example, having
a[n] [external] PR person in on a meeting where confidential information is discussed."
See, e.g., Interview with General Counsel #38 (Nov. 1, 2008) (on file with author).
278. Baum, supra note 15, at 72-73 (arguing in the context of the attorney-client privi-
lege in general that corporations "have an incentive to assert the privilege ... when the
assertion is false" because "it is costly for plaintiffs to challenge the assertion" and "since
the assertion may be true, a positive pay-off ... is not guaranteed").
279. Many scholars and courts do not outwardly recognize that there is more than one
standard applicable to third-party consultation or more than one approach to the agency
exception or that application of the third-party doctrine is complex. See, e.g., In re Grand
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tion "can be a challenge" when confidential information is shared with
external PR consultants, the majority of interviewees believed they had a
"good argument" that communications with external consultants are priv-
ileged.280 In keeping with that, fifty-three percent of general counsel re-
spondents to the S&P 500 survey in the PR Study appeared to believe
that attorney-client privilege law was clear and would protect communi-
cations with external PR consultants. 28' This is perhaps even more dis-
concerting than the number of general counsels who remain uncertain
Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326; Baum, supra note 15, at 64 n.6 (claiming that courts
have "done away" with protection of communications with third-party consultants "by
holding that lawyer communications ... will only be privileged when the professional acts
as an 'interpreter' for the lawyer"); Corcoran, supra note 44, at 725 (explaining only the
broadest interpretation); Hantler et al., supra note 10, at 25, 29 (claiming attorney-client
privilege protects communications with non-testifying experts that assist attorneys in provi-
sion of legal services and failing to identify the varying ways courts apply the doctrine);
Linas, supra note 13, at 407 (claiming that attorney-client privilege, as it relates to account-
ants, patent agents, and non-testifying experts "is well-established and poses few problems
for attorneys who wish to ensure that their communications with clients will be privi-
leged"); Murphy, supra note 12, at 570 (explaining only the narrow interpretation and the
functional equivalents theory); see Joseph W. Martini & Charles F. Willson, Defending
Your Client in the Court of Public Opinion, 28 CHAMPION 20, 21 (2004); see also United
States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1975); In re Tri-State Outdoor Media
Group, Inc., 283 B.R. 358, 363 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2002); cf. Davis & Beisecker, supra note
10, at 594 (recognizing that "categorization of others as agents for the lawyer has been less
clear" but explaining that "[c]ommunications with accountants, administrative practition-
ers and patent agents have all been protected by the attorney-client privilege where...[their] purpose was to assist the lawyer in rendering legal services to the client"); Jones,
supra note 51, at 423-33 (recognizing that determining whether the privilege applies to an
agent is "difficult" under Kovel but failing to identify the various ways courts have inter-
preted Kovel).
280. Interview with General Counsel #30, at 20 (July 10, 2008) (on file with author).
See also Interview with General Counsel #31, supra note 31, at 17 (recognizing that it is not
a one hundred percent guarantee, especially given the culture of waiver with the govern-
ment, but believing that if there is a "baseline agreement of confidentiality," the external
consultants are agents and communications would be protected by the privilege); Interview
with General Counsel #29, at 31 (June 7, 2008) (on file with author) (understanding the
issue but believing that communications with external consultants would likely be pro-
tected); Interview with General Counsel #27, at 18 (June 1, 2008) (on file with author)
(explaining that it "is very hard to generalize but there are very specific strategies on how
to preserve and protect the privilege, for example, having counsel, that may be outside
counsel, in every discussion"). Two interviewees mentioned that Delaware courts and
M&A lawyers recognize a "deal privilege" protecting communications with external con-
sultants in M&A deals. Interview with Law Firm Partner #49, supra note 37, at 11; Inter-
view with General Counsel #2, supra note 157, at 23. Although there exists something
called "business strategy immunity," it is not clear that any "deal privilege" as described by
the interviewees really exists. See Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., No.
3841-VCL, 2008 WL 3878339, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2008) ("[B]usiness strategy immu-
nity has been invoked by this court to prevent discovery 'where the information disclosed
may not be used for proper legal purposes, but rather for practical business advantages."'
(quoting NiSource Capital Mkts., Inc. v. Columbia Energy Group, No. CIV. A. 17341, 1999
WL 959183, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24, 1999))). For example, in a recent case, a Delaware
court held that communications between the corporation and its financial advisors during
merger negotiations were not protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product
doctrine, or the rule protecting facts or opinions of non-testifying experts. See Hexion
Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., No. 3841-VCL, 2008 WL 3878339 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 22, 2008); see also supra note 275.
281. This is consistent with the interviews. See supra note 275, sources cited supra note
280; see also Glynn, supra note 14, at 80-81 ("[S]ome of the misunderstandings in particular
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how to safely handle communications with external PR consultants. 282
The problem is not simply that application of the privilege is uncertain.
Instead, it is that attorneys cannot calculate the risks of exposure and
many believe that the risks are lower than they currently are. As the
Supreme Court stated in Upjohn, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the
courts, is little better than no privilege at all."
'283
2. Allows Inconsistent and Inequitable Results
In addition to "duplicative work" that wastes time and effort, 284 the
doctrine's lack of predictability risks inconsistent and inequitable results.
A judge in one court may deny protection to the same communication
which a judge in another court deems privileged.28 5 A system that ap-
plies different tests or provides different results for similar actions is not
perceived as administering justice-one of the original justifications for
the attorney-client privilege itself.286 Although its elasticity enables
judges to deny protection when they think attorneys are using it to create
a zone of secrecy-arguably a good thing-the third-party doctrine en-
ables judges to deny protection based on a bias against certain types of
third parties.287 For example, a judge that feels that PR matters should
never be considered integral to the provision of legal services can easily
deny protection to external PR consultants.288 The doctrine's obscurity
support the conclusion that executives, employees, and attorneys speak freely because they
believe the communications will remain confidential.").
282. There is other evidence that attorneys are confused and uncertain. Posting of
Beck/Herrmann, The Privilege and Public Relations Firms, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW, http://
druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2007/05/privilege-and-public-relations-firms.html (May 11,
2007, 3:42 PM) (on file with author) (discussing the uncertainty around protection of com-
munications with PR consultants and whether it is safer for the attorney or the client to
hire the consultant); Glynn, supra note 194, at 80-83 (contending that the current attor-
ney-client privilege doctrine is uncertain and that clients do not understand its scope).
283. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
284. Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 73 (1992) ("[A]dherence to precedent increases judicial efficiency by
eliminating the duplicative work and the risk of error from incompetence or bias that
would result from starting each case anew from first principles."); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 972 (1995) ("Rules can, in short, be the most
efficient way to proceed, by saving time and effort, and by reducing the risk of error in
particular cases.").
285. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt., No. 02-Civ-7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at
*8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003) (denying protection to all communications between PR con-
sultant, attorney, and client); H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ-
1274,1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6578, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995) (privileging all commu-
nications between PR consultant, attorney, and client).
286. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (explaining that the privilege was
devised "in the interest and administration of justice" (emphasis added)).
287. The current doctrine is vague and conflicting. As such, it enables judges to sup-
plant their own substance and political preferences. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1690 (1976); cf Frederick
Schauer, PLAYING BY THE RULES, 98 (1991) (discussing rules as "devices for the allocation
of power").
288. Although hard to prove, in a few case opinions, the language indicates that the
judge would never believe that communications with PR consultants could aid legal advice.
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also confers special power to the government. A regulator can more eas-
ily "convince" a corporation to waive the privilege when failure to waive
might result in more severe charges, and the corporation cannot accu-
rately assess the likelihood of privilege protection absent waiver.289
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed, the current doctrine that protects communications be-
tween lawyers, clients, and third-party consultants is unpredictable.
Worse yet, the two approaches that have emerged are inadequate. The
broad approach is too expansive, and the narrow approach is too con-
strictive. So, where should the line be drawn? Which communications
with third-party consultants should be protected? There are some diffi-
culties in answering this question. First, as discussed in Part II.C, there is
the difficulty in determining when a communication is for legal as op-
posed to business advice. Second, answering this question requires (to a
certain extent) bracketing the dispute about whether the attorney-client
privilege should be applied to corporations. 290 Therefore, the central in-
quiry of this Article is: How capacious should the corporate attor-
ney-client privilege be? As corporations' boundaries continue to expand,
the use of outside consultants grows, and therefore the need for attorney
consultation increases, should the attorney-client privilege follow suit?
As demonstrated by the analysis of the current approaches to the third-
party privilege doctrine, there is a danger that the attorney-client privi-
lege could become too capacious with respect to communications with
third-party consultants. It could (as argued with respect to the broad ap-
proach) encourage corporate misconduct and provide a huge zone of se-
crecy in opposition to open discovery rules. However, if the
attorney-client privilege is interpreted in this context too restrictedly
(like the narrow approach), it may fail to provide its intended benefits,
like informed decision making and increased compliance. Moreover, it is
hard for the privilege to be valuable if attorneys cannot make any logical
prediction ex ante about which communications will be privileged, or at
See, e.g., Dorf & Stanton Commc'ns, Inc. v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919, 924-28 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (Newman, J., dissenting); John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, No. M885, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 507, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 1995) (refusing to protect notes taken by
external PR consultant during a meeting even though the notes contained details about the
litigation strategy and legal advice), enforced sub. nom Doff & Stanton Commc'ns, Inc. v.
Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919 (Fed. Cir. 1006). See also Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v.
Wachner (Calvin Klein 1), 198 F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It may be that the modern
client comes to court as prepared to massage the media as to persuade the judge; but
nothing in the client's communications for the former purpose constitutes the obtaining of
legal advice or justifies a privileged status.").
289. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. This issue is not limited to the third
party context but is exacerbated there because the privilege is already unpredictable in the
corporate context. Sexton, supra note 2, at 471. Furthermore, large corporations can be
hailed into almost any state or federal court or both. Cf Hamilton, supra note 64, at 654
("[I]nconsistent application throughout the nation makes structuring a company's affairs to
conform to various privilege regimes a daunting task.").
290. See supra note 14. But see supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
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least know by which standard the communications will be judged. The
point is that whatever solution is developed should excel on the criteria
identified in Part Ill-criteria that is often used to analyze whether a cor-
porate attorney-client privilege should exist. That is, it should be de-
signed to limit corporate misconduct and a zone of secrecy, but also to
enable informed decision-making and compliance. Moreover, it should
strive to be consistent with the spirit of the corporate attorney-client priv-
ilege and to provide some enhancement in predictability and clarity over
that afforded by the current regime. Based on these first principles, the
following sections provide a specific proposal for revising the third-party
corporate attorney-client privilege doctrine and an analysis of the
proposal.
A. SPECIFIC PROPOSAL2 9 1
The attorney-client privilege is an exception to the general rule that
relevant information should be discoverable. 292 It is a privilege. There-
fore, as communications move farther away from the traditional, formal
lawyer-client scenario, there should be more concern over the substance
and purpose of the communication. Therefore, this Article recommends
a standard that, on the one hand, permits more external consultation than
does the narrow approach, but, on the other, constricts courts' ability to
construe the privilege very broadly and alerts attorneys to confer with
third-party consultants with care and deliberation.
1. One Uniform Standard
This Article proposes adopting one uniform standard, based on an
agency theory, to analyze whether third-party consultation waives the at-
torney-client privilege. At first it may seem strange to excise the func-
tional equivalents test, since it addresses how the third party works in
relation to other employees, while the agency test addresses how the third
party aids the attorney. However, as discussed, the differences between
the two exceptions fade in application.293 In practice, both theories place
291. Although these recommendations are intended for federal courts and third-party
consultation in the corporate context, they could also be applied to states and the
individual context. State attorney-client privilege law is obscure and suffers from similar
problems to those discussed here. Cf Hamilton, supra note 64, 633-40 (surveying state
corporate attorney-client privilege after Upjohn). Moreover, should a federal court adopt
the proposal in this Article, it may affect state courts because state courts consider how
federal courts apply the corporate attorney-client privilege when making their own
determinations. Cf Judith A. McMorrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991
BYU L. REV. 959, 959-66 (arguing that persuasive federal court opinions, although not
binding on state courts, "assert a form of 'persuasive federalism"' and explaining that the
Upjohn "decision has been widely cited by state courts"). Indeed, state courts rely on
Kovel and other federal court cases applying federal attorney-client privilege law to
determine whether the privilege should apply to communications between attorneys and
third-party consultants. See, e.g., Comm'r of Revenue v. Comcast Corp., 901 N.E.2d 1185,
1198 (Mass. 2009).
292. See Rice, supra 170, at 742.
293. See supra Part II.B.3.
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the emphasis on "why an attorney was consulted, rather than with whom
the attorney communicated. ' 294 On closer examination, therefore, the
agency theory provides a useful limiting principle to prevent the over-
broad protection sometimes produced by the functional equivalents test.
As explained above, the way that courts apply functional equivalency en-
ables companies to cover third-party consultancy services with the expan-
sive protection afforded by Upjohn simply because the corporation hired
the third-party consultant instead of the attorney. This is easily avoided
by applying one agency-based standard to consultation with any external
professional specialist.2 95 Thus, any third-party consultant that is a pro-
fessional strategic consultant (for example, a PR consultant) would be
analyzed under an agency theory-even if hired by the client on an on-
going basis. A uniform standard ensures that functional equivalency can-
not increase the reach of the attorney-client privilege in this context and
that decisions do not turn on who hired the consultant.
2. A Nexus Test
As discussed above, the broadest interpretation of Kovel threatens to
protect all consultations between the lawyer and the third-party consult-
ant, and the narrowest fails to protect almost any third-party consulta-
tion. This Article recommends requiring a strong nexus between the
consultant's service and the legal advice or services ultimately provided
to the client. As a few federal courts have mandated,296 the proponent
should be required to show how the communication with the third party
was necessary or "indispensable"297 to the lawyer in providing legal ad-
vice or services.2 98 In other words, it would not be sufficient to demon-
294. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977) (making this
point in supporting the subject matter test over the control test).
295. "Specialist" refers to a third-party consultant in the traditional sense. This recom-
mendation does not impact people independently contracted to handle a corporation's in-
ternal IT department or sales force who are not strategic consultants. These types of quasi-
employees would still be analyzed under the functional equivalents test.
296. See supra note 92.
297. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (citing 8 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 2301 (1928)). Kovel indicates that to sustain a privilege an accountant must be
"necessary, or at least highly useful," for the effective consultation between the client and
the lawyer. Id. at 922.
298. Federal courts have infused a standard similar to this one in their opinions. For
example, in Haugh, the court required that proponents identify a "nexus between the con-
sultant's work and the attorney's" advice or "role in preparing [the] complaint or case...
for court." Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt., No. 02-Civ-7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586,
at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003). In Cavallaro, the First Circuit used language from Kovel
and interpreted the case as requiring that the third party be "necessary, or at least highly
useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer." Cavallaro v.
United States, 284 F.3d 236, 240 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir.
1961)). In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed To (A) Grand Jury
Witness Firm And (B) Grand Jury Witness, the court denied protection to certain commu-
nications for failure to show "a nexus sufficiently close to the provision or receipt of legal
advice." 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). In Attorney General of the United States
v. Covington & Burlington, the District Court of the District of Columbia applied a nexus
test in reverse. 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (D.D.C. 1977). It denied protection because the
firm's activities were "only tangentially related" to the legal matters. Id. Here, communi-
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strate that the consultation simply helped the attorney, but instead that it
was essential to doing something related to being a lawyer, like fine-tun-
ing a legal strategy, ensuring compliance, avoiding liability, protecting a
legal defense, administering an estate, or litigating an antitrust issue,
etc. 299 If the communication was necessary for the attorney's provision of
legal advice and services and the proponent can identify a strong nexus
between the consultancy and the attorney's role, then it should be pro-
tected.300 If the communication merely helped the company to design a
PR campaign, protection should not be afforded. 30 1 On the other hand, if
the communication helped ensure that the PR campaign did not create
legal liability, induce prosecutors to bring charges, or weaken trial de-
fenses, and it was the only way to accomplish these goals, then it should
be protected because there is a strong nexus between the consultation
and the legal advice provided. What is necessary would be proof that the
consultation-whatever type it was-served this purpose.302
To that end, under the rubric recommended in this Article, it does not
make sense to consider-as scholars and courts have-the type of service
or advice the third-party consultant provides or if they are typical or atyp-
cation is protected if the consultant's services have a nexus to or are substantially related to
the lawyer's advice. Some scholars have also analyzed application of Kovel under a similar
necessity test. See, e.g., Gertsberg, supra note 12, at 1446; Gruetzmacher, supra note 12, at
980 (asking whether attorneys need to communicate with accountants when handling com-
plex financial transactions in order to facilitate provision of legal services); Richmond,
supra note 12, at 399 (explaining that courts "confine [the attorney-client privilege in this
context] to its narrowest possible limits" and that under current doctrine, in order to be
protected, there must be "a clear nexus between the public relations consultant's work and
the attorney's role in representing the client"); Epstein supra note 28 at 217 (describing the
Kovel doctrine as protecting communications with third parties "where the communication
with the other professional ... is deemed necessary to assist the attorney better to under-
stand the facts and give a legal opinion to the client"); see also supra note 92.
299. Sexton, supra note 2, at 490 (1982) (identifying these actions as legal services).
Professor Sexton explains that, although some courts interpret the privilege to only extend
to legal advice, the privilege should and does cover legal services-that is "any action by
the attorney requiring peculiarly legal skills." Id. at 491. Defining what are "legal ser-
vices," however, is an arduous task and is not static. We are a "nimble profession." See
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 391-411, 439-66, 606-54 (2d ed.
1985). Lawyers have risen to the changing marketplace and redefined what comprises le-
gal services many times over. Daly, supra note 49, at 282 (discussing the profession's abil-
ity to change); Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction to LAWYERS' IDEALS/
LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (Robert L.
Nelson et al. eds., 1992); Sisk & Abbate, supra note 45, at 7 ("Professional services, re-
garded as non-legal only a few decades ago may be essential elements of effective legal
representation today.").
300. Some courts have attempted to apply a similar test. See, e.g., Haugh, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *8-9 (applying a similar test). See also supra note 298. The pro-
posed test is not dissimilar to "substantially related" test like that in the intermediate scru-
tiny test in constitutional law or that in Rule 1.9. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.9 (2002).
301. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326; Haugh, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *7; Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner (Calvin Klein I), 198
F.R.D. 53, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
302. See Haugh, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *7; Calvin Klein 1, 198 F.R.D. at 54-
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ical. 30 3 When an attorney consults with an accountant about a restructur-
ing, the fact that the accountant provided typical service or non-legal
advice is irrelevant. The point of the doctrine is to allow the attorney to
take into account non-legal considerations when forming legal opin-
ions. 304 Further, that attorneys alone could not have handled the matter
should not prevent establishment of a nexus.305 The agency exception
was devised because attorneys sometimes need the help of others to pro-
vide competent legal advice.
To be clear, this Article is not advocating absolute protection of all
communications between the attorney and the third-party consultants
that are necessary for the provision of legal advice. Third-party consul-
tants assist lawyers by helping them anticipate the business consequences
of their legal decisions. However, this recommendation does not extend
the privilege to all business information and advice provided to the law-
yer or associated with the lawyer's services. 30 6 The other requirements of
the attorney-client privilege apply. Namely, protection would only be
afforded to those communications that would directly or indirectly reveal
a client confidence or lawyer's legal advice. 307 There is justification for
shielding information, opinions, and advice of the expert that are based
on client confidential information because, as others have pointed out,
they provide opposing parties with "'strong clues' about the absolutely
303. Analyzing the type of service provided does make sense, however, if the court is
applying the functional equivalents exception to strategic consultants-which this Article
argues against. For example, if the consultant only provides typical consulting services,
then it may not be serving as a functional equivalent. In re Currency Conversion Fee Anti-
trust Litig., MDL No. 1409-M-21-95, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18636, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21,
2003) (applying a functional equivalents theory and finding significant that the consulting
company merely provided standard trade services). Similarly, if the consultants provide
advice, this indicates that they are not merely interpreting. United States v. Chevron Tex-
aco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (explaining that the narrow inter-
pretation of Kovel "excludes the broader scenario in which the accountant is enlisted
merely to give his or her own advice about the client's situation").
304. See supra Part II.A. Further, if the consultants provided legal advice, it would be
the unauthorized practice of law. Murphy, supra note 12, at 586.
305. Allied Irish Banks v. Bank of Am., 240 F.R.D. 96, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (concluding
that the report and all preparatory work was not motivated by pending litigation or the
need for legal advice in part because AIB could not have hired attorneys alone to handle
its problems (since its problem was also one of public perception)).
306. Thus, this recommendation is consistent with the policies behind the rejection of
an accountant-client privilege. First, it does not, as the Supreme Court was worried about,
"insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's interpretations of the client's fi-
nancial statements." United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984)
(rejecting accountant-client privilege). Second, it is not a client-consultant privilege, but
one that applies only when consultancy is necessary for the attorney to provide legal ad-
vice-and then only that information that is based on or reveals confidential client infor-
mation or legal advice is protected. Thus, the conflict that arises when accountants act as
both tax advisors and "independent attestors of financial statements" or "protectors of the
marketplace" does not exist. IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S.
Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 424 (1998) (prepared statement of Stefan Tucker) (explaining
this conflict as one between the obligation to maintain confidentiality and obligation to
disclose).




protected information. '30 8 Thus, under the proposed rubric, the external
PR consultant's notes in the drug-recall scenario would be protected to
the extent that they are based on and/or reveal the legal strategies. Obvi-
ously, if a party seeking protection cannot make the showing, all commu-
nication, including confidential information, is discoverable.
To a degree, this recommendation is simply the middle ground between
the extremes. Indeed, one of the virtues of this nexus test is that it is
consistent with the inclination of some federal courts and scholars.309
Moreover, it addresses the substantive issues with the doctrine. How-
ever, the nexus test alone leaves litigants and judges without real guide-
lines for determining if a nexus exists and if the communication was
necessary and in furtherance of legal as opposed to business advice.310
Furthermore, it may not, on its own, do enough to reign in the use of
attorneys as shields against discovery. Therefore, when analyzing
whether a nexus exists, courts should also consider the following four fac-
tors, drawn in part from the doctrine. 311
3. Four Factors
First, the court should consider whether the lawyers were skilled in the
308. Imwinkelried, supra note 10, at 28-31, 45. In his search for a solution to courts'
tendency to protect all of a non-testifying expert's information and deny the opposing
party the opportunity to depose the expert before trial, Professor Imwinkelried argues that
courts should not protect third-party consultation even when that information is derived
from and may indirectly reveal client confidences. Id. He reasons that the attorney-client
privilege is based on common law and does not have a derivative evidence component. Id.
Nonetheless, arguably it is exactly because of the derivative potential that courts have long
protected communications between attorneys and clients when they may only indirectly
reveal a client confidence. Indeed, some courts apply the privilege to a lawyer's legal ad-
vice if it is merely based on, but does not reveal, confidential information because the
confidential information, even if not directly revealed, can be derived. See, e.g., Neal, 27
F.3d at 1048; Rattner v. Netburn, No. 88-Civ-2080, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6876, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 930 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991); see
supra notes 68-69. Moreover, as Professor Imwinkelried admits, a rule that requires courts
to parse communications that were only based on client confidences from those that actu-
ally disclose them would be laborious, costly, and time consuming. Imwinkelreid, supra
note 10, at 48. Lastly, Professor Imwinkelried's point is really not that communications
between attorneys and third-party experts that indirectly reveal client confidences should
not be protected. Instead, it is that the more absolute protection of the attorney-client
privilege is not necessary because the work-product doctrine will apply. Id. at 37, 49.
However, the work-product doctrine only applies in the context of litigation and, as dis-
cussed, suffers from other inadequacies. See supra notes 147-168 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 298.
310. As discussed, determining whether a communication is in furtherance of legal as
opposed to business advice is difficult, and corporate attorneys often dispense both busi-
ness and legal advice. Solving this problem is outside the scope of this Article. That being
said, the factors are designed to aid the court in making the determination.
311. These are not the only factors relevant to determining if there is a nexus, but
courts should consider these four factors in addition to other relevant evidence. See infra
note 363. Multi-factored tests requiring analyses of a nexus between two subjects have
been introduced in other areas of law as well. For example, the Supreme Court introduced
a nexus test into patent law in 2002. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002) (explaining that the presumption of prosecution history
estoppel can be rebutted by showing that "the rationale underlying the amendment may
bear no more than a tangential relationship to the equivalent in question").
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area in which they sought expert assistance.312 If a company was consid-
ering a corporate merger, a court might not find a nexus for communica-
tions between a tax consultant and an outside law partner that has
specialized in tax and mergers and acquisitions for twenty years. Impor-
tantly, this factor is not meant to uncover abuse, but instead to help the
court determine necessity.313
Second, the court should consider the way that the communication
sought to be privileged was conducted or distributed. It is probative if
the communication or document was shared only with "top management
and any employee whose opinion would be considered by top manage-
ment before forming a decision. ''314 This is a smaller group than that
312. Courts have also considered this factor. See, e.g., Cavallaro v. United States, 284
F.3d 236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002) (taking into account that an attorney had twenty years of
experience in trusts and estates and, therefore, might not have needed advice from a tax
consultant regarding a family trust); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003
Directed To (A) Grand Jury Witness Firm And (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d
321, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (considering that the attorney did not have PR experience);
United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (con-
sidering the "significant [tax] expertise" of an in-house counsel in denying privilege protec-
tion). As stated, this recommendation does not affect other types of agents, like
secretaries or paralegals. This recommendation applies to communications with third-
party professional specialists that are consulted for their strategic, content-based expertise.
Thus, the fact that an attorney can type does not mean that he or she cannot seek the
assistance of his or her secretary in typing his or her briefs.
Some may contend that this recommendation provides incentives to lawyers to be nar-
row legal specialists. If that is the case, it is in keeping with the trend in legal practice
today. See, e.g., VIEW FROM THE Top: Q&A WITH LAW FIRM LEADERS, CHAIRMEN AND
MANAGING PARTNERS 99 (Marcy Lerner et al. eds., 2005) ("I see continuing consolidation
and a trend towards specialization in large [law] firms and also in boutique firms."); TORA
KAY BIKSON ET AL., THE LABOR MARKET FOR ATTORNEYS IN THE STATE OF CALIFOR-
NIA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 8 (2003), available at www.rand.org/pubs/monograph-
reports/2007/MR1710.pdf ("A defining feature of the legal profession is the scope of spe-
cialization within the field."). Moreover, if a lawyer becomes especially skilled in an area,
he or she may be able to competently handle the matter without sharing confidential infor-
mation with a third-party consultant also skilled in that area. Thomas D. Morgan, Eco-
nomic Reality Facing 21st Century Lawyers, 69 WASH. L. REV. 625, 635 (1994) ("The more
lawyers know about science, technology, economics, psychology, management, and other
matters affecting their clients' interests, however, the more value lawyers will be able to
add to their clients' activities."). The counter-argument, however, is that this recommenda-
tion enables or incents attorneys to be generalists. If attorneys are not specialists in an
area, then there is a higher likelihood that consultation with a third-party consultant will be
viewed as necessary by a court. Further, because the recommendation permits consulta-
tion with third-party consultants in other disciplines, it helps a lawyer provide informed
legal advice that is not detached from business concerns and is arguably more relevant to
corporate clients.
313. On these same lines, a court might also consider the capability of internal staff. Cf
In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 219-20 (S.D.N.Y 2001) (deciding exter-
nal PR consultants were functional equivalents because, inter alia, internal PR resources
were "insufficient"); Richmond, supra note 12, at 399 (explaining that based on doctrine,
the privilege "is more likely to attach where a client does not have in-house public rela-
tions capabilities"). That is, if the company has an internal PR group, this may negate the
necessity of talking with an external PR consultant. However, those in favor of outsourc-
ing argue that outside consultants do not replace but instead compliment and help train
internal staff. Rosen, supra note 28, at 648.
314. Hayes v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 752 N.E. 2d 470, 473 (I11. App. Ct.
2001) (describing a similar test for the control group test); Sexton, supra note 2, at 503-04
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traditionally covered by the Supreme Court's broad Upjohn decision.315
Limiting the distribution in this manner helps show that the communica-
tion was primarily in furtherance of legal advice and not to protect un-
privileged information from discovery. 316 As one court explained, it also
helps ensure that "the mere receipt of routine reports by the corpora-
tion's counsel will not make the communication privileged. '317 Courts
should also consider the form of the communication and whether the sub-
stance was communicated by other methods to non-lawyer corporate em-
ployees. In the drug-recall scenario, the fact that the trials were
previously distributed to others in the same form suggests that perhaps
the client was not seeking legal advice from the lawyer about the trials
themselves. On the other hand, evidence that other methods were used
supports the contention that the attorney was involved to secure legal
services and not to shelter otherwise discoverable information.318 In the
drug-recall hypothetical, the external PR consultant provided a document
to the lawyers that presented PR advice based on potential litigation
strategies. The lawyers used this information to provide legal advice to
(recommending that confidentiality be preserved "where the attorney shares the informa-
tion with those empowered to make legal decisions for the corporation").
315. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). Upjohn required that com-
munications be kept "highly confidential," which as discussed, supra in note 66, has been
interpreted as a fairly broad "need to know" standard. See, e.g., FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline,
294 F.3d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("The Company's burden is to show that it limited its
dissemination of the documents in keeping with their asserted confidentiality, not to justify
each determination that a particular employee should have access to the information
therein.").
316. The Supreme Court's concern that the control group "frustrates the very purpose
of the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees
of the client to attorneys" is absent here because this recommendation is about lawyers
communicating with third-party specialists. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392. Professor Lonnie T.
Brown recommends that courts adopt a similar approach to attorney-client privilege law in
general. Brown, supra note 63, at 953 (defining the "control group" based on Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 4.3 because it is "as close as possible to articulating a true corpo-
rate analog for the individual client paradigm"). He argues that using this control group
"narrow[s] the scope of the corporate attorney-client privilege so as to protect the sort of
information that the privilege was originally designed to cover, as well as that which corpo-
rations desire most to be kept confidential, such as legal advice from counsel or incriminat-
ing communications from senior management to corporate counsel." Id. at 907. Paul Rice,
however, argues that the presence or absence of confidentiality does not further or detract
from the purpose of the attorney-client privilege, and that it is inefficient to inquire into
whether distribution was appropriate. Paul Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding
Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L. 853, 888, 890 (1998). He
proposes that the confidentiality component to the attorney-client privilege be abolished
in favor of a standard that protects all communications between attorneys and clients re-
gardless of third parties as long as the court determines that the communication was made
in good faith and that it is fair to the parties to protect it. Id. at 888, 893. This proposal,
however, is problematic. First, it greatly expands the privilege. Any third party privy to
attorney-client communications could not be compelled to reveal the communication.
Second, it enables litigants to pierce the attorney-client privilege based on an equity analy-
sis, which makes protection even more equivocal and likely affects behavior ex ante.
317. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977).
318. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 211 F.R.D. 249, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (considering
this factor in the context of internal employees); cf. In re Air Crash Disaster, 133 F.R.D.
515, 519-20 (N.D. I11. 1990) ("If the lawyer is acting merely as a custodian, for example,
there is no privilege attached to the communication.").
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the client. Assuming the PR document was not mass distributed, there is
less worry about the potential for abuse than if the general counsel had
simply distributed the document as "the" legal advice.
Third, the court should consider, as some courts do, whether there is
"contemporaneous documentary proof supporting [either party's] inter-
pretation of the facts. ' 319 For example, the consultation should relate to
the consultant's specialty and contract. 320 If an accountant provides ad-
vice to the lawyer about the accountant's former client to aid in litigation
against the former client, such communication should not be protected.
Further, although form should not be elevated over substance, the fact
that the lawyer is present at the meeting,321 that the document specifically
requests legal advice, 322 that there is a separate bill or retainer agreement
for the project, or that there is an already existing lawsuit on the mat-
ter323 support the proponent's nexus contention.324 Admittedly, this fac-
tor is extremely fungible. 325 However, requiring attorneys to formalize
the relationship in some way raises consciousness around the privilege
and its parameters. It requires attorneys to be cognizant of and more
diligent about the decision to share confidential information with third-
319. United States v. Adlman (Adlman 1), 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995).
320. This ensures that ordinary fact witnesses are not designated consultants in order to
garner shelter. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text for more discussion. Alex-
ander, supra note 14, at 321 n.433 (critiquing a case because it enabled parties to "convert
mere witnesses into sources of privileged information simply by designating them litigation
consultants"). Although it has not been followed by all courts, Upjohn requires this type
of connection for employees. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95 (requiring that "communications
concerned matters within the scope of the employees' corporate duties"); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam). The old sub-
ject matter test also required this type of connection. Diversified Indus., Inc., 572 F.2d at
609 (explaining that such limits prevent protection to any employee that "functions merely
as a fortuitous witness").
321. But see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed To (A) Grand
Jury Witness Firm And (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(announcing that privilege could extend to communications between a client and a third
party without the presence of an attorney if directed by attorney). See infra note 329 and
accompanying text.
322. Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 144 (D. Del. 1977) ("It is not
essential, however, that the request for advice be express. Client communications intended
to keep the attorney apprised of continuing business developments, with an implied re-
quest for legal advice based thereon, or self-initiated attorney communications intended to
keep the client posted on legal developments and implications may also be protected.").
323. Arguably, this factor would also help prove work-product protection. As dis-
cussed above, however, because the work-product doctrine is distinct from the attor-
ney-client privilege, there are situations where attorney-client privilege protection would
be sought in addition to or in lieu of work-product protection. See supra Part II.D.
324. Cf United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495,1500 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting attor-
ney-client privilege protection based, in part, on the fact that the client's billing statements
did not separate the accountant consultant's work done to help the lawyer from other
accounting and advisory work provided by the accountant to the client generally).
325. Application of this factor may result in manipulation like that described below in
note 332. However, this is generally true of formal requirements. Moreover, there is a cost
to manipulation. It requires multiple people to evade the law, which makes it more likely
that someone will refuse to cooperate or blow the whistle. Finally, this factor is one of




party consultants and to delineate when they are wearing their legal
hat.32
6
Last, a court should consider the substance of the law involved. If the
legal issue implicates a great deal of facts or is very complex and hinges
on highly specialized knowledge (like corporate securities laws), this may
support necessity. 32 7 Additionally, if the cause of action is bound up in
the type of services provided by the consultant, this may support a nexus
argument. For example, a nexus between consultation with a PR execu-
tive and the provision of legal advice is more substantiated if the case is
one of defamation, libel, or slander than one seeking damages for failure
to comply with the Consumer's Legal Remedies Act.32
8
As long as the litigants know beforehand that the presence of these
issues will support a nexus, there is no inequity. Importantly, their ab-
sence does not necessarily indicate lack of nexus. For example, requests
for legal advice can be implied, and one can imagine circumstances where
the lawyer would direct the client to relay information directly to the
third-party consultant and not see the need to be present (or bill the cli-
ent for the time).329
Courts have considered a few factors in the past that this Article con-
tends should not be considered because they serve as artificial distinc-
tions. For example, that there is a prior consulting relationship between
the client and the third-party consultant should not be a factor for or
against a nexus. 330 It is precisely because of the prior or existing relation-
326. Other scholars have recommended that attorneys take formal steps to preserve
confidentiality and the privilege. See, e.g., Chambliss, supra note 54, at 1732 (recom-
mending that firm counsel "bill the firm for time spent on in-house advising" to "under-
score [the] separation and the firm's identity as the client" and to preserve privilege when
relying on in-house law firm counsel).
327. This is similar to the agency theory's original justification. See supra notes 74-76
and accompanying text.
328. Moses, supra note 15, at 1836 n.134 ("Libel is an area in which legal spin control
may be the basis of the entire case. Libel cases are about damage to public image; the case
itself may be designed to resurrect the image of the plaintiff in the public eye. Any way to
get the press to pay attention to the plaintiff's position arguably advances the goals of the
client.").
329. See supra note 321; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003 Directed
To (A) Grand Jury Witness Firm And (B) Grand Jury Witness, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 331
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (protecting communications between client and PR firm when a lawyer
was not present as long as the lawyer directed the client to reveal confidential information
to PR the consultant and it was for purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer); see
also United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (explaining that a lawyer's
physical presence is not necessary); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038,
1048 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[T]here can be no more virtue in requiring the lawyer to sit by
while the client pursues these possibly tedious preliminary conversations with the account-
ant than in insisting on the lawyer's presence while the client dictates a statement to the
lawyer's secretary .... ").
330. But see United States v. Adlman (AdIman 1), 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 n.1 (2d Cir. 1995)
(emphasizing the prior consulting relationship with client); Cavallaro v. United States, 284
F.3d 236, 249 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[W]hen a party hires an accountant to provide accounting
advice, and only later hires an attorney to provide legal advice, it is particularly important
for the party to show that the accountant later acted as an agent necessary to the lawyer in
providing legal advice.").
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ship that the consultant's advice may be valuable. Moreover, the commu-
nication should be no less protected simply because the client or in-house
attorney, rather than the outside attorney, hires the consultant. 331 Today,
the general counsel is generally the hub of any legal controversy and is in
charge of the outsourcing decisions. Considering who hires the consult-
ant or whether there was a prior consultant relationship puts form over
substance.332 Additionally, it negates the purpose of the third-party at-
torney-client privilege doctrine, which is to protect communications that
are necessary to the lawyer's ability to render legal services (and that
directly or indirectly reveal a client confidence or legal advice) regardless
of the formal relationship to the client. 333
Lastly, the judge need not attempt to determine if the communication
would not have occurred but for the client's need for legal advice or legal
services. 334 Although a positive answer to this question is fairly strong
support for the nexus, it is problematic. As Federal Rule of Evidence 501
urges, the privilege should be interpreted "in light of reason and experi-
ence. ' 335 Large corporations conduct business by multidisciplinary teams
made up of internal and external consultants. 336 These teams meet for
multiple purposes that intertwine. Legal risks often cannot be under-
stood independent of business risks. 337 Thus, in many circumstances it
would be next to impossible to determine if the communication would
331. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. at 325-26. See also Cavallaro, 284 F.3d
at 331 (explaining that communications would not be privileged if the PR firm had been
hired by the client directly and acknowledging the "artificiality" of this distinction in order
protect "effective operation of the privilege"); Gruetzmacher, supra note 12, at 989 (ex-
plaining that cases that require a consultant to be hired by a law firm or a client to hire a
law firm first "epitomize form over substance, and have done nothing but create uncer-
tainty and confusion in an area of the law in which certainty is crucial").
332. Indeed, many of the interviewees mentioned that, although the general counsel
was the ultimate hiring manager, the lawyers structure it so that the outside law firm hires
the external consultant to try to ensure privilege protection. See, e.g., Interview with Gen-
eral Counsel #2, supra note 157 (explaining that the law firm formally hires the external
consultant and attempts to put in the "right" contract language to garner privilege protec-
tion); Interview with PR Executive #50, at 4 (April 7, 2008) (on file with author) ("Some-
times, more than sometimes, we will be retained by outside council in order to protect
privilege. But in most of those cases, well, our contracts with the outside council, the con-
tract will stipulate that the cost will be borne directly by the client.").
333. Chore-Time Equip., Inc. v. Big Dutchman, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (W.D.
Mich. 1966) ("The admission of non-lawyers into the field of patent practice is not a suffi-
cient reason 'for breaking down well recognized and soundly based rules affecting the
claim of privilege."' (quoting Ellis-Foster Co. v. Union Caride & Carbon Corp., 159 F.
Supp. 917, 920 (D.N.J. 1958))).
334. See, e.g., First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)("[C]laimant must demonstrate that the communication would not have been made but for
the pursuit of legal services." (quoting Sexton, supra note 2, at 492)); see also, United
States v. Adlman (AdIman I), 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) (recommending a "but-
for" and "because of' test in the work-product doctrine context); Sexton, supra note 2, at
459, 490.
335. FED. R. EVID. 501.
336. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
337. Rosen, supra note 28, at 659.
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not have occurred but for the need for legal advice. 338 The nexus test
avoids such problems of proof. Consider the drug-recall scenario. That
the attorney needed the input from the PR consultants in order to pro-
vide the effective legal services is more than plausible, 339 but there was
also a business need.340
B. ANALYSIS
The following section analyzes this Article's recommendations based
on those first principles identified above.
1. Zone of Secrecy and Corporate Misconduct
Critics of the corporate attorney-client privilege in general, and specifi-
cally of its application to third-party consultants, contend that "corpora-
tions will attempt to funnel [more] corporate communications through
their attorneys in order to prevent subsequent disclosure. ' 341 This risk
likely grows with the scope of the doctrine. Further, scholars argue that
when corporations know that something will not be discoverable, they are
more likely to misbehave. 342 These concerns are valid. The public could
end up with less information or worse, it could be misled-as it may have
been by tobacco companies.3 43 Admittedly, protection of consultation
with third parties as recommended in this Article's proposal might cover
up matter that would have been discoverable under a narrow Kovel the-
ory.344 For example, it would likely protect the notes taken by the PR
consultant in the drug-recall scenario while the narrow interpretation of
Kovel would not. Hypothetically, it might also protect discrete scientific
studies conducted at the behest of lawyers to determine if current product
label disclosure is adequate (presuming the results disclose confidential
338. Sexton, supra note 2, at 492 ("[D]ifficulties of proof [are] associated with any dem-
onstration of subjective motivation .. "). Professor Sexton believes that corporate em-
ployees should not "have to demonstrate that the communication would not have been
made but for the existence of the privilege" because of the inherent problems of proof
associated. Id. at 492. Still, he argues that in order for the corporate attorney-client privi-
lege to apply, Upjohn requires that the communication to the attorney would not have
been made but for the contemplation of legal services. Id. More analysis needs to be done,
however, to determine whether these same problems of proof occur with this "but for" test
as with the one he argues against.
339. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
340. In the work-product context, this same type of test proves malleable and unpre-
dictable. See supra Part II.D.
341. In re Feldberg, 867 F.2d 622, 627 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Litigants may use secrecy to
cover up machinations, to get around the law .. "); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977).
342. See supra note 241.
343. See supra note 15.
344. It is difficult to quantify the impact of this recommendation since application var-
ies. As mentioned supra, courts within the same district have applied a narrow and broad
standard. Moreover, some courts that apply the narrow standard find that it covers third-
party consultation even when the third party does more than translate. See supra note 91.
My standard protects any communication that would be protected under the narrowest
interpretation of Kovel.
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client communication and/or legal advice). 345 Importantly, this test is not
as inclusive as the broadest interpretations of Kovel because the propo-
nent has to show not just that the communication was in furtherance of
legal services, but that it was necessary for them. Further, it constricts the
availability of blanket protection in those situations where third-party
consultants, like those in the drug-recall scenario, might be deemed func-
tional equivalents346 because it does away with the functional equivalents
test for third-party strategic consultants. Because it is narrower than the
broad approach, it may discourage the type of aggressive interpretation
to the attorney-client privilege applied by the tobacco lawyers.347
As discussed, under the narrowest interpretation of Kovel, none of the
communications in the drug-recall scenario would be protected, but
under the broadest interpretations of Kovel or the functional equivalents
test, all of them could be. Under the multifactored nexus test, neither
would be the case. The documents detailing the external PR executive's
recommendation on the best media response would not be protected be-
cause they were not necessary for the lawyer to provide legal advice. The
clinical trials conducted by the external scientists would also not be pro-
tected. Although understanding the drug's side effects is nice to know,
and the lawyer is likely not a trained scientist, it does not appear that the
studies were conducted so that the attorney could provide legal advice
back to the client. 348 Instead, it seems they were originally conducted to
determine the drug's efficacy and were not sent to the lawyer for legal
advice. Moreover, they may have been distributed to more than just
those employees able to impact the decision-making.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Upjohn, "[t]he privilege only pro-
tects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the
underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney. '349 Thus,
plaintiffs in many cases will not end up having less access to the informa-
tion they need to bring suit. They simply will not be able to use the de-
fendant's own words to prove what they should otherwise be able to
345. Preexisting documents are not subject to attorney-client privilege protection.
Brown, supra note 63, at 916. Therefore, if studies were already done and ordered for
business purposes, the corporation cannot protect them by sending them to the attorney.
They are only coverable if the attorney requests them in order to provide legal advice.
Further, the underlying facts or results of the study are discoverable by other means. Id.
346. Courts have found external PR consultants, like the one in the drug-recall scena-
rio, to be functional equivalents. See supra Part II.B.2 and notes 248-250.
347. See supra note 242.
348. Cf. Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 177 F.R.D. 491, 497 (D. Kan. 1997)
(denying privilege because the party did "not point to any specific ... that the documents
were created to give legal advice instead of for general business purposes, nor [that] the
documents themselves evidence the necessary link").
349. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981); H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v.
William Carter Co., No. 95-Civ-1274, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6578, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. May
16, 1995) ("An attorney may not be compelled to disclose communications made to him or
her by a client, even where those communications contain purely factual material. Nor
may an attorney be compelled to disclose facts that he or she learns from a client. The
client, on the other hand, may be required to disclose the underlying facts (although not
the communications to counsel).").
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establish by discovery. The facts are discoverable by other means. 350 As
the Eighth Circuit explained, when litigants fail to learn that which is
privileged, it is often "simply due to their own failure to ask the proper
questions. ' 351
2. Compliance, Informed Decision-Making, and the Spirit of the
Doctrine
Admittedly, as compared to the narrow approach, the recommended
approach presents a cost to the public's access to information. But shield-
ing this information promotes compliance and informed decision-making
in the same way that protecting attorney-led internal investigations does.
That is, an attorney may be better able to investigate whether a corpora-
tion is complying with trading laws with the help of an external financial
consultant. Or, armed with the information that a PR executive can pro-
vide about the potential spin of a legal course of action, a lawyer may be
better able to counsel the client against doing something that is techni-
cally legal, but risky.352
However, the recommended approach is less expansive than the broad
approach to the agency exception and the functional equivalents test. It
requires that the consultation be necessary to the provision of legal ser-
vices, which is in sync with the spirit of Kovel, the original decision that
provided an exception to the waiver for third-party consultation. This is
likely why some courts and scholars infuse necessity into the standard.353
Given that this approach requires necessity and an analysis of four fac-
tors, it might reduce corporations' and lawyers' use of external consul-
tants as compared to the broad approach. Because protection will be
lost, attorneys will abstain if they do not believe that the communication
is necessary to render legal services. This lack of certainty may, there-
fore, "chill" consultation. Arguably, however, it does so in a way that
comports with the spirit of the doctrine. Attorneys will only seek the
help of third-party consultants when they really, really need it-as op-
posed to when they think it just might maybe help them somehow.354 So,
for example, in the drug-recall scenario, had the lawyer already decided
to pull the drug, admit responsibility, and preemptively settle the cases,
but wanted to know how the external PR consultants would handle the
PR, he or she would abstain from candid, open consultation with the ex-
ternal PR consultant. John E. Sexton argues against necessity tests in the
employee context because of this chilling effect.355 Here, however, the
350. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
351. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 941 (8th Cir. 1994).
352. See Beardslee, Advocacy Part I, supra note 6, at 45-46.
353. See supra note 298.
354. Cf Sexton, supra note 2, at 495 (arguing that communications with employees
should be privileged when the employees "reasonably could have believed ... that the
content of the communication related to the legal services").
355. Cf id. at 482 ("[A]n inability to forecast accurately whether a claim of privilege
will be recognized by courts will chill communications."); id. at 495.
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party required to determine whether the communication is important to
legal services is the attorney-not the client. Significantly, the chill is not
as disconcerting in this context because it is one step removed from the
attorney-client privilege sweet spot, that is, communication between at-
torney and client.356 While this test may force attorneys to make the ne-
cessity calculation before they can really know the answer (a classic
chicken-egg problem), attorneys can (and already do) consult with exter-
nal third parties hypothetically-without discussing information they
want to remain privileged.357 This is not the ideal way to consult with a
third-party specialist, but it is sufficient in those situations where the at-
torney suspects that consultation would waive the privilege.
Moreover, corporations will arguably still hire external consultants.
The difference will be that corporate employees will only share confiden-
tial information with them when the attorney believes it is necessary for
competent legal advice or when the client believes it is worth the risk
regardless. 358 That said, given that this proposal does away with the func-
tional equivalents exception for strategic consultants, corporations' pro-
pensity to treat external consultants like internal employees may be
reduced. However, this may enable third-party consultants to perform an
informal regulatory function for the corporation. As discussed, third-
party consultants on internal crisis teams may serve a gatekeeping role.359
Arguably, the less these consultants are treated like and feel like regular
employees, the lower the risk that they will become less objective and the
higher the odds they will be able to play that gatekeeping role.360
3. Predictability/Clarity
Given that the multifactored nexus test utilizes one standard, it is more
predictable than the current doctrine (which incorporates three standards
with varying interpretations). That said, the proposed multifactored
356. Third-party consultants that might have been deemed functional equivalents of the
client are not "real" employees of the client. See discussion supra Parts II.B.3. Therefore,
this test does not chill communications between client and attorney.
357. Many of the general counsel interviewees that were so concerned about protection
of the privilege mentioned that they tried to limit exposure of client secrets by speaking to
the external PR consultants hypothetically.
358. Just as attorneys warn corporate clients that they represent the corporate entity
and not the officers or employees, they should also warn the client of the risks associated
with consulting candidly with third-party consultants. Bruce A. Green, Interviewing Cor-
porate Client Officers and Employees: Ethical Considerations, PROF'L LIAB. LITIG. ALERT,
Winter 2005, at 1, 3 (noting that lawyers should and do provide these types of warnings);
see supra note 190.
359. See supra notes 225, CITE ID="_REF212533028">-263 and accompanying text.
360. The importance of gatekeepers in today's legal corporate environment can not be
over emphasized. See supra note 224. As Milton Regan explains, law firms are driven by
the market and, therefore, external lawyers may be "both less willing and less able to insist
that corporate clients give weight to interests beyond those of shareholder wealth max-
imization." Regan, supra note 15, at 938; cf David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Law-
yers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 871 (1992) ("Because of the financial and other rewards of a
'cutting edge' corporate legal practice, the fear of liability in this context is not sufficient to
deter even clearly questionable conduct, let alone legitimate advice that might be made to
appear questionable after the fact.").
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nexus test is not nearly as predictable as a bright-line rule or a very nar-
row or very broad interpretation of Kovel.361 Moreover, it entails trans-
action costs. 362 However, this Article contends that the recommended
multifactored nexus test lends sufficient clarity and consistency to the
process in a way that maximizes the other, arguably more important, nor-
mative criteria.
First, it is not a naked standard. It includes four factors that harness
the analysis. 363 Second, although there is a need for more certainty than
that provided by the current regime, attorneys work within a probabilistic
universe. 364 Therefore, the level of certainty required in order to enable
external consultation may be less than that provided by a bright-line rule.
As Professor Timothy Glynn argues, "the level of certainty required" for
the privilege to promote candor and communication "most likely varies
by client and circumstance. '365 Based on preliminary findings from the
PR Study, it appears that in this context, the possibility of coverage is
quite different than the complete absence of it. And the decision to share
information is a calculated risk. 366 Thus, although attorneys claim they
will abstain from consultation if they know their communications will not
be protected (as under the narrow theory), they do not need definitive
protection to justify consultation with third-party consultants. 367
361. There are obviously costs associated with taking into account the context sur-
rounding the communications. Cf Wilkins, supra note 360, at 878 (explaining that
"[d]etermining contextual differences takes time and can lead to the point where it be-
comes necessary to treat every case as unique"). However, these costs exist currently
under any interpretation of the exceptions and are arguably streamlined with this
recommendation.
362. In addition to costs associated with administering the test in court, there will be
costs associated with putting together privilege logs. However, many courts already re-
quire particularized privilege logs. See, e.g., FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 145
(D.C. Cir. 2002). Moreover, knowing the standard and factors that will be considered by a
court may induce attorneys to keep more careful records of communications as a matter of
due course, which is something they may not do if the rule is extremely vague or narrow.
See supra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
363. My recommendation harnesses the range of what David B. Wilkins refers to as
"substantive tilt." Wilkins, supra note 360, at 811; supra note 287. The factors work to
some extent like rules in that they "allocate the limited decisional resources of individual
decision-makers, focusing their concentration on the presence or absence of some facts and
allowing them to 'relax' with respect to others." Schauer, supra note 287, at 146.
364. Also, they understand that the facts of the controversy are likely to be exposed.
Interview with General Counsel #60, at 28 (July 23, 2007) (on file with author). ("In to-
day's environment, you know, with an employee population of young bright enlightened
individuals, it's a rare person who believes that a corporation can keep a secret especially if
its got some community or regulatory impact").
365. Glynn, supra note 14, at 82.
366. Interview with Law Firm Partner #55, supra note 33, at 18 ("It's all a balance of the
risks.").
367. Interview with General Counsel #2, supra note 157, at 20-23 (explaining that he is
"more frank in his conversations because of the possibility of coverage" but that there
would be less communication and a larger wall between PR and Legal without the possibil-
ity of coverage). A minority of interviewees mentioned that, although they try to preserve
the privilege, attorneys are sometimes willing to take the risk of exposure in order to get
the external advice. Interview with General Counsel #17, at 40 (Feb. 6, 2007) (on file with
author); Interview with General Counsel #27, at 9 (Feb. 26, 2008) (on file with author)
("It's difficult to speak in generalities, but I would say that although it's important to pro-
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Third, in addition to adding some clarity that informs behavior ex ante,
this proposal also informs behavior post hoc. Litigants know what type of
proof to submit to support a claim of privilege, which may decrease frivo-
lous claims. And courts know which factors are important to the analysis.
As such, the multifactored nexus test will lead to better analyzed opinions
because it centers the inquiry on the type of service the attorney provides,
as opposed to that provided by the third party.368 And it streamlines the
analysis. Although many judges write as if there is only one standard,
they often spend time justifying the standard they apply.369 Under the
multifactored nexus test, the court will not waste energy justifying the
theory it applies. Third, although this test does not specifically delineate
legal from business advice-a likely impossible task37 0-it provides some
factors to inform the determination and it forces the litigants and judges
to be more particular-a rigor currently absent from the analysis. Thus,
it prevents judges from hanging their hat on one factor, as they some-
times do.371 In those instances, the nexus test may not change the end
result, but it would change the quality and depth of analysis. In addition
to considering formal documents, courts still have to consider the sub-
stance of and the circumstances surrounding the actual communications.
They have to dig into the facts of the case-which is exactly how the
attorney-client privilege should be decided-case by case.372 Therefore,
a court will still be able to deny protection if it suspects that attorneys are
acting as mules to protect what should be discoverable. Thus, although
clarity and predictability are of concern and any recommendation should
strive to increase these dimensions, as this one does, analysis of the attor-
tect the privilege that's not always the driving factor in terms of how you go about things.
There are other considerations."); Interview with Law Firm Partner #40, supra note 60, at
19 (explaining that sometimes "it's more important to get good PR legal advice coordi-
nated and privilege be damned."). However, even in these situations, there exists the pos-
sibility of coverage.
368. Analyses that deny protection because the consultant failed to provide legal advice
or special consultancy advice would not occur. See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying
text.
369. See, e.g., Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors to Tri-State Outdoor Media Group, Inc., 283 B.R. 358, 362 (2002) (focusing the
discussion on Kovel and its progeny and distinguishing Ackert to justify protecting commu-
nications between the law firm and the financial consultant hired by the law firm to help
negotiate the financial restructuring).
370. Indeed, as a profession we lack consensus on what are "full and complete legal
services," "good decision making," and "legal advice." Therefore, this recommendation
unavoidably suffers from some of the same problems associated with the attorney-client
privilege in general. The hope is that it will limit the number of times that the privilege is
wholly lost by lawyers seeking help from business consultants when it is necessary to pro-
vide fully informed, integrated, legal services to the client.
371. In Tri-State, the law firm hired a financial consultant to help negotiate its financial
restructuring. Tri-State, 283 B.R. at 361. The court decided the attorney-client privilege
protected communications between the lawyer and the financial consultant based on one
factor, the engagement letter. Id. at 363 (finding that work-product protection applied but
was ultimately waived because the consultant was a testifying expert witness).
372. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1963) (explain-




ney-client privilege has always been and should remain intimately tied to
the facts of each case.
4. Other Considerations
Likely, those most opposed to this Article's proposal will question why
corporations should not have to shoulder the costs of third-party consul-
tation, that is, the risk of reduced privilege protection. They will ask why
the attorney-client privilege should change to accommodate corpora-
tions' business needs,373 why attorneys should be encouraged to incorpo-
rate non-legal considerations in the provision of legal advice. The answer
to these questions is three-fold. First, under this Article's recommenda-
tions, corporations do have to shoulder the cost to a degree. If they want
the most protection possible, they have to tighten their "porous borders,"
that is, they have to hire the third-party consultant as an employee. 374
They can no longer rely on the functional equivalents test for shelter.
Second, as discussed, external consultants may actually play a role in
identifying and managing risks for corporations that lawyers may not.375
If the point of reference is malfeasant corporate directors, then third-
party consultants may be seen as "aiders and abettors." On the other
hand, if the assumption is that the corporate directors desire to comply
with the law, protecting some communications between lawyers and
third-party consultants is more palatable.376 Third, if it is true that law-
yers can sometimes provide better legal advice to their clients with open
third-party consultation, protecting such communication serves the inter-
ests not only of clients, but also the public and the legal profession. As
discussed earlier, in order to stay relevant and continue to add value to
clients, lawyers need to approach problems holistically. 377
373. For an argument that the corporate attorney-client privilege should expand as the
scope of legal practice expands and should protect non-legal components of attorney com-
munications that are intertwined with communications made primarily to attain legal ad-
vice, see generally Sisk & Abbate, supra note 45.
374. Admittedly, this may disadvantage those corporations that are smaller and cannot
afford to have internal staff on the matter. That said, this would arguably support the
attorneys' contention that the communication with the external consultant was necessary.
See supra note 250.
375. See supra notes 225, 262-263 and accompanying text.
376. The general counsels in the PR Study often asserted that they and their clients
tried to comply with the law even if there was little risk. See, e.g., Interview with General
Counsel #42, supra note 50 ("Because day-to-day we try to comply with the law. As a
general counsel of this company I was always involved in important disclosures to the mar-
kets because it's my lawyers' job to make sure that the statement is as clear and as accurate
and balanced for investors as possibly it can be. So, one input is sort of, are we doing this
the way SEC structured and unstructured disclosure would have us do it. We try to comply
with the law not just because we could get sued if we don't. My client[s] say to me, use this
disclosure consistent with your understanding of the securities law. So, that's what in-
house lawyers do all the time."); see supra note 224.
377. See supra Parts I and II.C and note 299. Arguably, this is also important for attor-
neys' livelihood. Sisk & Abbate, supra note 45, at 21 ("Appreciating the attorney-client
privilege as dynamic in nature requires that we open our eyes to the changes in the services
provided by lawyers as part of legal representation in today's society."). Some might con-
tend that this proposal increases the power and influence of the general counsel because
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Although this Article's proposal does not perform better on all criteria
as compared to a very broad or very narrow approach, it performs overall
as well or better on most. Although still subject to interpretation, which
might produce varying results, the multifactored nexus test recommended
in this Article will provide slightly more predictable protection to third-
party consultation in a way that balances the search for truth with the
need for confidential communications between attorneys and third-party
consultants. Unlike the narrow approach, the nexus test embraces the
role third-party consultation plays in the provision of legal advice to large
corporations. Unlike the broad approaches, it prevents the ease with
which corporations can funnel communications unrelated to legal services
through attorneys for protection. Last, this test encourages better, more
streamlined analysis. Even if reform fails to change the quality of analy-
sis, a set of norms will be elaborated by common law to guide attorneys'
interactions with third-party consultants. 37 8
CONCLUSION
In today's increasingly complex and regulated marketplace, corpora-
tions rely on third-party consultants to conduct business. Therefore, at-
torneys sometimes have to consult openly with these third-party
consultants in order to provide fully informed, competent legal advice
and services to their corporate clients. The primary thesis of this Article
is that there should be privilege protection for some exchanges between
attorneys and third-party consultants. The secondary thesis is that, as a
means to that end, the attorney-client privilege doctrine ought be revised
so that it protects these exchanges when they are truly necessary but does
not create a huge zone of secrecy against discovery. Therefore, this Arti-
cle makes some specific recommendations as to how the attorney-client
privilege could be modified to achieve this end. However, there are
likely other adequate means to achieve the same result.379 For example,
the general counsel is the one who decides when it is necessary to talk to external consul-
tants. However, under both the broad and narrow approaches that exist today, it is the
attorneys that decide when outside consultation is necessary for the provision of legal ad-
vice. Moreover, corporations will still have business reasons to seek outside experts.
378. Cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 771 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (arguing for a nexus test over a bright line rule in the context of 10-b5 claims
and explaining that "[s]ensible standards of proof and of demonstrable damages would
evolve and serve to protect the worthy and shut out the frivolous"). One question left
unaddressed is how this recommendation will be implemented. One possibility is that an
appellate level court or even the Supreme Court, when presented with the appropriate
case, will decide to enact changes to the doctrine similar to those proposed here. The other
option is change by legislation.
379. Because the attorney-client privilege is an exception to the general rule that all
information should be discoverable and was originally confined to communications be-
tween attorney and client, some readers might find it difficult to characterize communica-
tions between lawyers, clients, and third-party consultants as attorney-client




the work-product doctrine could be expanded to cover communications
between lawyers and third-party consultants irrespective of the prospect
or the existence of litigation. 380 What is important is that the right result
is achieved. This Article has argued that the right result will flow from a
solution that seeks to increase deterrence, decrease a zone of secrecy,
enable informed decision making, increase compliance, comport with the
spirit of the privilege doctrine, and provide increased clarity over the cur-
rent regime. However, even if there is disagreement as to the importance
of these dimensions, there is still value to this exercise. The issues ad-
dressed in this Article are connected to larger questions facing the legal
profession today such as: What comprises full and complete legal ser-
vices? How should the distinction between law and business be made?
What is the value of the attorney-client privilege given the work-product
doctrine? And should the corporate attorney-client privilege grow with
corporate practice? Moreover, at the very least, this Article identifies
issues with the current doctrine. The hope is that it will encourage fur-
ther discussion and change.
380. California has expanded the work-product doctrine to unconditionally cover at-
torneys' "impressions, conclusions, [and] opinions," but this expansion only applies to writ-
ten materials and only applies to attorneys' work product. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE
§ 2018.030 (West 2007) ("A writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal research or theories is not discoverable under any circumstances.");
Rumac, Inc. v. Bottomley, 143 Cal. App. 3d 810, 813 (1983) ("There is also no valid reason
to differentiate between the writings reflecting the private thought processes of a lawyer
acting on behalf of a client at the beginning of a business deal and the thoughts of a lawyer
when that business deal goes sour with resultant litigation."); Williamson v. Superior Court
of L.A. County, 582 P.2d 126, 129 (1978) ("Accordingly, [the California Code of Civil
Procedure] affords a conditional or qualified protection for work product generally, and an
absolute protection as to an attorney's impressions and conclusions.").
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